

Radovan Vukadinovic*

South East Europe and European Security Architecture

Introduction

Ever since their creation, the states in this area were experiencing problems with their security. They were feeling the rivalry existing between great powers, they were exposed to their political manipulation and were used as little powers in great games. At the same time, these countries were seeking foot-hold in alliances with great powers,

* *Radovan Vukadinovic; Professor of International relations and Director of Graduate Programme in International Relations, Zagreb's University*

which, in most cases, never worked. The mechanisms and institutions of the international relations that should be leading to security, such as balance of power in international relations, diplomacy, or creation of alliances, did not bear positive results. On the other hand, all of these states were too weak to even consider some sorts of their own models of security, built by themselves, that would enable them to counter the external powers.

1. Security in the South East Europe

Security is widely debated and contested concept in international relations. As Bull provides "Security in international politics means no more than safety, either objective safety, safety which actually exists or subjective safety, that which is felt or experienced".¹ Coming from rather traditional explanation of security, which usually was connected with military threats to states and was leading to the war, in the case of recent Balkan development we could start with the war as a highest threat but also expanding the concept. New elements of security should be included: economic, political, social and environmental, which are representing nowadays new issues in the concept of security.²

Starting with a term internal security, which has a meaning in the frames of one state, one could go further looking for a wider elaboration: regional security. The concept which started to be used very widely is: co-operative security, which is combining in itself process of peaceful reconciliation, building first elements of regional co-operation and as a result of all these combined activities a basis for a stable security could be created.

Defining the area of South East Europe or Balkans geographically one could start with geographic division of the area made by Magocsi,³ who is making regional borders on the basis of major river ways. Starting from the premise of defining regions and rivers as boundary lines Magocsi introduces three European zones: northern, Alps-Carpathian and Balkans. In his interpretation Balkan area is bound by the Sava-Danube demarcation line in the north, stretching to the south to the Mediterranean-Aegean seas. The Balkans consists of: Croatia (south of the Kupa-Sava demarcation line), Bosnia-Herzegovina, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece and the European part of Turkey.⁴

Another term: South East Europe has an established tradition originating in Germany as a distinctive label of a group of countries located in the area between South East Germany and Russia. Central Europe and South East

Europe were created as a labels at a time when there was a great rivalry between the German and Russian empires.

South East Cooperation Initiative (SECI) and Stability Pact have a wider incorporation and countries like Slovenia, Romania and Moldova are also included.⁵

The geographic, cultural, religious and political characteristics of South East Europe self impose several conclusions, which essentially determine the comprehension of the political denotation of the region. The area of South East Europe can be to a great extent, characterised by:

- its direct or indirect instability,
- the fact that most countries in the area fall within the group of transition countries or so called “new democracies”,
- fragile democratic foundations and a lack of extensive and long democratic traditions,
- traditional orientation towards and linkage with great states,
- a lack of agreement and desire for co-operation within a South East Europe framework,
- an aspiration of all states in the area to join the European Union and NATO and in that manner, depart from the backward trends of the Balkans.

2. Recent experiences with security

During the Cold War era, the Balkans became a sort of a tampon zone in relations between the two blocks. Although present in the Balkans through their members, the two leading powers – the United States and the Soviet Union – held that the most important line of confrontation is the one dividing the two German states. So-called central front was a priority, while the Balkans was left to a controlled development within the two blocks, with two non-block states.

Maintenance of balance in overall relations in European space implied the stability in Balkans, where each of the two great powers had a possibility of controlling their own allies. Yugoslavia was left with a leading role in the non-alignment policy, and Albania, after its friendship with China ended, entered a grey zone of minor interest.

The fall apart of the bipolar system of international relations has cast a completely different light on the Balkans. It became clear that this region was unable to build its own security system and that the dissolution of the balance between the two blocks resulted in a security vacuum. Differing

from some other parts of Europe, the Balkan has never created some normal geopolitical configuration that would enable for emergence of some commonly accepted central factor with its geopolitic periphery. In some other regions such a centre is a focal point to which the peripheral states gravitate in their efforts to receive some economic, cultural, scientific and other benefits. Since in this case the states were either gravitating to powers that are out of their own geopolitical space (Germany, France, Russia), or were encumbered with problems that were preventing any intensive mutual communication, the centre of the Balkans never really existed.

Partly this could be explained as a result of existence old different cultural and civilization experiences and religious divisions. But lack of the attractive centre in the Balkan was a permanent feature of contemporary Balkan's history. Every Balkan state was looking toward West and in the days of Cold War bloc division was directing political orientation in the frames of bipolar structures.⁶ Yugoslavia, which was expelled from the Eastern bloc, was seeing the creation of the Balkan Pact 1953 with Turkey and Greece not as a chance for establishing some new Balkan centre, but as important link toward West. Through relations with two other Balkan states Yugoslavia was getting security guarantees and indirect link with the Western bloc.

During the Cold War era, the Balkan member states were integrated in the structures of the respective blocks, and as such were representing the periphery in relation to the leaders of the alliance. Yugoslavia, as a non-aligned state, with considerable international activities, did not succeed in becoming a geopolitical centre of the Balkans.

Disappearance of the Warsaw Treaty and dissolvment of relations in the Eastern Europe resulted immediately in security disintegration in the Balkans. Lack of some central force that could be instrumental for stability and development was further strengthened by accelerated disintegration of Yugoslavia, which only contributed to the spread of Balkan security vacuum.

The end of Cold War clearly showed that this region was filled with crisis, with no mechanism or any pivotal point that could act in the direction of their resolving. The Cold War era, with relatively minimal security-political forms of overall co-operation in the Balkans, has left all of the Balkan states standing alone in search for their positions. It was easier for Greece and Turkey, since both countries continued their normal relations with the NATO. Bulgaria and Romania were left without security granted by the Warsaw Treaty, or even more so by the Soviet Union. Albania has lost its internal security, while Yugoslavia started to disintegrate under its internal crisis and wars initiated by Milosevic's regime.

The traditional differences: civilizational, religious, political and economic have prevented creation of a institution that could be used as a mediator, or as a crisis management centre. Differing to some other European regions (Central Europe, the Baltic) where the new democracies have relatively quickly found their bearings and succeeded in building starting mechanisms for their gathering and joint actions, the fall-apart of the Warsaw Treaty and the end of the Cold War found Balkan states unprepared. And when new democracies in Balkans started to contemplate their security they were primarily interested in breaking out from this region and linking themselves with the NATO, seen as the guarantor of their new security.

New political forces, elected in democratic elections, have gradually started to emerge on political scenes in Balkan states, as well as in the states of the former Yugoslavia. They were also unable to build any forms of mutual co-operation in the field of security. The issue of internal political relations was essential for some of them (Romania, Bulgaria) while the new states in the territory of former Yugoslavia were faced with so many new problems, brought by the war, that some joint consideration of security issues was out of question, at least until the international community stepped in with the first serious instruments for crisis resolving (Washington Treaty in 1994 and Dayton-Paris in 1995).

3. Consequences of the wars

The wars in the territory of former Yugoslavia found the European Community (EC) quite disoriented. Unprepared for such action, the EC, later the European Union (EU), strayed in its efforts to find a solution, which enabled the internal conflict to turn into a full-scale war in the centre of the European continent. Unsuspectedness of such a development, as well as different political interests and traditions of relations, instead of a unique European policy, resulted in various approaches and attempts to restore security in this area, through the EU, OSCE, and finally, the UN.

Instability in Balkans and the significant security vacuum had their impact on creation of some new political approaches by several powers that had a longer tradition of relations with this region. Within this new development Germany, France, Russia and Turkey were seeking new footings for promotion of their interests, or restoring or maintaining their positions. On the other hand, American policy, initially leaving the resolving the conflict in former Yugoslavia to the Europeans, gradually started to take over the initia-

tive and finally became the most significant arbiter and a key actor in solving the security problems in the Balkans.

Unsolved ethnical issues, that led to conflicts, and later to the war in former Yugoslavia, made Europe realise the complexity of the divisions and the problems arising from it. At the same time, Europe was swept by huge wave of refugees, transferring parts of security problems out of the Balkan region itself. Although initially there was a belief that it will not happen, this transfer of crisis and its development had some impact on the European security as well, which led to a more prompt European reaction towards stabilisation of the situation.

Religious divisions were also soon incorporated into national policies of the newly independent states in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and, at the same time, gave way to speculative calculations on various new axis that could be formed based on the religious similarities. Besides this, the engagement of the Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim support opened way for a stronger proliferation of both political and religious forces (Islam), as well as for searching for allies outside of the Balkan space.

All these retrograde political and religious developments had their reflection on the economy as well. The fall-apart of the socialist system, followed by the transition, have made positions of all new democracies in Balkans more difficult. For Albania, Romania and Bulgaria this transition from the socialist economy to the free market economy was too fast and too painful, and for new states in the territory of former Yugoslavia the war with its consequences also contributed to economic decline. Of all countries of the region today only Slovenia has the, more or less, same level of the GDP as before the war. Economic positions of all other countries of the region have significantly deteriorated. This has, of course, resulted in economic unattractiveness of the whole area for foreign investment, which sees stability as one of the basic preconditions for its engagement. Therefore, it might be said that the overall geo-economic interest for this area has significantly decreased.

4. South East Europe – a part of European security architecture

Inclusion into the European security architecture⁷ is seen in the South East Europe as a great opportunity for creation of a new security situation in this area. That concerns especially the countries that are not the NATO members and which are trying to get closer to Euro-Atlantic institutions, and to achieve their major goals through presently developing European security network: accession to the European Union and the NATO.

Greece, as both the EU and the NATO member, acts as a principal generator of new European ideas and initiatives aimed at closer gathering and further development in the area, while Turkey is seeking to capitalise on present favourable situation and its NATO membership to achieve the full EU membership. Bulgaria and Romania are strictly holding to the NATO's Partnership for Peace, are active in Balkans co-operation and are trying to fulfil their obligations for EU accession in full. Besides this, both countries, and especially Romania, wish to create an impression that they belong to the group of countries that may achieve the full NATO membership during the first circle of NATO enlargement.

Most problematic relations towards the new European architecture may be found in the Western Balkans. The, so-called, unstable stability is a result of the post-war situation and firm presence of international forces in this region. At the same time, the principal cause, and the generator of instabilities in these areas, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after Milosevic still radiates new threats and challenges, either that linked to its own parts (Montenegro, Sandjak, Vojvodina, Kosovo), or those relating to the unstable and very turbulent internal political situation in Serbia. This creates a situation where a key issue is tied to the possibility of controlling events in Serbia and to the particular moves which new regime might make in some other parts: Montenegro and Kosovo. Combined with the unstable situation in Albania, such development might create additional challenges for this part of the Balkans, which all has a reflection on a fragile Macedonian stability, very sensitive to the developments in the neighbourhood.

If Yugoslavia is defined as the centre of the crisis and instability, than it is understandable that the countries surrounding it are launching the initiative for development of national security systems that would be leaning on European security architecture. Slovenia is participating in the Partnership for Peace for some time now, and is hoping to be among the first countries to join the NATO. Croatian new policy has led the country into the Partnership for Peace and is hoping to maintain such a tempo, seeing the NATO membership as its strategic goal as well. Both Macedonia and Albania are participating in the Partnership for Peace. Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country consisting of two entities, is undergoing a phase of strong international efforts aimed at decreasing its military forces, and at the same time, through bringing closer together all three national components (Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian), to build a unique military that could then very soon be included into the Partnership for Peace.

Taking the present situation into account, efforts of all these countries to accelerate the accession to the NATO and to tie their security to the wider

European security architecture, can be clearly seen in every political document dealing with foreign and security policy.⁸

Association, stability and co-operative security are nowadays the most commonly used syntagmas in this part of Europe. Each of those reflects the outside views on the region, but also strivings of these countries to achieve stability through a faster associating, that could in turn lead to the co-operative security. But after experiencing recent wars, ethnic cleansing, waves of refugees and economic prices paid so far, all these countries realise that they are unable to build a co-operative security through their joint actions alone, rather that it has to be supported by outside factors.

In present situation, this support is seen primarily in political positions of the international community and its military presence in the area. These are the elements seen as factors that could help building the new security in the region.

Due to existing difficulties, as well as a constant danger that the development might result in new instabilities, the countries of the, so called, West Balkans are committing themselves differently to some institutional structures of the new European security. They are actively participating in the OSCE but without any illusions on significance of this mechanism, especially since it was seen in the action on the ground. Much more importance is being paid to category of Euro-Atlantic institutions, signifying accession to the EU and the NATO, and thus becoming a part of the well developed European space. Due to this, relatively poor attention is being paid to the issue of relations between the NATO and the WEU, or to the development of the EU's CSFP. In a desire to find *modus vivendi* for leaving the West Balkans behind, seen as a necessary nuisance, these countries are trying to mark their own way to Europe as soon as possible.

This makes clear that even attempts on creating some forms of regional security, that would be a co-operative one, at this moment, would have very slim chances of succeeding. Almost all of these countries saw in Yugoslavia a danger, or threat to their own security, and were aware of the fact that their forces, even if combined with forces of some other countries from the South East Europe, could not guarantee their security in the case of new instabilities. Therefore, this formula on accession to Euro-Atlantic institutions is seen as a concrete answer to their attempts on reaching security.

The forms of regional security, be they seen in a wider context of the Stability Pact, or some narrower, that would call for creation of a free trade zone in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, opening channels for communication and exchange of ideas, people and capital, are not receiving any

stronger support for the time being. This very important part of co-operative security, actually its precondition, is seen as something that is being forced upon these countries from abroad and that is not sufficient enough to satisfy the needs of majority of countries. On top of this, there is also a fear that such collective approach could slow down the progress of some countries on their way towards Euro-Atlantic structures, and in Croatia, for example, the fear that through such links, allegedly, some new form of Yugoslavia could be recreated, is still present.⁹

Viewed in a perspective, it could be concluded that the outside factors in the Balkans will advocate regional co-operation as a concrete proof of ability for closer approach to Europe, while the countries of the region will independently, or maybe through some bilateral efforts, try to break out from such frames and find possibilities for faster accession to Europe.¹⁰ Applying the instruments available, especially its military presence, the international community, fore mostly the EU countries, will be the ones dictating the direction and the tempo of the approach to Europe. Within this, the approach to the architecture of European security will be conditioned primarily on the assessments of behaviour of individual countries of the region and their contribution to the development of regional relations.¹¹

The example of "new" Croatia may be used as a significant illustration of possible changes, and of the ability of international community to rapidly and swiftly change its views in case of positive democratic changes. This is certainly the most important international value of changes in Croatia, changes that should show to Croatian neighbours all the possibilities that would open to them as well if they follow this path. Even the developments in Serbia were partly influenced by Croatian example and the way how easy was to make the first step in transition of regime.

The unstable stability that has emerged in the areas of the South East Europe, controlled by the international military force, is certainly better than wars and ethnic cleansing. But, since this process is unfinished, it is apparent that some time will elapse before these countries access European security architecture, and that without definite solution of the Yugoslav question, which is connected with emergence of the new democratic regime in Belgrade, there are no chances for resolving potential crisis, nor for development of some co-operative regional security that could lead the whole region to the Europe.

Looking in the future of the South East Europe one could expect:

- Gradual changes toward democracy in the area and slow start of regional co-operation leading toward a co-operative security,

- For all countries in the South East Europe is a Euro-Atlantic integration primary aim and with changes in Belgrade hopefully new regime will look for a way out also in that direction,
- Due to the war memories, improvements in the so called Western Balkans area will be not easy and it will need time,
- Presence of international forces will be for some time very much needed and with its help some regional projects connected with European security could be expanded,
- After stabilization and normalization of the relations one could envisage the time when the whole area of South East Europe will be in the European security architecture sharing security with all other European countries.



Notes:

1. Bull, H.: *The Anarchical Society*, London 1997, p. 18.
2. For an analysis of this concept of security see: Buzan, B.: *People, States and Fear, An Agenda for International Security in the Post-Cold War Europe*, 2nd end Wheatshhead, 1991.
3. Magocsi, P. R.: *Historical Atlas of East Central Europe*, London 1998, p. 24.
4. *Ibid.*
5. In its regional approach EU is mentioning countries: Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia and Macedonia. The same group of the countries is also defined as a Western Balkans. Institute for Security Studies of WEU is covering with the term South East Europe the following countries: Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and the countries from ex-Yugoslavia: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, G. Lenci, L. Martin (eds) *The European Security Space*, Paris 1996, pp. 10-11.
6. For wider explanation see: R. Vukadinovic, *Mediterranean between war and Peace*, Zagreb-Belgrade 1987, pp. 18-19.
7. The concept of security architecture belongs to the descriptions frequently used in various meaning. We understand this as a "set of institutions which fulfil a security function, and the way in which their mutual relations are arranged". W. Kostecki: *Europe after the Cold War: The Security Complex Theory*; Warsaw, 1996, pp. 166-167.
8. Even a representatives of Serbian new regime are advocating possibility for Serbia to enter PjP soon.
9. This was a traditional Tudjman's fear which is deeply rooted not only in the ranks of Croatian Democratic Union but is also shared among other Croatian political parties.
10. Vukadinovic, R.: *Sigurnost na jugoistoku Europe*, Varazdin 1999, pp. 174-175.
11. *Security and Reconstruction of South-Eastern Europe*, Sofia, 2000, pp. 24-27.

Resumé:

Radovan Vukadinovic: *Juhovýchodná Európa a európska bezpečnostná architektúra*

Autor príspevku v úvode konštatuje, že štáty juhovýchodnej Európy mali od samého vzniku problémy so svojou bezpečnosťou. Zaživali rivalitu mocností, ktoré ich vystavili politickej manipulácii a využívali vo veľkých politických hrách. Mechanizmy a inštitúcie medzinárodných vzťahov, ktoré by viedli k bezpečnosti, ako sú rovnováha síl v medzinárodných vzťahoch, diplomacia či vznik aliancií, nepriniesli pozitívne výsledky. Na druhej strane je skutočnosťou, že štáty juhovýchodnej Európy boli príliš slabé na to, aby vôbec uvažovali o nejakom vlastnom bezpečnostnom modeli, ktorý by sami vybudovali.

V prvej časti *Bezpečnosť v juhovýchodnej Európe* autor uvádza prehľad viacerých geografických vymedzení priestoru juhovýchodnej Európy a charakterizuje túto oblasť (nestabilita, krajiny v procese transformácie, slabé demokratické základy, absencia demokratických tradícií, neochota spolupracovať v rámci regiónu, všetky balkánske štáty chcú vstúpiť do EÚ a NATO).

Druhá časť *Nedávna skúsenosť s bezpečnosťou* porovnáva situáciu Balkánu počas studenej vojny a po nej. Uvádza, že po rozpade bipolárneho systému medzinárodných vzťahov si oblasť Balkánu nedokázala vybudovať vlastný bezpečnostný systém a zánik rovnováhy medzi dvoma blokmi vyústil do bezpečnostného vákua.

Zánik Varšavskej zmluvy a narušenie vzťahov vo východnej Európe sa ihneď prejavilo dezintegráciou Balkánu, čo len prispelo k rozšíreniu bezpečnostného vákua na Balkáne.

Koniec studenej vojny zreteľne ukázal, že tento región v sebe obsahoval množstvo krízových momentov a nemal mechanizmus, ktorý by ich pomohol eliminovať. Toto obdobie ľahšie prežívali Turecko a Grécko. Naproti tomu Bulharsko a Rumunsko sa ocitli mimo bezpečnosti, ktorú dovtedy garantovala Varšavská zmluva, resp. Sovietsky zväz. Albánsko stratilo svoju vnútornú bezpečnosť následkom rozpadu Juhoslávie, kde Miloševićov režim vyvolal vnútornú krízu a vojny.

Na rozdiel od ostatných oblastí Európy (stredná Európa, Pobaltie), kde sa nové demokracie pomerne rýchlo etablovali a úspešne začali budovať mechanizmy spoločného postupu, koniec studenej vojny našiel balkánske štáty nepripravené. Keď nové demokracie na Balkáne začali reflektovať svoju bezpečnostnú situáciu, chceli sa predovšetkým dostať mimo túto oblasť a vstúpiť do NATO, ktoré chápu ako záruku svojej novej bezpečnosti.

Nové politické sily, zvolené v demokratických voľbách, nedokázali v oblasti bezpečnosti vzájomne spolupracovať. Bulharsko a Rumunsko mali vnútorné politické problémy, zatiaľ čo nové štáty na území bývalej Juhoslávie sa ocitli pred novými problémami, ktoré priniesla vojna, takže ani neuvažovali o nejakom spoločnom postupe v otázkach zaručenia bezpečnosti.

Tretia časť *Dôsledky vojen* sa zaoberá postojom Európskeho spoločenstva k balkánskej kríze, ktorý umožnil, že vnútorný konflikt nakoniec prerástol do vojenského konfliktu. Fakt, že sa takýto vývoj vôbec nepredpokladal a rozdielnosť politických záujmov členských štátov, ako aj neschopnosť efektívne zakročiť, vyústil do pokusov opätovne nastoliť bezpečnosť v tejto oblasti pomocou EÚ, OBSE a nakoniec NATO. Americká politika, ktorá najskôr nechávala riešenie konfliktu v bývalej Juhoslávii na Európanov, postupne začala preberať iniciatívu a nakoniec sa stala kľúčovým aktérom pri riešení bezpečnostných problémov na Balkáne.

Európu zasiahla veľká vlna utečencov, ktorí prenášali bezpečnostné problémy mimo územie Balkánu, čím tento vývoj ovplyvnil aj európsku bezpečnosť v širšom zmysle. To prinútilo členské krajiny Európskej únie konečne reagovať a pokúsiť sa stabilizovať situáciu.

Čoskoro vystúpili na Balkáne do popredia aj náboženské rozdiely a stali sa neoddeliteľnou súčasťou národnej politiky nových nezávislých štátov, poskytli priestor na kalkulácie o rozličných nových zoskupeniach na základe náboženskej príbuznosti.

Celý vývoj ovplyvnil, pochopiteľne, aj ekonomiku. Pre Albánsko, Rumunsko a Bulharsko bol prechod od regulovanej socialistickej ekonomiky k slobodnej trhovej ekonomike príliš rýchly a bolestný a nové štáty na území bývalej Juhoslávie sa i v dôsledku vojny ocitli v zložitej ekonomickej situácii. Iba Slovinsko si udržalo približne rovnakú úroveň hrubého národného dôchodku v porovnaní s obdobím pred vojenským konfliktom. Hospodárky prepad sa odzrkadlil aj v tom, že do oblasti neprichádzali zahraniční investori.

Štvrtá časť pod názvom *Juhovýchodná Európa ako súčasť európskej bezpečnostnej architektúry* hovorí o veľkej príležitosti juhovýchodnej Európy začleniť sa do európskej bezpečnostnej architektúry a zmeniť tak bezpečnostnú situáciu v tejto oblasti. Platí to najmä pre nečlenské krajiny NATO, ktoré sa usilujú dostať bližšie k euro-atlantickým štruktúram.

Autor ukazuje, akú úlohu v tejto situácii teraz zohráva Grécko a Turecko, ale všíma si aj ambície Bulharska a Rumunska pri rozširovaní NATO.

Pripomína, že Juhoslovanská zväzová republika aj v období po páde Miloševića čelí hrozbám a rizikám vo svojom bezprostrednom okolí (Čierna

Hora, Vojvodina, Kosovo) a upozorňuje na nestabilnú politickú situáciu v Srbsku. K tomu pristupuje nestabilné Albánsko a krehká stabilita v Macedónskej republike. Je teda pochopiteľné, že v situácii, keď je Juhoslávia (používa tento termín – D.G.) ohniskom krízy a nestability, vývoj národných bezpečnostných systémov v okolitých krajinách sa opiera o európsku bezpečnostnú architektúru. Slovinsko sa spolieha, že sa čoskoro stane členom Aliancie, a takto získa bezpečnostné záruky, Chorvátsko tiež vidí svoj strategický cieľ v prístupení k NATO. Macedónsko a Albánsko sa zúčastňujú na programe NATO Partnerstvo za mier. Na Bosnu a Hercegovinu, ktorú tvoria dva celky, vyvíja medzinárodné spoločenstvo silný tlak, aby redukovala svoju armádu a jej tri národnostné zložky – Chorváti, Srbi a Bosniaci vytvorili jednotnú armádu, ktorá by sa v blízkom čase začlenila do programu Partnerstvo za mier.

V súčasnej situácii bezpečnosť Balkánu vo významnej miere zaručujú aj vonkajšie faktory reprezentované medzinárodným spoločenstvom a vojenskou prítomnosťou v oblasti.

Pokiaľ ide o vplyv medzinárodných bezpečnostných inštitúcií, nemožno si robiť ilúzie o význame mechanizmov OBSE, ale vstup do EÚ a NATO by mal pozitívne pôsobiť na bezpečnosť v tejto oblasti. Autor konštatuje, že malá pozornosť sa venuje vzťahom medzi NATO a ZEÚ či rozvoju spoločnej zahraničnej a bezpečnostnej politiky EÚ.

V súčasnej situácii má pre západný Balkán veľmi malú šancu nejaká vlastná cesta do Európy, t. j. pokus vytvoriť nejakú formu kooperatívnej regionálnej bezpečnosti, pretože väčšina krajín videla v Juhoslávii ohrozenie vlastnej bezpečnosti.

Ani regionálna bezpečnosť v širšom kontexte Paktu stability, ktorý otvára možnosti pre komunikáciu a výmenu názorov, ľudí i kapitálu, nemá dnes nijakú silnú podporu.

Chápe sa ako niečo, čo sa nanucuje zvonka. Navyše pristupuje strach niektorých krajín, že takýto kolektívny prístup by mohol spomaliť ich postup do euro-atlantických štruktúr.

Smerovanie a tempo približovania sa k Európe však bude určovať medzinárodné spoločenstvo, najmä členské krajiny EÚ.

Prípad „nového“ Chorvátska by mohol ilustrovat možnosť zvratu vo vývoji a schopnosť medzinárodného spoločenstva rýchle zmeniť svoj názor v prípade pozitívnych demokratických zmien.

Nestabilná stabilita, ktorá vznikla v juhovýchodnej Európe, kontrolovaná medzinárodnými vojenskými silami, je určite lepší variant než vojny a etnické čistky. Bude si to vyžadovať určitý čas, než sa tieto krajiny začlenia do

európskej bezpečnostnej architektúry. Je zrejme, že bez vyriešenia tzv. juhoslovanskej otázky nemožno eliminovať potenciálnu krízu, ani rozvinúť nejakú formu kooperatívnej regionálnej bezpečnosti, ktorá by priviedla celú oblasť Balkánu do bezpečnej a stabilnej Európy.*

* *resumé: Daniela Geisbacherová*