Electronic Library of Scientific Literature - © Academic Electronic Press


Vol. XI / No 1 / 2002


3 Jaroslav Bureš

Charakter státu a politického systému v ideologických představách současných islamistických hnutí na Blízkem východě a arabském světě
Character of a State and Political System in Ideological Concepts of Contemporary Islamistic Movements in the Middle East and Arab World

30 Emil Souleimanov

Turkismus ve Střední Asii: hledání (ztracené) identity
Turkism in Central Asia: Looking for a (lost) Identity

46 Lýdia Kokavcová

Prítomnosť islamu v SRN s dôrazom na život a adaptáciu tureckej menšiny
The Presence of Islam in Germany with an Emphasis on Life and Adaptation of the Turkish Minority

65 Attila Kovács

Medzi nacionalizmom a islamským fundamentalizmom: niektoré aspekty hnutia Hamas
Between Nationalism and Islamic Fundamentalism: Some Aspects of the Hamas Movement


80 Ravshan Mirzomuradovich Alimov

State and Islam
Štát a islam

93 Alisher Abbasovich Azizkhojaev

The Strategy of Development of the Uzbek State and Islam
Stratégia vývoja uzbeckého štátu a islam

103 Jozef Klavec

K niektorým aspektom islamského fundamentalizmu
To Some Aspects of Islamic Fundamentalism


115 Niekoľko všeobecných údajov o islame


118 Tomáš Mrázik

Peter Juza: Terra incognita (... o dnešnom Rusku, postsovietskom priestore, diplomacii a politike)


Jaroslav Bureš: Character of a State and Political System in Ideological Concepts of Contemporary Islamistic Movements in the Middle East and Arab World

Islam is not only an ideology but also a complete system dealing with organization of a state and a world. The law and ideology can be fulfilled only after a real Islam state respecting the God is created. Islamism or Islamic fundamentalism believes religion represents God’s order and is in contradiction with secular systems. Islamists exploit little loyalty of Muslims to the institution of a national state as they identify themselves primarily with their ethnic, clan or kin allegiance. Ethnic heterogeneity is surpassed only in time of an outer danger.

At a state level the new order is often called an ”Islam Order” as a contrary to the Bush’s idea of a New World Order. The current global époque (Pax Americana) shall face an alternative (Pax Islamica). The two concepts have three differences: western individualism and Islamic collectivism; western national state concept and Islamic community (umma) concept; and Islamic dogmatic universalism and wider western openness to different ideology and thoughts schools. Islamists do not present specific ideas of realization of the project; their key goal is to dissolve the current system of power. The Islam order shall be first built on a national level and later spread all around the world. The major difference between the Shiite’s political concept and Sunnite’s concept of the Muslim Brotherhood is in the Shiite’s already created exact notion of institutions the future Islamic state and Sunnite’s vague ethic concept answering questions of the future governor and ways of his rule. Islamic revolution in Iran conformed Shiite’s action but the ideology was not spread into a majority Sunnite environment (stronger influence was gained only in Lebanon). Khomeini considered his Islamic republic the only real Islamic state and all the others marked as illegitimate. Sunnite’s Islamic movements have not present relevant strategy leading to seize of power yet. Egyptian Muslim Brother Sajjid Qutb became the spiritual leader of the Sunnite’s militant Islamism and declared that there was no Muslim regime and all Muslims had to wage a jihad for their reislamization. The world peace can be introduced only under flags of Islam.

General remaining behind decreases the Muslim’s world self-confidence and builds complexes. A third way derived from the so-called ”Golden Era” is being sought. Current Islamism has characteristics of a totalitarian ideology and rests on distorted Islam dogma. It tries to suppress all tolerant schools of thoughts in a fear of a culture identity loss. Liberal democracy (sovereignty of people) is being refused as incompatible with religious interpretation of Islam because only the God is sovereign. The only possible order is the Islamic one (as a contrary to the imported order). After bankruptcy of democracy the right time for Islam to grip the power and become the leading doctrine comes. But Islam gives opportunity for a wide spectrum of interpretations and can justify dictatorship, republicanism, and monarchy. There are three Islamic schools of thoughts concerning Islam and democracy: the first claims that Islam is democratic not only because of the concept in which according to the Koran the emperor has to confer, but there is not law to order it, but also of free interpretation and consensus. The second school states that Islam and democracy cannot be compatible. The third school sees Islam’s own democracy (emperor’s consultations, loyalty oath).

An issue of security and defence of Muslim community is a very specific one. Structures of a state must be Islamic and its security must remain in hands of an Islamic state. Islamic community and Islamic state must have a complete sovereignty over the internal issues and territory (and thus all artificially introduced colonial regimes were illegal, similarly the government introduced in Afghanistan in a ”non-Islamic” way may have the same fate).

All Islamic doctrines are based on an imperative of introduction of the Islamic legal order (post-Koranic construction of law), which is being considered as a symbol of Islam identity. Many Arabic countries introduced Islamic legal order within the citizens’ status (family and heritage law), some adopted tough punishments. Egypt declares Islamic legal order as a main source of law, Sudan has the Islam Penal Code, etc.

According to the Islamists sovereignty always belongs to Allah (by Koran and Sunna), never to a man. Those not respecting the God’s sovereignty are nonbelievers. This thesis may be abused for suppress freedom of thoughts or a decision of a state or a ruler. There is no clear separation of a state from religion defined in Islam. Scholars refusing the idea of an Islamic state are from time to time pursued by Islamists. Islamic state is connected to romantic but confused form of a protest against the current crisis situation in the Islamic world. Shall the supporters of this state form we face a threat of chaos, conflict and totalitarian state with restricted sovereignty of citizens and without autonomous segments of a civil society. Multiethnic and multi-confessional character of a majority of Islamic states and a crisis of the national state institution support this kind of development.

Islamists usually have no well-developed economic strategy in their programmes and often this issue is considered a premature and useless in their national liberation fight. Their economic ideas are very general, formless with a stress on Islamic ethic problems. In general they refuse big social differences and put accent on a common benefit principle. Involvement into the world economy is often mentioned with disrespect. Islamists are strongly interested in differences between the rich and poor and tenaciously criticize West but also their own rich for ignoring the poor in the world or their own countries.

The quasi-national state in the Arabic environment is under internal and external threat. On the one hand globalisation undermines etatistic structures and on the other there are the Islamists who never accepted existence of a national state in its current form and are trying to pursue their Islamic order. National state in the Islam world did not secure sufficient political participation and economic growth. They are a product brought form outside by west colonial structures, which managed to destroy Islamic system. The national state did not manage to anchor well in the society what is well used by fundamentalists. Islam is a model emphasizing maintaining the community and has strong traditionalistic roots what in time of expansion of western culture modernism and deepening of economic and social crisis can create a favourable basis for radicalisation of a society in the Islamic world.


Emil Souleimanov: Turkism in Central Asia: Looking for a (lost) Identity

Shortly after establishment of independent republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan the concept of Pan-Turkism (or more softly Turkism) was completely identified with Turkey’s power acting east of its own borders. But Turkism was not by a wide margin a simple tool of Ankara (Istanbul) for a pursue of its own political goals but a complicated phenomenon with more than a hundred years long history trying to find an answer to a question of national identity of Turkic ethnics. As the Central Asian ethnics still lack clearly defined national self-consciousness, the pillars of Turkism could help them as an advisable ideological basis for constitution and strengthening that national identity which is an indispensable precondition for building of a modern statehood.

The first Russian attempt to penetrate Central Asia led to a crushing military defeat. Because of tenacious resistance of local inhabitants the Russian Army was made to retreat to the city of Chiva in 1717. Even though in the first half of the 19th century majority of ”Kazakh” kin-tribal structures accepted the Russian protectorate state bodies on the territory of ”internal” Central Asia – khanates of Chiva, Bukhara and Kokand remained independent. After repeated military failure in 1839 Russian chose a more careful strategy: St. Petersburg troops advanced south step by step along the Syr Daria River. After the break out of the Civil War in America (1861-1865) international cotton markets scored a sharp deficit. This economic reason as well as an attempt to somehow apply a policy of prestige after humiliating defeat in the Crimea War (1853-1856) then forced Russia to activate its South endeavour. In 1865 Tashkent was occupied and later Samarkand (1869), Chiva (1873) and Kokand (1876) were conquered. Massacre in Turkmen fort of Gök-Tepe (1881) and conquest of Merv Oasis (1884) concluded Russian occupation of Central Asia. Number of people of the Russian Empire increased approximately by one-sixth, area enlarged to ca. 3.5 km2.

Accent of Russian politics in the region then moved to the possibly most substantial usage of natural resources. By the end of the 19th century administrative territorial unit of Turkestan (Türkestan) was delimited and included all conquered territory in Central Asia. The second half of the 19th century was characterised by relative balance of St. Petersburg’s colonial politics in the region what was undermined by political passivity of the Central Asia ethnics.

Probably this is why the ideology of Turkism was born not in Turkestan but in surroundings of an ethnic tragically influenced by Russian colonialism. In 1883 Crimea Tatar Ismail-bei Gaspirali (Gasprinskiy) founded a newspaper the Terdzhüman (Interpreter) what is an official date for birth of Turkism. Thanks to the Terdzhüman ideas of Turkism were spread among the Turkic ethnics of Russia. Gaspirali’s appeal: ”Fikerde, telde ve eshte berdemlek” (”Unity of thoughts, unity of language, unity of action”) thus becomes a cardinal motto for generations of intellectuals in Crimea, Kazan and Azerbaijan and inhabitants of Central Asia.

Indisputably it is worth to mention that popularisation of Turkism in the Ottoman Empire appeared only after it was born and promoted on the Russian territory. For Turks who as the only Turkic ethnic group had already had their statehood Turkism was a wanted alternative to Europeanization. It represented a concept of own nationalism under conditions of Europe on a break of the 19th-20th centuries where radical nationalism was nearly automaticity. But for the Turkic minorities in the Russian Empire Turkism was made to face gradual Russification, to prevent moral degradation of the indigenous society (not only of elites as was a case of Turkey) which appeared by replacing traditional ethnic and religious values by foreign ones, to defend own racial ”sufficiency” face to face Great-Russia chauvinism. As one can see the mission of Turkism was originally limited to cultural sphere.

But in 1916 mass protests of Central Asia inhabitants broke out against forced mobilisation of men into the war waging Russian Army. Because of a blood suppression of these originally sporadic uprisings the resistance movement against a Russian rule spread around whole Central Asia and gained in intensity. Fights among badly armed rebels and czar units cost all together hundreds of thousands of lives of Turkestan civilians.

Shortly after the Russian Revolution an extraordinary congress of Turkestan delegates declared establishment of Independent Turkestan with the seat in Kokand. In March 1918 Bolsheviks burned down Kokand and massacred its inhabitants. This just strengthened determination of the Basmak Movement (Turkestan Liberation National Movement) to continue the fight. Though the Red Army occupied Turkestan in the beginning of the 20s, guerrilla operations in many spheres continued until the first half of the 30s.

Newly established Bolshevik regime in Moscow made logical conclusions from the recent development in Central Asia and with a great responsibility approached persuasion of a special politics towards the region. Conditions for effective prevention of irredentistic efforts of Central Asia inhabitants were a communists’ priority task; it was followed by region fragmentation into individual republics, while a number of regions with traditionally Tajik majority (Bukhara, Samarkand) became a part of Uzbekistan. Deislamization and Russification had here a character of a purposive state politics; all manifestations of ”non-soviet” patriotism were suppressed.

After 1945 not negligible amount of industrial enterprises evacuated during the Second World War remained in Central Asia. This factor together with Khrushchev’s plans of Kazakh ground cultivation recalled a great wave of Russian and Russian speaking (among others Ukrainian, Belorussian and Jewish) inhabitants into Central Asia Republics what reflected in essential change in region demographic situation. In 1979 Russians in Kazakhstan created 40.8 % (compared to 36 % of Kazakhs), in Kirgistan 25.9 %, in Turkmenistan 12.6 %, in Uzbekistan 10.8 % and in Tajikistan 10.4 %.

Russian immigrants were only superficially interested in leading positions in a social life of these republics and lacked even a small willingness to adapt themselves in a new cultural environment and learn local languages. Classical imperial disrespect of new colonists towards indigenous peoples added to further strengthening already lined minority complex of Central Asia ethnics; actually an ideology of ”vassal” and ”sovereign”.

One cannot be surprised that short after disintegration of the Soviet Empire inhabitants of Central Asia faced newly gained independence with crippled self-consciousness and absence of more-or-less readable concept of national identity. As a century ago also today as an answer to the question of national identity one would usually first hear importance of a certain clan membership or origin from a certain region and only then a thesis of ethnic identity. Only few are able to define what it does mean to be a Kazakh, what the historical mission of Kazakh nationality or nation means. But only after a reply to a question ”Who am I?” it is possible to establish a base of statehood and define direction of further development.

But this is why the campaign started by Central Asia political elites to build modern nationalism is so dangerous. In an attempt to create an ideological base of statehood in a shortest time possible a national ideology often built on hyperbolised national myth is being formed. The given reality in a light of continuing social-economic stagnation threatens to lead into a fierce worsening of mutual relations among the local ethnics especially because ”then to an explosion even a little dispute could be sufficient”.

Under given unfavourable circumstances still more and more people looks at the ideas of Turkism as at an alternative to radicalisation of nationalistic crush in individual countries of the region. Turkism is thus often given a meaning of some ideological anabasis of Central Asia rapprochement. Shall we think in ”republican” nationalism categories Central Asia (especially a number of its potentially conflict zones) is a quite heterogeneous region. But a view from a position of Turkism makes Central Asia a relatively homogeneous unit since majority of Central Asia countries inhabitants is created by ethnics of Turkic origin. Even though it is definitely not a remedy to cure all complex problems accompanying building statehood of Central Asia republics in its early stage, but it is clear that adaptation of Turkism ideas at a level of state ideology is able among others to significantly reduce potential of a national conflict among Central Asia ethnics.

Turkism ideology – a kind of inter-nationalistic nationalism – could temper dangerous ”republican” nationalism and in the same time loosen Central Asia nations their minority complex grown during Soviet occupation. This can reflect in forming a favourable climate in relations with non-Turkic ethnics of the region.


Lýdia Kokavcová: The Presence of Islam in Germany with an Emphasis on Life and Adaptation of the Turkish Minority

Nowadays, Islam and Christianity are considered to be two different religions. Anyway, they both, together with the Jewish religion, have their origin in the so-called abrahamitic religious group. Many common elements can be found in the Old Testament. On the contrary, the main difference between Islam and Christianity can be seen in a person of a Founder: Mohammed was a founder of a state, religious leader and the prophesier of God. Jesus means for Christians the Son of God, what for Islamic people means abuse of his Unique. In the theory discussing the ”fight of the cultures”, Samuel Huntington says the forms connected with Islamic phenomenon are always of the same cultural substance, whereby this substance is present in the Islamic fundamentalism at the most. This statement is contrary to the western understanding of Christian rationality and secularization. So, Islam is often considered for ”strange” and according to some authors it takes a role given to the communism before the fall of an iron wall.

Anyway, the coexistence of people practicing these two religions is not only necessary, but also irreversible. Migrants are pioneers of this kind of coexistence in one area. In Germany, the Turkish migrants and Germans have been living together for more than 40 years.

In spite of different tries to put the origin of Islamic religion in Germany to the 16th century, its quantitative and qualitative importance has been noticed at the beginning of 60’s by arrival of a big wave of workers of Turkish origin, based on the agreement between Turkey and Germany. Turkish people consider their country to be a modern one, West-oriented, since the Ataturk reforms (abolition of a polygamy and religious schools, getting rid of religious princes, etc.) have been realized in a big measure. Nevertheless, Turkey later became an active member of the Islamic World Conference. In Germany, the Turkish people create 80 percent of the Islamic Diaspora. Except the fact that they are the biggest group of immigrants in Germany, they make the Islamic religion the third biggest in this country and are the youngest part of the society (more than a half of them are 25-45 years old). The so-called first generation – workers and their relatives – were not interested in a life of a German society, but all the more they were keen on the news from their motherland. Till 80’s, the religious organizations in Germany were the first stop of workers after their arrival. So, there exist four reasons for the migrants’ stronger religious orientation: a) absence of other motherland cultural values; b) language barrier; c) mosques as a meeting point for people willing to discuss; d) negative attitude of a part of German society towards the migrants. The problem for keeping on Islam abroad seems to be present within the second and the third generation, since their members do not have as strong bond to the Islamic religion as their parents. In Germany, only 12 percent of young Turks under 15 years want to keep on the religious tradition of their parents, the most common is the disavowing position (58 percent). More than 20 percent of young people of Turkish origin are accepting Islam only because their parents want it. Anyway, the problems with integration of the second and third generations of Turks into the German society can bring a higher interest in Islamic matters, since these young people are often not able to accept the German education and school system.

Another important issue in the German society is a Turkish woman. As an educator of children, she creates the cultural and society patterns in the family. In an industrialized society, an Islamic woman experiencing discrepancy between her internal patterns and information received from her environment. For example, if she wants to correct the attitude she grew with – ”man is wiser than a woman” – she must determine a new relation between her and her husband. Often she is not understood and so the double conflict – towards the family and within the external society she lives in – arise. If she is not successful in overwhelming of this conflict within an industrial society, she may be frustrated. According to the research done in the western part of Berlin, 86.8 percent of Turkish women suffered psychosomatic problems and 78.7 percent of them stated these problems had arisen since their arrival to Germany. Many Turkish women are strongly bound to the home environment (33 percent of Turkish girls are not looking for German friends), but in spite of this fact they adapt to the German way of life for example by clothing. It is necessary to say that many problems of Turkish people living in Germany are not connected with Islamic religion itself, but with the life of migrants in general. The second Turkish generation is often classified as a ”lost one”, because they do feel neither as Turks, nor as Germans. The lack of language knowledge based on the life between two cultures is causing enormous problems at school. Then, the Ottoman-Islamic way of education is very different to the German one. This way is in Germany considered for authoritative and obsolete; on the contrary, the German teacher is for the Turkish parents weak and unworthy. So, Turkish children and young people are often frustrated: in the morning German school, in the evening motherland culture. The special case is a Turkish girl: because she is considered for ”silly” at home, at school she is even more frustrated. Of course, not all education problems may be caused by Islamic religion. It is the case only when Islamic religion is being practiced in an orthodox way within the family, so, that it is in direct contradiction to the life in the German school community. Otherwise, many of education problems have their origin in the migration life itself.

Islam is in Germany presented also by a very small group of converters, people, who are often indicated as the ”strangers in both of the cultures”. Not every person marrying the Islamic one must convert to Islam. Within 118 cases of conversion in Berlin, every third man and every second woman converted to Islam because of a relationship with an Islamic person. In these cases the marriage followed as well. In the case of converters, profession an Islamic religion is not a quick decision, but a long lasting process connected with the inner change of a person. For converters, Islamic religion means recoiling from the old way of life, old friends and family.

In Germany there are 13 Islamic, two Turkish and one Turkish-Islamic organizations. All of them declare contribution to the ”peaceful coexistence of Islamic and Christian people”. The number of mosques is some hundreds. They are situated into the industrial Centers – Berlin 34, Hamburg 45, and Cologne 9 mosques. German countryside is not ready to accept the Islamic way of life yet – since there exist 45 mosques in Hamburg, in the whole Bavaria, considered for rural area, there are 44 of them. The situation for professing an Islam is even worse in former East Germany: 12 years after unification of Germany, there are only 3 mosques in 5 new provinces. Also this fact illustrates the problems of the Turkish minority in the German society. If the first Turkish immigrants were considered to be the generation of workers, the second generation is trying to be fully involved into the society. Islam plays an important role in this process, because its practicing among young people is very individual: either extremely strong or very weak. The orthodox form of Islam is often a reaction to frustration feelings. And although the third generation is bound to the motherland of their parents more weakly, the Islamic cultural and religious patterns are present here as well.


Attila Kovács: Between Nationalism and Islamic Fundamentalism: Some Aspects of the Hamas Movement

Hamas is not a monolithic organization and not a typical fundamentalist movement. And it is not a social or revolutionary movement of any kind. Hamas is an organization with various activities. Political activism, especially acts of violence against Israeli targets, or in the current context of Gaza, West Bank and Jordan one can find schools, hospitals, professional organizations, Islamic NGOs, research institutes etc. with a direct or indirect connection to Hamas.

Origins, Background, Positions

The Arabic word hamas (zeal) derives from verb hamisa, which in a philosophic sense denotes the idea of throwing oneself wholeheartedly behind a cause. The word Hamas is an acronym for Harakat al-muqawwama al-islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement). Hamas was established in Gaza in the fall of 1987 and served as a political and military arm of the Association of Muslim Brothers (Jama‘t al-ikhwan al-muslimin). The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in March 1928 by Hasan al-Banna‘ in Isma‘iliyya, in Egypt, and later branches in mandatory Palestine during the first Palestinian revolt of 1936-1939 were established.

The beginnings of Islamic fundamentalism have a close connection with activities of the Muslim Brotherhood Society. The ideas of the militant branches of the Brotherhood came to Palestine and Transjordan.

With the radicalization of the Brotherhood another tree Islamic groups were established in addition to Hamas in Palestine: (1) Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb at-tahrir al-islami) a group of Palestinian Islamic intellectuals, founded in 1953 by sheikh Taqi ad-Din an-Nabahani; (2) Islamic Jihad (al-Jihad al-Islami) founded around 1980 by sheikhs ‘Abd al-‘Azíz Audah and Dr. Fathi ash-Shiqaqi; (3) Islamic Jihad of the Holy House (al-Jihad al-Islami al-Bajt al-Muqaddas) founded in the beginning of ‘70 by sheikh As‘ad Bayyud at-Tamimi from Hebron.

As it might be expected, in the aftermath of the 1948 war the membership of the Brotherhood increased considerably in the Palestinian society. The Egyptian government banned the movement in the Gaza Strip between 1949 and 1952 although relations improved again between 1952 and 1954. Despite being outlawed again in 1954 following the attempt on Nasser’s life, by the mid 1950s the Brotherhood had become the strongest political force in the Gaza Strip with the size of its constituency exceeding that of some other nationalist groups such as the Communists, the traditional rivals of the Brotherhood.

Following the 1967 war, the Muslim Brotherhood decided to remain on the sidelines as far as violent resistance activities were concerned. The atmosphere of relative calm with which the Brotherhood surrounded themselves in the aftermath of 1967 helped them develop the strongest Islamic movement in Palestinian society; throughout the 1970s, no other Islamic group posed a credible challenge to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Ironically, Israel did not try to impede the growth of Islamic bodies both before and at the beginning of the intifada, motivated on the one hand by a desire to increase division in Palestinian ranks and on the other hand by a policy aimed at creating a rival to the PLO.

The Brotherhood worked diligently on building its infrastructure and organization in Palestinian society with both Israeli and Arab-Islamic (Saudi, Kuwaiti, Iranian) financial support.

The significant change in the Muslim Brotherhood movement was the transition from passivity towards the Israeli rule to militancy and large-scale violent activity, especially in and from the Gaza Strip. The movement changed its name to the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, and emphasized its Palestinian character and patriotism. It professed to be not just a parallel force but an alternative to the almost absolute control of the PLO and its factions over the Palestinians in the Territories.

Leadership and Organization: Sheikh Ahmad Yasin and the Basic Structures of Hamas

Sheikh Ahmad Yasin was born in a middle-class farmer family in a village near Ashquelon. Yasin spend much of his time in a mosque that hosted a center for thwe Muslim Brotherhood. There he and his young colleges were exposed to the teaching of Muslim leaders such as Hasan al-Banna‘.

In 1952 at the age of sixteen he was wounded during a soccer game and became partly paralyzed. Yasin finished his university studies in 1958 and in spite of his invalidity he was accepted as a teacher in one of the neighborhoods of Gaza.

Ahmad Yasin was received as member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza in 1955, while it was a clandestine movement outlawed in Egypt, which controlled the Strip. In 1966 he was imprisoned for a month by the Egyptian authorities for subversive activity.

After the War of 1967 and the loss of contact with Egypt, Yasin gradually developed the infrastructure of the Muslim Brothers in the Gaza Strip in the social, economic and political field and pushed the militants of the organization to take control of the newly built Islamic Center in 1973 and five years later an Islamic University. They become headquarters for Yasin’s group, lather Hamas. As the Palestinian society become steadily more Islamic, the networks of mosques, the basic infrastructure for Hamas, in the occupied territories expanded, recruiting its personnel from the new generation of more action-oriented members of the Brotherhood. Between 1967 and 1987 the number of mosques in the occupied territories doubled. In terms of social background of its leaders there appears no significant difference between Hamas and PLO. The most of Hamas leaders, like Dr. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ar-Rantisi, Dr. Mousa Abu Narzuq or Yasin himself, hails from relatively proposed middle-class families.

The leading members of Hamas fall into five categories: the sheikhs (religious leaders), the Islamic intellectuals, the professionals, the younger leadership candidates and the activists in the secret cells and the regional command centers. Sheikh Yasin was something like a director general, and there were other hi-level leaders to serve for some special efforts (cooperation between regional centers, military, security, education, Islamic call – da‘wa, propaganda, etc.). Hamas has a unified consultative council (majlis ash-shura) and one division for external issues (qiyada al-kharij) – Hamas’ leadership outside the Palestinian territories, and one internal division (qiyada al-dakhil) for inside the Territories. In a share of resistance to Israeli occupation a military arm of Hamas the Brigades of ‘Izz ad-Din al-Qassam was created.

On 9 December 1987 Yasin called the most prominent leaders of the Islamic Center to his home to discuss the actual issues of the Israeli occupation. Five days later on 14 December the Brotherhood leaders and the newly established Islamic Resistant Movement – Hamas issued a calling on the people to stand up in a protracted upspring by its Arabic name intifada.

Ideology and Pragmatism

In August 1988 Hamas released its own covenant, a thirty-six-article document clearly stating its objectives and covering an extraordinary range of issues. The covenant goes on to introduce the Hamas movement and its birth saying that it went forth to perform its role for the sake of its Lord.

The first chapter defines the movement, explaining its relationship to the Muslim Brotherhood and saying that it ”works towards raising the banner of Allah on every inch of Palestine”. The Islamic resistance movement... professes a comprehensive understanding and precise conceptualization of the Islamic precepts in all aspects of life: concept and beliefs, politics and economics, education and social service, jurisdiction and law, exhortation and training, communication and arts, the seen and the unseen and the rest of life’s ways.

The belief of Hamas that all the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Muslim generations makes armed Jihad inevitable.

”Neither a single Arab country nor all Arab countries, neither any king or president, nor all the kings and presidents, neither any organization nor all of them, be they Palestinian or Arab, possess the right to rule over it. Palestine is an Islamic Waqf land.”

The liberation of Palestine is obligatory for every Muslim no matter where he is. Part of its grass-roots appeal comes from disillusion with the secular ranks of the PLO who are seen by many as being too weak in their resistance to the occupiers. The Hamas Covenant does not have a really serious theological message. The text and the Language of the Covenant are interpretable in many different ways. The Hamas ideology was deeply influenced by another significant issue, which is the Islamization of the Palestinian identity by means of Islamization of the Palestinian land and history.

As Hamas has developed from being simply an arm of the Muslim Brotherhood to a major political organization, it has shifted its actions to be increasingly seen as a primary source of resistance to the occupation and therefore a legitimate challenger to the hegemony of the PLO. Its decisions on how to maintain best this challenge during the current peace process and vis-ŕ-vis the possibility of elections as part of that process are purely pragmatic.


Ravšan Mirzomuradovič Alimov: Štát a islam

Rozvoj každej spoločnosti vo všetkých historických obdobiach významne ovplyvňovali vzájomné vzťahy medzi štátom a náboženskou sférou. Platí to aj o islame, ktorého stúpenci tvoria v štyridsiatich štátoch sveta väčšinu obyvateľstva a v tridsiatich jeho významnú časť.

Autor state porovnáva právny rámec vzťahu štátu k islamskému náboženstvu v období sovietskeho režimu a po tom, ako Uzbekistan získal nezávislosť. V období sovietskeho štátu síce formálne platil princíp slobody svedomia, ale v praxi ho nepodopierali primerané zákony a právne akty. Tento stav spôsoboval veľké porušovanie práv veriacich. Zákon O slobode svedomia a náboženských spoločnostiach sa prijal až v roku 1990, tesne pred rozpadom Sovietskeho zväzu.

Dovtedy iba päť zväzových republík (ruská federatívna, ukrajinská, bieloruská, gruzínska a arménska) malo právne upravený vzťah štátu a náboženstva vo forme dekrétov o odluke náboženstva od štátu a školy.

Základné ustanovenia o svetskej povahe štátu a náboženskej slobode boli ústavne stanovené hneď v prvý deň nezávislosti Uzbekistanu. Zavrhovala sa odluka náboženských a iných nevládnych organizácií od štátu. Ústavne garantovaná rovnoprávnosť všetkých občanov Uzbekistanu sa stala základom realizácie princípu náboženskej slobody. Ústava Republiky Uzbekistan zaručuje každému občanovi krajiny slobodu svedomia, právo praktizovať akékoľvek náboženstvo, alebo nepraktizovať žiadne. Zároveň nedovoľuje vnucovať náboženské názory. Právna úprava hovorí o úplnom rešpektovaní cítenia veriacich, pričom náboženské názory občanov sa pokladajú za ich súkromnú záležitosť. Predpokladá sa, že medzi jednotlivými konfesiami bude prebiehať civilizovaný dialóg založený na uznávaní všeľudských duchovných a morálnych hodnôt. Náboženstvo sa nesmie využívať na deštrukčné účely a spoločnosť má predchádzať hrozbám náboženského extrémizmu a terorizmu. Zákon o slobode svedomia a náboženských spoločnostiach prijal uzbecký parlament Olyi Majlis v apríli 1998.

Uzbekistan je mnohonárodný a mnohokonfesionálny štát, v ktorom žije viac ako sto národností a obyvateľstvo patrí k pätnástim konfesiám.

Keď si Uzbekistan zvolil cestu demokracie, za základ pokroku vymedzil slobodnú, harmonicky rozvinutú osobnosť, ktorá v sebe zahrnuje kultúrne dedičstvo a humanistické tradície svojho národa. Autor uvádza, že na území Uzbekistanu (najmä v Buchare a Samarkande) jestvuje mnoho kultúrnych architektonických pamiatok zaradených do zoznamu UNESCO. Spomína aj intelektuálne dedičstvo stredovekých stredoázijských mysliteľov, ktorí ovplyvnili islamský duchovný svet. Upozorňuje na skutočnosť, že islam absorboval aj kultúrne hodnoty zoroastrizmu, budhizmu a manicheizmu.

Proces liberalizácie rozličných spoločenských sfér vrátane duchovnej znamená, že sa vytvárajú podmienky na uspokojovanie náboženských potrieb veriacich. Na začiatku roka 2002 pôsobí v Uzbekistane 1857 mešít, ktoré predstavujú viac ako 90 % všetkých registrovaných náboženských spoločností (vrátane neislamských). Existujú teologické vzdelávacie inštitúcie (islamské aj iné) a tradičné náboženské sviatky (zakázané v období sovietskeho režimu) sa stali dňami pracovného pokoja.

Pri kabinete ministrov vznikol výbor pre náboženské záležitosti, ktorý o. i. pomáha utvárať tolerantné vzťahy medzi rozličnými uzbeckými náboženskými spoločnosťami. Pretože územie Uzbekistanu bolo tradične miestom, kde sa stretali a spoločne jestvovali rozličné konfesie, bola vzájomná tolerancia pre normálny vývoj životne dôležitá. Avšak zároveň jestvovalo a jestvuje nebezpečenstvo vzniku rozličných deštruktívnych klerikálnych síl, ktoré využívajú islamskú rétoriku na dosahovanie vlastných politických cieľov so zámerom zvrátiť ústavný poriadok v stredoázijských krajinách a zaviesť radikálne náboženské idey. Hlavnou metódou sa stáva teror vo svojich rozličných podobách – vojenskej, ideologickej, filozofickej atď. Tragické udalosti zo septembra 2001 ukázali, že náboženský extrémizmus a medzinárodný terorizmus sa stali najväčšími hrozbami moderného sveta.

Predstavitelia štátu si uvedomujú, že všetky otázky, ktoré sa týkajú náboženstva, sú veľmi chúlostivé. Aj keď článok 31 Ústavy zakazuje násilné šírenie náboženských ideí, existujú v Uzbekistane sily, ktoré sa usilujú využiť náboženstvo a náboženskú ideológiu ako nástroj na uplatnenie vlastnej politickej vôle – šíria fanatickú podobu konfesionálnej viery a odmietajú toleranciu voči tým, ktorí ju nevyznávajú. Takýto stav však Uzbekistan ako štát nemôže akceptovať, pretože vývoj islamu na jeho území má hlboké korene a svoju vlastnú, osobitnú históriu. Hanafizmus – liberálny trend v islame – pôvodne vznikol na uzbeckom území a jeho právna škola v širokej miere prijala normy miestneho zvykového práva, ktoré sa vytvorilo ešte pred prijatím islamu. Preto je miestne obyvateľstvo oddávna veľmi tolerantné voči iným konfesiám. Podľa reprezentatívnych prieskumov štyria z piatich respondentov nepokladajú samých seba za nábožensky veriacich, aj keď väčšina z nich sú veriaci. Títo respondenti vysvetľujú svoj postoj tým, že všeľudské a národné hodnoty sú rovnako dôležité v živote ako náboženské normy.

Ďalším tradičným špecifikom uzbeckej spoločnosti je veľký vplyv rodiny, náboženstva, spoločenských vzťahov a hodnôt štátu na formovanie životného štýlu. Rodina zohráva dominantnú úlohu vo vzorcoch ľudského správania a formovaní hodnôt (vrátane hodnoty náboženstva).

Po získaní nezávislosti pred Uzbekistanom vyvstal problém tzv. ideologického vákua. V základe kultúrnej obnovy sprevádzanej záujmom o náboženské hodnoty, najmä islamskej proveniencie, sa štát stretol s otázkou uspokojovania náboženských potrieb. Autor pripomína, že v období nadvlády komunistickej ideológie bolo potláčanie náboženstva súčasťou ideologického boja. Sovietske zriadenie zaviedlo represívne opatrenia voči tisícom členom kléru, zbúral tisícky mešít, deštruoval historické a kultúrne hodnoty.

Po získaní nezávislosti Uzbekistanu niektoré extrémistické skupiny sa usilovali ovplyvniť miestnych politikov. Nemožno prehliadnuť, že do roku 1991 viac ako 90 % imámov z mešít nemalo primerané cirkevné vzdelanie (boli iba samoukmi).Väčšina moslimov nemala prístup ani ku Koránu. Práve túto situáciu využívali islamskí extrémisti v prvých rokoch nezávislosti. Na konci osemdesiatych a začiatku deväťdesiatych rokov všeobecný trend demokratizácie sprevádzala aktivizácia islamského faktora v tomto regióne, predovšetkým v údolí Fergana. Začali sa aktivizovať náboženské strany, vyskytli sa snahy spolitizovať náboženské vedomie, najmä u mladých ľudí.

Vo všeobecnosti možno hrozby náboženského extrémizmu v Strednej Ázii, najmä v Uzbekistane, rozdeliť na vnútorné a vonkajšie. Oba druhy však majú príbuzný obsah: moslimská viera má byť nástrojom deštrukcie štátu, spoločenskej stability, ako aj národnej, občianskej a etnickej zhody. Ide o pokusy vyvolávať medzi jednotlivými sociálnymi vrstvami nezhody založené na protiklade “správneho” a “nesprávneho” náboženstva. To vyvoláva nepriaznivý obraz o Uzbekistane tak medzi islamskými, ako aj medzi neislamskými krajinami.

Medzi náboženské a extrémistické organizácie, ktoré sa v minulých rokoch usilovali destabilizovať sociálnu a politickú situáciu, patrili najmä dve, tzv. Islamské hnutie Uzbekistanu (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan – IMU)Chizb-ut-Tachir (strana sformovaná koncom štyridsiatych rokov 20. storočia v Jordánsku). Pritom treba opätovne upozorniť, že extrémistické náboženské a politické organizácie sú zakázané v absolútne všetkých moslimských krajinách. Nebezpečenstvo Chizb-ut-Tachiru spočíva v jeho strategickom cieli, ktorým je vytvoriť zjednotený teokratický štát nielen v jednotlivých moslimských krajinách alebo oblastiach, ale v celom islamskom svete, t. j. vytvoriť celosvetový kalifát. Aby sa tento cieľ dosiahol, vyzývajú tieto organizácie moslimov, aby viedli permanentnú svätú vojnu – džihád, až pokým nenastane deň posledného súdu. Pretože tieto extrémistické skupiny operujú na území údolia Fergana, má toto územie veľký regionálny i národný bezpečnostný význam.

Treba zdôrazniť, že geopolitická situácia v Strednej Ázii sa v nedávnej minulosti výrazne zmenila. Zapríčinilo to najmä zosilnenie boja proti náboženskému extrémizmu a medzinárodnému terorizmu zo strany medzinárodného spoločenstva, príkladom čoho je situácia v Afganistane. Zmena k lepšiemu – zlepšenie situácie v oblastiach susediacich s Afganistanom – má pre Uzbekistan veľký význam. Verejná mienka v Uzbekistane potvrdzuje pozitívne očakávania vo vzťahu k ďalšiemu vývoju v susednej krajine. Obyvateľstvo Uzbekistanu si zároveň uvedomuje, že boj sa vedie proti medzinárodnému terorizmu, a nie proti islamskému náboženstvu, obyvateľstvu či štátu, a preto podporuje spoluprácu štátu s medzinárodnou koalíciou proti terorizmu.

Súčasne si treba uvedomiť, že nebezpečenstvo náboženského extrémizmu a terorizmu nemožno vykoreniť iba silou. Na to je potrebný celý komplex vojenských, politických, finančných, diplomatických, právnych a iných opatrení a spolupráca rozličných nevládnych organizácií. Pri uplatňovaní týchto opatrení (tak regionálneho, ako aj medzinárodného charakteru) by mali zainteresované štáty navzájom spolupracovať a koordinovať svoj postup. Boj proti medzinárodnému terorizmu sa musí stať najdôležitejšou úlohou globálneho rozsahu.


Ališer Abbasovič Azizchodžajev: Stratégia vývoja uzbeckého štátu a islam

Prechodné obdobie vývoja sekulárneho štátu, ktorého väčšina obyvateľstva sú moslimovia, má určité osobitosti, čo si vyžaduje vypracovať vhodné postupy v domácej a zahraničnej politike. Strategickými prioritami Uzbekistanu sú – vytvoriť základy trhovej ekonomiky, občianskej spoločnosti a nájsť optimálne spojenie tradičných (národných a náboženských) a všeobecných hodnôt vo vyváženej forme.

Uzbecký štát systematicky reformuje právnu, politickú, ekonomickú, sociálnu a ďalšie sféry života. Reformy sú hlavným mechanizmom štátu v prechodnom období; ich cieľom je vytvoriť základ budúceho stabilného vývoja krajiny. Za najvyššiu prioritu možno pokladať udržanie spoločenskej stability, ktorá je nevyhnutnou podmienkou zavŕšenia prechodu.

Krajina si zvolila sekulárnu cestu vývoja, aj keď to bola dosť ťažká voľba. Uzbekistan zdedil z obdobia Sovietskeho zväzu neproporčnú ekonomiku i deformované vedomie, poznačené militantným ateizmom. Posledné roky pred získaním nezávislosti charakterizovali národnostné nepokoje v oblastiach Margilan a Oš, ako aj napätia v ďalších mestách a dedinách. Vzrástol počet poloextrémistických a extrémistických jednotiek v oblasti, niektoré z nich používali islamskú frazeológiu – najmä tie, ktoré pôsobili v údolí Fergana.

Keď Uzbekistan získal nezávislosť a odmietol komunistickú ideológiu, objavila sa určitá ideologická prázdnota. Tá sa však začala rýchlo vypĺňať – jednak pozitívnymi tradičnými národnými hodnotami, ale aj fundamentalistickým radikalizmom a extrémizmom zahraničnej proveniencie. Strany Birlik (jednota) a Erk (sloboda) v sebe spájali militantný nacionalizmus a populizmus; ich fundamentalizmus pod pláštikom islamu nemal zábrany pri výbere spojencov a metód.

V týchto podmienkach deštruktívnych aktivít fundamentalistov a militantných nacionalistov vypracoval Uzbekistan svoj vlastný postup, ktorý sa zakladal na Ústave Republiky UzbekistanZákone o slobode svedomia a náboženských spoločností zo 14. júla 1991. Ústava kodifikovala vzájomnú toleranciu jednotlivých konfesií. Prijatý zákon však jasne nestanovoval reštrikcie voči využívaniu náboženstva na politické ciele. Tento nedostatok riešili novelizácie zákona v rokoch 1993 a 1998.

V polovici deväťdesiatych rokov sa organizácie Chizb-ut-TachirUzbecké islamské hnutie, podporované medzinárodnými organizáciami Chizb-ut-Tachir-al-Islami al-Káida, aktívne podieľali na politickom boji. (Treba však upozorniť na to, že prvé znenie článkov zmieneného zákona naodrážalo skutočnú situáciu na začiatku deväťdesiatych rokov.)

Do konca deväťdesiatych rokov plynuli do Uzbekistanu značné zdroje z ilegálneho obchodu s drogami. Sprievodným javom bol terorizmus, ktorého cieľom bolo destabilizovať spoločnosť. Heslá o islamskej čistote mali pomôcť pri vytváraní kalifátu na spôsob stredovekého polofeudálneho štátneho útvaru.

Autor state je presvedčený, že každý radikalizmus, najmä terorizmus, sa nakoniec zdiskredituje sám, pretože nemá podporu spoločnosti ako celku, ktorá spoznáva deštrukčný charakter jeho pôsobenia. V podmienkach, keď súčasný islamský radikalizmus vo forme polofeudálneho islamského Talibanu a tzv. vojenského komunizmu s jeho červeným terorom stupňuje svoje aktivity, uzbecký štát má mimoriadnu zodpovednosť za stabilitu a zabezpečenie mieru v krajine.

Radikálne skupiny podporované finančnými zdrojmi (pochádzajúcimi prevažne z obchodu s drogami) presahujú svojím vplyvom národné hranice. Transformujú sa na teroristické organizácie, ktoré chcú násilím celý svet zmeniť na svoj obraz. Preto si v tomto prípade násilie vyžaduje zo strany štátu a medzinárodného spoločenstva adekvátne protiopatrenia podoprené právnym rámcom.

Avšak zápas s terorizmom môže byť účinný len vtedy, ak sa opiera o stabilizačný program, ktorý zasahuje všetky sféry spoločenského života. Uzbekistan vytvára dlhodobé stabilizačné programy spoločnosti, ktoré dopĺňa o posilnené mechanizmy, ktoré majú udržať mieru radikalizácie jednotlivých skupín na čo najnižšom stupni.

V Uzbekistane sa islamský radikalizmus prejavil ako deštrukčný prvok – najskôr v skupinách ako Islom lashkarlari (islamskí vojaci), Adolat (spravodlivosť), Tauba (spása), zjednocujúc mladých ľudí s ideologicky zdeformovaným názorom, pripravených všetko zničiť v mene vidiny svojho islamského štátu, v ktorom by oni boli výlučnými držiteľmi moci. Obviňujúc každého z odklonu od Koránu, vytvárajú vlastné štruktúry zamerané proti pôsobeniu a funkciám štátnych orgánov. Napríklad v decembri 1991 obsadili budovu v meste Namangan a kládli si tieto požiadavky voči štátu:

Na jar 1992 extrémisti zajali niekoľko rukojemníkov zo štátnych orgánov, aby jasne demonštrovali svoj úmysel uplatňovať teroristické metódy zamerané na destabilizáciu krajiny a na jej oslabenie. Radikáli sa neskôr zúčastnili na bojoch podobných skupín na území Tadžikistanu a Afganistanu, absolvovali výcvik vo výcvikových táboroch v týchto krajinách, podieľali sa na sabotážach.

Uzbecký štát po vlastných skúsenostiach s terorizmom, teroristickými organizáciami a zohľadňujúc udalosti z 11. septembra 2001 v Spojených štátoch amerických zapojil sa do boja proti terorizmu.

Koalícia krajín bojujúca proti medzinárodnému terorizmu, bojovým výcvikovým strediskám a lídrom organizácie al-Káida, ako aj proti ďalším silám, ktoré s nimi sympatizujú a podporujú ich, vytvorila novú silnú infraštruktúru, ktorá má zabrániť destabilizácii nielen Spojených štátov, ale i svetového spoločenstva ako celku.

V súčasnosti ľudstvo čelí násiliu a porušovaniu práva v medzinárodnom meradle. Preto je nevyhnutný spoločný postup koalície štátov proti terorizmu, vytvorenie všeobecných štandardov boja proti nemu, ktoré by zabránili jeho ďalšej činnosti.

Terorizmus ako jav spojený s obchodom s drogami a ilegálnym obchodom so zbraňami si vyžaduje trvalú pozornosť svetového spoločenstva. Dôsledná politika vlád, schopná čeliť terorizmu, musí poskytnúť stabilitu svetovému spoločenstvu vrátane islamských štátov, ktoré sú jeho súčasťou. Uzbekistan je sekulárny štát, ktorého 80 % obyvateľov je moslimov. Vo veľkej väčšine však ide o zdravé moslimské spoločenstvo, ktoré prijíma uznávané svetské i náboženské hodnoty. Zodpovednosť za osud krajiny, za jej stabilitu diktuje Uzbekistanu, aby zaujal aktívny postoj v zabezpečovaní stability a bezpečnosti v Strednej Ázii. Úspech predstaviteľov koalície v boji proti terorizmu znamená aj pre Uzbekistan novú úroveň rozvoja, nové ekonomické perspektívy vrátane budúcej ekonomickej integrácie.

Stabilita regiónu sa v prípade Uzbekistanu spája s možnosťou vyšších investícií do ekonomiky, najmä do malých a stredných podnikov. Investície do ekonomiky predstavujú stabilizačný faktor najmä vo vzťahu k tej časti populácie, ktorej nespokojnosť by mohla vyústiť do nežiaduceho radikalizmu. Pre stabilitu je nevyhnutnou podmienkou proporcionálny hospodársky vývoj, ktorý by eliminoval živnú pôdu terorizmu.

Na záver treba zdôrazniť, že v úsilí Uzbekistanu o stabilizáciu vlastnej krajiny i celého regiónu vôbec nejde o to, aby sa moslimská komunita vylúčila z účasti na politickom vývoji. Islam a terorizmus nie sú totožné veličiny. Drvivá väčšina uzbeckého islamského obyvateľstva odmieta teroristov typu Bin Ládina a radikálne skupiny, ktoré deštruujú Uzbekistan ako štát a islam ako náboženstvo.


Jozef Klavec: To Some Aspects of Islamic Fundamentalism

Author focuses his attention on sources of Islamic fundamentalism. He states that Islamic fundamentalists see the zenith of Islamic religious society development in the period of both the Prophet Muhammad’s and his four successors life. Successors are evaluated as a caliphs following the right way, what means that Allah unlimited power is respected. From this point of view Islamic fundamentalism can be framed as a more broadly based social and religious protest against modernity’s threats to traditional Islam. It was an effort to return to early Islam values in rapidly modernising world. Moreover the removal of sovereign is possible if people are not guided by him through the right way. The first sovereign’s duty is to follow the Shari’ah provisions and to be kind hearted to the people.

Personal qualities of the sovereign and negative factors which both breach and injure mutual relationships between the Creator and his creation are considered as a significant topic of fundamentalists’ reflection. Rectification of both defects and insufficiency means for them a main goal of their mission. Participation in Jihad (it does not mean only a Holy War but also a spiritual self-improvement effort) represents an important instrument for restoration of the harmony in mentioned relationships. A contemporary Islamic fundamentalism is inspired by the orthodox legal schools of the past period as well as others theoreticians of Islamic thinking (e.g. Said Kutb, al Mawdudi and others).

The author mentions Islamic fundamentalism movements in Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood), Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Palestine. In conclusion he is concerned with Ben Laden and al Qaeda activities and opinions as well.




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