Electronic Library of Scientific Literature - © Academic Electronic Press


Vol. XII / No 3 / 2003


3 Ronald D. Asmus

Stredná a východná Európa v období novej neistoty
Central and Eastern Europe In an Age of New Uncertainty

20 Ingrid Brocková

Why the EU – US Economic Relationship Matters
Prečo záleží na hospodárskych vzťahoch EÚ a USA

36 Matúš Korba

Nová bezpečnostná stratégia USA a transatlantické vzťahy
The New American National Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations


61 Tomáš Valášek

EÚ a NATO: partneri či súperi?
The European Union and NATO: Partners or Rivals?

71 Martin Klus

Vízia modelu Európy budúcnosti
Vision of Future Model of the European Union

84 Viktor Krupa

Etnická a religiózna mozaika Indonézie
Ethnic and Religious Mosaic of Indonesia


97 Ján Voderadský

BUDIL, Ivo T. – FLIEDR, Bob – HALÍK, Tomáš – HEKRDLA, Martin – KOMÁREK, Stanislav – KREJČÍ, Oskar – KROPÁČEK, Luboš – MENDEL, Miloš – NÁLEVKA, Vladimír – ZBOŘIL, Zdeněk: Střet civilizací? – Žhavé sondy deseti autoru.
Evropský literární klub, 1. vydanie, Praha 2002, ISBN 80-86316-31-9

103 Martin Štoffa

Ettmayer, W.: Vojny a konferencie. Diplomacia predtým a teraz
Kriege und Konferenzen. Diplomatie einst und jetzt. Inštitút pre stratégiu a bezpečnostnú politiku, Viedeň 2003, 96 strán, ISBN 3-901328-88-2

108 Peter Juza

IŠTOK, Robert : Politická geografia a geopolitika. Prešov 2003, 392 strán, ISBN 80-8068-191-0

111 Peter Juza

KOROLEV, K. (ed.): Klasika geopolitiky, 19. storočie 
Klassika geopolitiki, 19. vek. Terra Fantastica, Sankt Peterburg 2003, 718 strán, ISBN 5-17-017281-8

Stredná a východná Európa v období novej neistoty

Central and Eastern Europe In an Age of New Uncertainty

Ronald D. Asmus

During the last decade countries of Central and Eastern Europe regained their independence and succeeded in establishing new democratic and market based political and economics system. These countries reoriented their foreign policies from the East to the West. Soviet troops were withdrawn, the Warsaw Pact demised and a new goal in that time concerned visionary and unreachable was set: to rejoin the West by joining the EU and NATO. These goals are either achieved or within reach. The region became stabilized, more democratic and less threatened than at any point in recent memory. Attention of the West is now focused several hundred kilometres eastward. In this time the Western Alliance is increasingly divided and in disarray. The core institutions – the European Union and NATO – that many assumed were more or less permanent elements of a new post-Cold War security order suddenly after differences over the Iraq issue seem fragile.
Looking ahead one can identify three major challenges the region of Central and Eastern Europe will face in the decade ahead. The first one lies across the Atlantic; the second one within Europe; and the third one is at home.
The first challenge lying across the Atlantic concerns NATO and its internal discrepancies. And it goes far beyond the specifics of Iraq. On one side there stand so-called structuralists arguing that the growing asymmetry of power is fundamentally reshaping different American and European views of the world and thus a US-European break-up was increasingly likely if not inevitable. The opposing view is that the conflict was not at all inevitable and is largely attributable to the different impact September 11th had on US and European thinking and thus the real problem is the lack of a common sense on strategic purpose or paradigm. Different analyses lead to different policy prescriptions of the way forward. If the problem is rooted in an asymmetry in power and outlook, then there is little prospect of fixing it. Europe will not be an important strategic partner of the US in the future and NATO will not be a central institution. The second school wants to preserve NATO but avoid the kind of fractious debates. They argue that NATO needs to be maintained to preserve a trans-Atlantic link and sustain a pool of military forces that can be called into on an ad hoc basis by future coalitions of the willing. According to the third school of thought the Alliance can only be saved through radical reform that re-harmonises strategic perspectives on both sides of the Atlantic.
What does this all mean for Central and Eastern Europe? Well, these countries are joining an Alliance that is not the smoothly oiled and well functioning machine they thought it was. The central question facing all allies, both new and old, is whether they want to tackle the new threats of the 21st century on a trans-Atlantic basis. If NATO is going to remain central to American foreign policy, it has to address those challenges that are central to American and Western security. For Central and Eastern Europe this mean that if they wanted the US to remain fully engaged in Europe over time, then they must join with Washington in pushing for the broader transformation of the Alliance. Many Central and Eastern European leaders have fewer reservations on fighting totalitarianism out of Europe than their Western European counterparts. But we have also seen limits to such support. The first is in terms of capability. Another issue is how deeply Atlanticism is rooted in these societies. Will these countries be able to stand up and support the United States again in another crisis if major European powers like France and Germany are again opposed to such a course?
The second challenge facing Central and Eastern Europe lies in Europe and centres on the future construction of the European Union and European integration more generally. One can see many differences among EU members about what the EU is all about, who speaks for Europe and how to shape relations with the United States. There are claims the EU has already overcome similar crises and emerged ever stronger, but, is it true? In recent months one thing became clear: it is that the future health and vitality of NATO and the EU are inherently and inevitably intertwined.
What does this mean for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe? A “return to Europe” was a driving force behind the reform process and engine that drove these countries to work so hard to catch up with the countries of Western Europe. The instincts of many of these countries will be to side with the United Kingdom. Central and Eastern Europe view American power and influence as an opportunity to be exploited, not as a problem to be countered. As small and medium-sized countries they will tend not to be federalist but intergovernmental. But they will be careful to antagonize the two key continental powers – France and Germany. It is one thing to stand up against France and Germany on occasion and on a specific issue. It is quite another to pursue a course that pits them against these two countries across a wider range of issues.
The third challenge facing Central and Eastern Europe lies at home. It is the ability of the countries to successfully continue the process of political and economic reform process and the rebuilding of their societies started in 1989. Though an extraordinary amount has already been made much remains still to be done. It is also not so hard to se a reform fatigue in societies that have been pushed hard to change. The results are mixed and the fruits of progress are unevenly distributed. An initial wave of pro-Western reformist leaders is gradually stepping down from the political stage. Both equally committed reformers and populist politicians are replacing them. One can also see warning signs of political fragmentation, economic slowdown and, in some cases, even nationalistic and/or populist temptations. The last decade was one of great progress and accomplishment for Central and Eastern Europe, the next decade may turn out to be an age of new uncertainties and challenges.
Having achieved their desired destination of NATO and EU membership, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe find themselves entering institutions that themselves are struggling to adapt themselves to the challenges of a new era. From the first day of their membership they are expected to take active part in an important discussion about the future of NATO and the EU. If there is one lesson from the last decade that can serve as a compass for the future, it is that Central and Eastern Europe is much better off when these countries proactively seek to take their future into its own hands, when they work together as a region and when they followed their own instincts and went against the prevailing conventional wisdom in the West.

Why the EU – US Economic Relationship Matters

Prečo záleží na hospodárskych vzťahoch EÚ a USA

Ingrid Brocková

Európska únia (EÚ) a USA sú najdôležitejšími partnermi podporujúcimi a výrazne formujúcimi svetový obchodný systém. Transatlantické partnerstvo predstavuje ročne transakcie vo výške cca 2500 mld. USD, pričom poskytuje 12-miliónovú zamestnanosť na oboch stranách Atlantiku. Za obdobie posledných 50 rokov každý „progres“ vo svetovom obchodnom systéme bol výsledkom iniciatívy a dohody EÚ a USA. V prípade, že tieto dva bloky nie sú schopné dospieť k dohode, ako to bolo v oblasti poľnohospodárstva v Uruguajskom kole obchodných rokovaní, je malá šanca na úspech posunúť liberalizáciu obchodného systému smerom dopredu.
Dôkazom transatlantickej ekonomickej previazanosti je Nová transatlantická agenda (NTA) a v rámci nej dialóg podnikateľskej komunity – Transatlantický obchodný dialóg (TABD). Ich prioritnou náplňou je budovanie bezbariérového trhu liberalizáciou už aj tak dosť otvorených obchodných a investičných vzťahov a dotváraním efektívnejšieho mechanizmu riešenia vzájomných obchodných sporov. TABD je dobrým príkladom toho, kedy sa regionálne fórum môže stať vhodnou platformou na expandovanie jeho agendy na multilaterálne fórum v globálnom meradle. Charakter dialógu TABD-vláda povzbudzuje kooperatívnejšie hospodárske vzťahy medzi EÚ a USA.
Vytvorením Svetovej obchodnej organizácie (WTO) mnohí experti predpovedali, že globálne obchodné rokovania sa stanú redundantnými. Nie je to tak. Nové kolo globálnych obchodných rokovaní, spustené v Dohe (2001), to len potvrdzuje. Nie je jednoduchšie ako tie kolá predchádzajúce. Naopak, zložitejšie, pretože agenda WTO pokrýva už politicky senzitívne otázky, ktoré sú veľmi úzko naviazané na domácu reguláciu jednotlivých štátov. Tieto problémy navyše rieši organizácia, ktorá má veľmi diverzifikovanú členskú základňu. V prevažnej miere sú členskými krajinami rozvojové krajiny, ktoré majú odlišné záujmy od krajín bohatých, ale majú značné rozdiely aj medzi sebou. Nie je preto prekvapujúce, že nové kolo globálnych obchodných rokovaní napreduje veľmi pomaly.
Ministerská schôdzka v Cancúne (september 2003) je vnímaná ako katalyzátor a kľúčový test pre vlády, či to myslia s liberalizáciou seriózne. Najmä USA a EÚ by mali byť príkladom. Kritickou oblasťou je poľnohospodárstvo. Bez progresu v otázkach s ním spojených je ťažké predpokladať progres v ďalšej liberalizácii priemyselných taríf a obchodu v službách. Takisto je potrebné vyriešiť otázku dodávok liekov pre rozvojové krajiny.
Článok pojednáva o dvoch výzvach spojených s novým kolom globálnych obchodných rokovaní: 1. vzťah EÚ a USA a 2. agenda rozvojových krajín. Vzťahy EÚ a USA sú mimoriadne dôležité pre úspech WTO. Ostatné členské krajiny síce uznávajú fakt, že bez nich žiadny progres v rokovaniach nie je možný, na druhej strane sa však obávajú, že ich vlastné záujmy budú potlačené v prípade dohody dvoch veľmocí. Otvorenými otázkami ich vzťahov je poľnohospodárstvo (zníženie podpory americkým farmárom, reforma CAP), dodávka liekov pre rozvojové krajiny (silne ovplyvňovaná lobingom farmaceutických amerických firiem). Agendou EÚ zostáva presadenie diskutovania investičných pravidiel, verejného obstarávania na pôde WTO, čo je silne oponované rozvojovými krajinami. Nepodstatnou nie je ani úloha domácej politiky v USA a EÚ v nadchádzajúcom období – prezidentské voľby v USA a rozširovanie EÚ.
Samostatnou výzvou je fakt, že Doha kolo má ambíciu nazývať sa „rozvojovým“.
Dobrá tzv. „pro-Doha“ dohoda by mohla priniesť zníženie taríf aj v bohatých, aj chudobných krajinách s prínosom vo výške až 520 mld. USD. Zvýšila by hospodársky rast v rozvojových krajinách a do roku 2015 by pomohla cca 140 mil. ľuďom vymaniť sa z chudoby. Platné pravidlá WTO sú síce ďaleko od perfektných, ale pravda je, že neschopnosť rozvojových krajín získať výhody z obchodu samotného, nie je otázkou nerovnakých príležitostí; v mnohých prípadoch je to dôsledok neschopnosti ich využitia (chýbajúce kapacity a zdroje). Neúspešné krajiny s malým počtom produktívnych priemyselných odvetví nemôžu očakávať zázraky z rastu vyvolaného exportom (vyžaduje si to múdru makroekonomickú politiku, budovanie infraštruktúry, systému vzdelávania a zdravotníctva). Liberalizácia, kombinovaná s dobrou domácou hospodárskou politikou, je silným prispievateľom hospodárskeho rastu a vyššieho životného štandardu.
Neochota priemyselných krajín načúvať požiadavkám rozvojových krajín môže mať za dôsledok aj zníženie kredibility a legitímnosti samotnej WTO. WTO má byť organizácia založená na konsenzuálnom rozhodovaní, nie fungujúca ako exkluzívny klub bohatých krajín. Svet je ešte ďaleko od plnej liberalizácie, špeciálne v oblastiach kľúčových pre rozvojové krajiny.
Globálna prosperita a medzinárodná bezpečnosť veľmi závisia od kooperatívnosti transatlantického vzťahu. Krajiny bohatého severu sa spustením kola globálnych rokovaní v Dohe zaviazali ku konkrétnym krokom smerujúcim k otvoreniu ich trhov, zníženiu dotácií do poľnohospodárstva a pozornosti záujmom rozvojových krajín. Doterajší vývoj však skôr nasvedčuje tomu, že bohaté krajiny pretláčajú záujmy svojich domácich konštituencií. Zatiaľ vyhliadka na úspešné ukončenie kola do roku 2004 je minimálna. Kolo má šancu byť úspešné, ak sa krajiny opäť vrátia k prioritným princípom: ako najlepšie integrovať rozvojové krajiny do globálnej ekonomiky. Liberalizácia obchodu nie je dostatočná na generovanie rozvoja ako takého, ale je dobrým začiatkom.
Kolaps rokovaní by bol tragédiou. Po prvé, nové kolo globálnych obchodných rokovaní je príležitosťou reformovať obchodné pravidlá, ktoré systematicky znevýhodňujú najchudobnejšie krajiny sveta. Po druhé, neúspešnosť rokovaní môže akcelerovať trend smerom k regionalizmu, bilateralizmu, prípadne k unilateralizmu, presadzujúc protekcionistické politiky, čo by malo za následok fragmentáciu globálnej ekonomiky a potlačenie multilaterálneho systému založeného na princípoch nediskriminácie. Najviac postihnutými by opäť boli malé a slabé krajiny. Po tretie, môže v dlhodobom meradle oslabiť WTO ako inštitúciu.

Nová bezpečnostná stratégia USA a transatlantické vzťahy

The New American National Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations

Matúš Korba

The National Security Strategy released (NSS) on September 20, 2002 by the White House may be the most significant US foreign policy statement since NSC 68, the 1950 document that codified the containment strategy of Cold War. The new strategy is a long-overdue codification of the principles underlying President George W. Bush’s foreign a security policy approach.
The body of the NSS makes it clear that American forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States. President G. W. Bush at the West Point speech in June 2002 put it more bluntly: “America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge.” Although military aspect of NSS is important, it is just one part of a more fundamental and more palatable new strategic approach: to tackle, rather than tolerate, the roots of global problems. US diplomatic and economic policies must work to encourage this national security strategy, the document says. Free markets, free trade zones, diplomatic initiatives and public health efforts can be just as important as military campaigns, it notes. The new American security strategy adopts a clear and newly-emphasised thrust: to increase security and economic development by using unrivalled US power and influence to expand freedom and open societies around the world. As in past calls for interventionist foreign policies, the G. W. Bush administration argues effectively that promoting US values overseas ultimately also advances US security.
Changing threats mean changing responses, and defence and security experts and analysts have termed the NSS 2002 the most radical reshaping of the strategy since the end of the Cold War. The threats of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have forced a fundamental reshaping of national security strategy. How the United States defends the homeland has shifted from a strategy of deterrence to one of pre-emption, according to the new strategy. A new emphasis on “pre-emptive” attacks against adversaries may be the hottest topic in news coverage of the new strategy. The strategy proposes expanding the relatively uncontroversial concept of true pre-emption – striking first against an imminent, specific, near certain attack – to the far broader concept of striking first to prevent the possibility of a longer term threat even developing, which might better be labelled preventive war. It is also the concept underscored in President Bush’s introductory message. The rationale for the shift appears to be twofold: to deal with actors who cannot be reliably deterred, and to address the enormous threat posed by the spread of WMD.
Deterrence served the United States well during the Cold War when it confronted the Soviet Union in a nuclear stand-off. Use of nuclear weapons would have meant massive retaliation and “mutually assured destruction”. The NSS 2002 document says the government will defend the United States “by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country”.
The NSS 2002 document insists, the ultimate goal of new American strategy must be to spread democracy everywhere. The United States must finish the job that W. Wilson started. The world, quite literally, must be made safe for democracy. The Bush NSS, therefore, differs in from its recent predecessors. It’s proactive. It rejects the B. Clinton administration’s assumption that since the movement toward democracy and market economics had become irreversible in the post-Cold War era, all the United States had to do was “engage” with the rest of the world to “enlarge” those processes. G. W. Bush administration, unlike several of its predecessors, sees no contradiction between power and principles. It is, in this sense, thoroughly Wilsonian.
But the new strategy is not an American “go-it-alone” tract. G. W. Bush said in the document the United States would work with all like-minded states. The strategy specifically calls for strengthened alliances to defeat global terrorism and prevent attacks. It encourages countries to act regionally to isolate terrorists and deny terrorists havens. The vision is one in which the core democratic-capitalist states (America, NATO allies, Europe generally, and regionally-based geographic outliers like Japan and Australia) will convert their previously defensive, reactive posture into a more proactive, forceful world presence. As stated in the NSS 2002 document, the US will work to expand NATO’s membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of defending and advancing our common interests. The US will try to ensure that the military forces of NATO nations have appropriate combat contributions to make in coalition warfare.
This notion is seen, for instance, in the various D. Rumsfeld trips to Europe to sell NATO allies on the idea of a modernised NATO military machine that could be deployed for offensive operations well outside the bounds of Europe itself. As seen by the G. W. Bush administration, this European capability would not just address intra-state ethnic quarrels, which is the threat currently motivating and dominating European debates about the future of EU combined capabilities and its common defence posture. Rather, Europe would develop the same assessments of global threats to the democratic core, and actively work with the United States in military operations to prevent, pre-empt, and thwart such global threats-in-being, and in the process, ideally expand the democratic core even further outwards.
Europeans noted with satisfaction that the chapter of the National security strategy 2002 devoted to co-operation with “other main centers of global power” begins with Europe. The document, however, steers wide clear of addressing what promises to be the most divisive issue in US-European relations, namely the future division of defence responsibilities between NATO and the European Union’s own defence apparatus and, by extension, the United States and the European Union. Nevertheless, the rest of the text carries a message that will not be lost on US allies in Europe: the United States intends to reinvigorate NATO as a collective defence institution, thus implying a scale-back of US and perhaps even NATO involvement in non-defensive missions such as peacekeeping. A pre-emptive use of force will be task of “ad-hoc” coalitions of willing and able nations, and will likely not be among NATO’s future missions. In this context Europe will delegate many other types of operations – peacekeeping, humanitarian interventions, conflict prevention – to the EU’s new defence arm in the framework of European Security and Defence Policy. The relations between NATO and EU are becoming more and more important not only for efficiency of European security architecture, but also for homogeneity of transatlantic links between USA and its European allies.

a NATO: partneri či súperi?

The European Union and NATO: Partners or Rivals?

Tomáš Valášek

Member states of the European Union differ in their views on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). There is disagreement over how ambitious ESDP should eventually become and, more importantly, whether it should complement or replace the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Future actions by EU members – decisions such as whether to conduct the planned military operation in Moldova with or without NATO cooperation – could set the two institutions on a path toward competition.
The tensions spring in part from a shift in priorities of many EU member states. In a world without a Communist threat, their security strategies are increasingly more focused on spreading a particular vision of a world order. This mission civilatrice has come to upstage defense as the traditional focus of the countries’ security policies. The European mission civilatrice, as expressed in the recent draft EU security strategy released in June 2003, calls for member states to build a “stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order”. It has a markedly different focus from the September 2002 US National Security Strategy, which stresses the need to promote democratization of domestic political systems in countries around the world. While both the EU and the United States agree that democracy is important, their differing priorities led them to clash over the right, under international law, to promote a regime change (in Iraq) by force. The dispute paralyzed NATO and turned the attention of many European countries to the European Union as a possible alternative venue. A security policy conducted under EU auspices would absolve the countries of the need to reconcile their viewpoint with the United States, and allow them to leverage security policies with trade and other tools of foreign policy already being coordinated at the EU level. For the conduct of a security policy focusing not on defense but on a European vision of proper world order, the European Union becomes a far more attractive vehicle than NATO. Washington further aggravated relations among the allies by stating that “the mission defines the coalition”, thus putting in question its own commitment to NATO.
A security and defense policy focusing on advancing Europe’s mission civilatrice would posit the EU as a soft-power alternative to the United States. It would satisfy proponents of European autonomy by clearly separating Europe’s identity from that of the United States, while also pleasing those EU states who see little need in the current security environment for a use of military forces. It is less clear, however, whether Europe could thus deter the threat of catastrophic terrorism. Already the French authorities uncovered and foiled a ploy to crash a hijacked airliner into the Eiffel Tower. Also, Europe may choose not to partake in US security policy but it may not be able to shield itself from consequences of a possible failure of those policies. The European Union depends on Middle Eastern oil to an even larger extent than the United States.
In theory, Europe could also ‘grow teeth’ – develop military capabilities enabling it to independently carry out operations such as the one in Afghanistan in 2001 – 2002. But this may require more political will than is in evidence in Europe today. The military spending of all European states combined is less than the US defense budget. Some of the most vocal proponents of more autonomy for EU defense efforts – the Brussels Four (Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and France) are also, with the exception of France, the lowest spenders of all NATO members. The quest for a more ambitious ESDP seems rooted in an essentially pacifist intellectual tradition, which makes creation of the EU ‘with teeth’ highly unlikely.
For Slovakia, whose declared foreign and security policy ties the country’s defense to NATO, the dispute within the European Union portends several potential pitfalls as well as advantages. First, it behooves the Bratislava government to pay closer attention to defense developments in Brussels, whether within the EU framework (the European Convention, ESDP) or outside (the Summit of Four), and to carefully judge their impact on Slovakia’s interest in maintaining a strong and viable NATO. But one must also address the cause rather than the symptoms of the current tensions between Europe and the United States. One possible avenue of rapprochement is a dialogue on a new understanding of a state’s right to self-defense under the international law; one that would take into account new threats such as the potential marriage of catastrophic terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. There seems to be a renewed willingness in Europe, despite the Iraq debacle, to consider the prevention concept laid out in the 2002 US National Security Strategy. Even a small country like Slovakia could gain considerable diplomatic capital from ability to recognize the right moment and initiate such dialogue, not unlike Norway did with the Oslo peace process.

Vízia modelu Európy budúcnosti

Vision of Future Model of the European Union

Martin Klus

Discussions of the European Convention, which summoning was result of effort to define a mission of the European Union and demeanors, how European Union can this mission subserve that it can operate as democratic and transparent, were ceremoniously finished in the end of June.
Their output is the introduction of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Its role is a European Union reform, to make it easier and effectively operating entity.
This difficult role could be done through unification of its normative base – Establishing Treaties. They could be clear and comprehensible, without change in their substance and processes of behavior of their institutional architecture and legislative implements of the European Union. This could lead to an approach of the European Union to European citizens.
To make a compromise about this important question between various groups and even between member and candidate countries within the Union difficult. The Final Draft Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe reflects it. It should resolve questions such as absence of tripartite power common at national level, requirement of separation between normative and executive in institutional base in the European Union, strengthen the power of national parliaments, reform of the European Parliament, reform of decision making sphere in the European Union, future possibility of two columns European Union structure, review of double – track Europe etc.
It’s more than possible, that Draft Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe introduced by the European Convention, which “effectiveness, simplification and approaching to European citizens” is more than controversial will be a subject to change during the Intergovernmental Conference which will include members and candidate countries of the European Union. Finally this Conference decides about the final version of the document primary determining future Europe.
In hoc, I’ve tried to introduce for a public discussion for lay and special community, a Vision of future model of European Union, as one of European integration development possibilities in closer and distant future, replenish-ed with all criteria defined by the European Convention like an initial for a future European Constitution treaty.
Model is divided into three parts. In the first part, I’ve tried to make a proposal for new, reformed European institutions and legislative processes within the European Union.
The second one consist of answers on questions about future of the three columns structure and vertical division of powers in the European Union.
Finally I didn’t leave unanswered controversial questions about delimitation of Europe as a continent and political body and looking for a capital city of Europe.

Etnická a religiózna mozaika Indonézie

Ethnic and Religious Mosaic of Indonesia

Viktor Krupa

At the beginning of the contribution the author deals with the historical development of the Indonesian borders within southeastern Asian region. He claims that the borders were formed naturally, based on the similar way of life, economy, culture as well as openness to the surrounding civilizations. According to the author, historical unity is significantly demonstrated by the level of language, even though it is the source of fragmentation. Except for a few areas, all the languages of the present Indonesia belong to one group known as austronesian.
In the next part of the article, the author analyses the development of the cultural, political, religious and language system since the prehistoric settlement period up to the presence with all its aspects. The author stresses the fact that the development in Indonesia was affected by more cultural influences than any other Asian country. India posed one of the most influential factors although the Indian models were not borrowed automatically but adapted to the local conditions. Indonesia did not accept the system of castes notwithstanding the Hinduism prevailed for a certain period in Indonesia. Differentiation of this originally homogenous region was influenced by the flow of the cultural aspects from China as well as from the northwestern India. The southern part was modified by the massive and fast formation of Islam and a relative opennes to the European influences.
From the beginning of the 13th century, new integration tendencies were seen in a new universal religion – Islam, spreading into this region. The success of Islam in Indonesia is caused by the fact that it was not the strict Islam, but rather Islam influenced by Sufism. Islam was not spread throughout Indonesia equally. For example in Java, there are groups of strict Islamists; followers of Islam adapted to the Indonesian conditions with its pre-Islamic and animist features and finally, people emphasising the heritage of animism and Hinduism as well as a large group of Christians in Sumatra. During the Sukarno era, the tolerance of religions was ideal but during the Suharto period more serious local conflicts occurred. While in the past Indonesia had to face the problem from the outside world, nowadays there are more complex inner issues – social, economic, as well as potentially religious and ethnic – manifested in the local separatism.
The author also stresses the important aspect of Indonesian language development. Language and ethnic fragmentation of the state required homogeneous language and thus Indonesian language (local variant of Malaysian language) became an official one. The author further describes the historical development of the language, its spreading and usage with all its features in detail.
In the next part of this contribution, the author explains the multiethnicity as a typical phenomenon and a source of conflicts in Indonesia.
In December 1975, Indonesia annexed East Timor, former Portuguese colony, after it had proclaimed independence, which was considered the most acute problem caused by the Indonesian government. The annexation was agreed by the USSR as well as the USA. The world hesitated to speak loudly about Asian colonization even though the Indonesian administration was harder than the European one and took a lot of lives of the East Timor population.
Next potential centers of separatism are in Molucs – north from East Timor. Molucs posed the core of the autonomous state in eastern Indonesia. South Molucs upraised against the Indonesian government in 1950 and proclaimed an independent state lasting for a short period of time. In the last two years, riots, armed conflicts between Christians and Muslims and vandalisms in Molucs have appeared again. More problematic is the future of Irian Jaya (west of New Guinea) which became a part of Indonesia in 1965. This decision was confirmed by the plebiscite in 1969, although Irian has nothing in common culturally and ethnically with the rest of Indonesia. Notwithstanding the fact that the territory of Irian there is rich in natural resources, aboriginal inhabitants have never benefited from it at all and therefore the Operation Free Papua Movement started with its sabotages. There is still guerilla war in the inland going on.
The three-above mentioned centers of resistance are located in the eastern part of Indonesia and are occupied by the non-Muslim population. The fourth, very serious and chronic center lies in the western part of Indonesia – in the north of Sumatra – occupied by Muslim Acehians. They formed the Free Aceh Movement requiring Aceh independence from Indonesia.
The oncoming future of Indonesia will be undoubtedly hectic. However, it would be untimely to speak about the dissolution of Indonesia. The future of Indonesia depends on ability to overcome the old centralistic model and replace it by the system, which would take into consideration the interests of individual regions with their specific economic and cultural needs.

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