Electronic Library of Scientific Literature - © Academic Electronic Press


Vol. XIII / No 2 / 2004


3 Attila Szép

Niektoré inštitucionálne aspekty začleňovania Slovenskej republiky do Európskej únie
Some of the Institutional Aspects of Integration of the Slovak Republic into the European Union

16 Boris Divinský

Zahraničná migrácia v Slovenskej republike: Súčasný stav a predpokladaný vývoj po vstupe krajiny do Európskej únie
International Migration in the Slovak Republic: Its Contemporary State and Expected Development after the Accession of the Country to the European Union

39 Jozef Bátora

Identita a štátny záujem v slovenskej zahraničnej politike

Identity and State Interest in the Foreign Policy of Slovakia


55 Marcin Zaborowski, Kerry Longhurst

Poland and Transatlantic Security
Poľsko a transatlantická bezpečnosť

67 Jeffrey Gedmin

Europe and America after Iraq – and Madrid
Európa a Amerika po udalostiach v Iraku – a v Madride


78 Pavol Demeš, Mário Nicolini

Rozšírená Európa: Nová agenda
Towards a Wider Europe: The New Agenda

85 Jozef Banáš

Parlamentné zhromaždenie NATO Bratislava 2004
NATO Parliamentary Assembly Session Bratislava 2004


92 Milan Zemko

Chmel, Rudolf: Moje slovenské pochybnosti

96 Alena Kotvanová

Divinský, Boris: Migration Trends in Selected EU Applicant Countries VOLUME V – Slovakia An Acceleration of Challenges for Society

101 Ingrid Brocková

Mrak, Mojmir – Rojec, Matija – Silva-Jáuregui, Carlos (eds.): Slovinsko. Z Juhoslávie do Európskej únie.

105 Balázs Jarábik

Antsipienka, Ales – Bulhakau, Valer (eds.): Belarus. Reform Scenarios.

Niektoré inštitucionálne aspekty začleňovania Slovenskej republiky do Európskej únie

Some of the Institutional Aspects of Integration of the Slovak Republic into the European Union

Attila Szép

Since signing of the membership agreement until formal accession to the European Union, the Slovak Republic was in a position of active observer in various committees, different commissions and working groups, including almost all sessions of the EU institutions. During this period, Slovak representatives were involved in a learning process by participating in day-to-day work of the EU. From institutional point of view, understanding of the decision making process followed by creation of appropriate national mechanism was the crucial task of mentioned period. This article is focused on analyses of some basic principles of the decision making process on European affairs in the Slovak Republic with the special attention on the particular role of the National Council of the Slovak Republic.
Bodies of European Communities were created as executive institutions and increasing role of national parliaments and the European Parliament in decision making process is visible since the Maastricht Treaty only. The protocol on the role of national parliaments and COSAC (Conference of the European Affairs Committee created in 1989) attached to the Amsterdam Treaty further strengthen the influence of national legislative bodies to the European affairs. The Protocol defined which documents should be passed to national parliaments for opinion. Intergovernmental co-operation within EMU, CSFP and JHA is by definition excluded from direct influence of national parliaments. Respective member states created different co-ordination mechanism between a government and a parliament. Today, executive power in different member states does not share with legislative power the same volume of information. Draft Protocol to the Constitutional Treaty on the role of national parliaments shall ensure that every parliament will get same information about European legislature in advance directly from EC.
Ability of a national parliament to influence the decision-making process of the European Council by binding mandate for the government remains a key difference between member states. Within the EU-15 three basic schemes could be identified.
1. policy-making – parliaments with a strong interference to the decision taking process, by a right of veto and continuous influence to the whole process of negotiations (e.g. Denmark, Austria)
2. policy influencing – parliaments with moderate interference to the decision taking process by adoption of opinion, but without a right of veto (e.g. United Kingdom, The Netherlands)
3. weak parliaments – parliaments without real interference to the decision taking process, just information (e.g. Italy, Spain, Ireland).
Besides institutional and legal framework, also local political traditions, internal policy balance and other factors are shaping mechanism of co-operation between a government and a parliament in European affairs. Strong legal competencies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic per se do not guarantee their future efficient use. Political parties themselves are playing important role. Austrian experience showed that members of parliament were exercising direct influence for the relatively short period. Actually they are using it for control of the government and as an information channel.
Structure of the MFA and other governmental institutions ensuring functioning of the Slovak Republic as an EU member state.
Currently existing decision-making mechanism in the Slovak Republic was created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Legislative proposals from the Permanent Representation of the Slovak Republic in Brussels are forwarded directly to respective ministries in Bratislava. At each ministry a permanent working group was created, which represents the first, lowest decision making level. Representatives of those working groups use to meet weekly at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at regular meetings of the Commissions for EU affairs. Two Commissions for EU affairs were constituted, by agenda copying EU structures of the COREPER 1 and the COREPER 2. Both Commissions are preparing instructions for Permanent Representation based on opinions of the respective ministries and a framework position of the Slovak Republic. Commissions themselves represent the second, medium decision making level. For sessions of specific councils respective ministry is preparing a special mandate in close co-operation with Commission 1 or 2 based on up-to-date development including results of COREPER meetings. Draft of the mandate is approved by a responsible minister and this is the third, high decision making level. According to the described mechanism Slovakia could be portrayed as a country with weak parliamentary control of the EU decision making process.
There are several reasons for this technocratic decision making mechanism. The key reason is that Slovakia as a new coming country should respect already established decision making process within the EU. Therefore its structure in the Slovak Republic is basically copying by hierarchy and rhythm of sessions the system of Working Groups-COREPER 1, 2-Ministerial Councils as it is functioning in the EC/EU. The leading role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the whole process is some kind of institutional inertia inherited from the period of pre-accession negotiations. Political representatives, neither from executive power nor from the parliament, are not directly involved in decision making process on the first and the second level. Political influence is in principles focused on ex ante and ex post control, without effective management in line of decision making process.
Lack of parliamentary control in the decision making process was principal part of the political debate in relation to the constitutional amendments in the National Council of the Slovak Republic. Political elite division in this question accords the government and the opposition. Representatives of the Christian Democratic Movement and the Hungarian Coalition Party together with some opposition representatives are in favour of deeper involvement of the national parliament in the decision making process in European affairs. There is a certain “democratic deficit” in the decision making process. But establishment of political parties in general do not possess necessary skills and information about the EU to make an efficient and valuable contribution. On side of the wider public a meaningful discussion was missing too. Public debate was focused almost exclusively on drawing from EU support funds and nomination on various political and administrative posts within EC. However, the expert community in Slovakia has an opportunity to influence national processes related to the EU through the National Convention which continue to work.
It is apparent that discussions about the role of the National Council of the Slovak Republic in the decision making process will continue. Interest of political representations to the practical modalities of the decision making process is a positive signal of continual maturity of Slovak political elite in this particular field. However the Slovak parliament actually does not have sufficient administrative and expert capacities for efficient political influence to the decision making process in European affairs.

Zahraničná migrácia v Slovenskej republike: Súčasný stav a predpokladaný vývoj po vstupe krajiny do Európskej únie

International Migration in the Slovak Republic: Its Contemporary State and Expected Development after the Accession of the Country to the European Union

Boris Divinský

The Slovak Republic has become a Member State of the European Union since May 1, 2004. This fact naturally brings about a multitude of consequences, among others in the area of international migration. In the presented contribution we attempt to evaluate not only international migration in the Slovak Republic until its accession to the EU. Also we try to provide some predictions of potential future trends and estimates of impacts of international migration after the accession of Slovakia to the EU for the short period to come.
When analysing the development of international migration in the Slovak Republic, it is methodologically appropriate to differentiate the migrants or foreigners in the country into three cardinal groups: the undocumented (irregular, illegal) migrants, the asylum seekers and refugees, and finally the aliens with a permit to stay in the territory of Slovakia. However, it is necessary to accentuate that reality is much more complex – other categories may be constituted by the legal and illegal labour migrants, former migrants with permanent residence in the country, de-facto refugees, displaced persons, persons with the acquired Slovak citizenship, repatriates, voluntary returnees, etc.
The development in the field of undocumented migration in the Slovak Republic has been quite dramatic since 1993. Table 1 demonstrates the absolute numbers of irregular migrants, namely in both directions – to and from the country – till April 2004. Out of the figures shown it is apparent that during the observed period Slovakia underwent several stages; a radical turning point happened in 1998 and then from 2001 up to now. This dynamics reflects a general growth of migration in the region of Central and Eastern Europe owing to the migration pressure from more countries, particularly in Asia. It is worth mentioning the following fact: the indicator of the absolute number, but mainly that of the relative number of irregular migrants (i.e. the ratio of these migrants to the number of all inhabitants in the country) for Slovakia belongs to a group of the highest values within the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is evident that Slovakia represents a transit territory for irregular migrants, unequivocally in the direction from the east to the west (Table 2). The structure of countries of origin as regards these migrants to the Slovak Republic has moderately been modifying over recent years. In general, undocumented migration to Slovakia is primarily of an economic character, i.e. it is made up by voluntary economic migrants – mostly from South and East Asia (China, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam), then from some European regions (Russia – Chechnya, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia) as well as certain African states. Nevertheless, it is also partly motivated by political reasons – war events, conflicts, repressions or any discrimination (at present Chechnya, previously Afghanistan, Iraq etc.).
The asylum seekers and the refugees form the second fundamental group of foreign migrants in the territory of Slovakia. The absolute number of irregular migrants in the country has since 1993 increased roughly for 6 – 7 times, but the quantitative growth of asylum seekers was much more remarkable within the given period. In 2003, their number exceeded the limit of 10,000 persons yearly for the first time and thus rose almost 120 times against 1992 (Table 3). However, only a minimum number of asylum applicants in Slovakia are granted asylum. This circumstance is often a subject for criticism by non-governmental organisations, international institutions and migrants themselves. Moreover, if the ratio of the number of illegal migrants to the number of Slovak inhabitants is practically the highest in the region of Central Europe, it is absolutely contrariwise in the case of granted asylums. Among the countries with the highest number of asylum seekers in Slovakia within a longer period belong Afghanistan, India, China, Iraq, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Somalia. The absolute numbers of asylum seekers from Afghanistan and Iraq, however, markedly decreased recently, while the number of applicants from Russia (more than 1/4 out of the total in 2003), Moldova, Armenia and Georgia intensely grows.
The quantitative development of aliens with a permit to stay in the territory of the Slovak Republic has to a considerable degree a different character than that of irregular migrants and asylum seekers. The category of these foreigners existed here already during the communist regime so they are not a new phenomenon in the country. Due to this fact too the structure of countries of their origin is significantly dissimilar. Among the 10 most represented countries of origin of such aliens may naturally be found almost all neighbouring countries, having intensive working and kin relations to Slovakia. The Czech Republic and Ukraine dominate in number (Table 5). The next subgroups are constituted by countries with a more numerous Slovak minority / Slavic nation having immigration traditions (Romania, Yugoslavia, also Bulgaria, Croatia), then by countries with historically formed communities in the territory of Slovakia (Vietnam, Russia, lately China) and recently the numbers of foreigners from some countries of the EU (Germany, Austria, Italy, United Kingdom, France) and also the U.S.A. and others increase too. But it is evident from Table 4 that, on the whole, after a certain numerical growth of these migrants at the initial stage of independent Slovakia we have been witnessing their stagnation since 1998. Currently they represent around 0.55% of the total number of Slovak residents.
When drawing a possible trajectory of the development of international migration to Slovakia following the country’s accession to the EU, we have to take into consideration factors evoking and influencing this migration. In addition, international migration is a highly complex, heterogeneous, largely stochastic phenomenon. For this reason it is extremely difficult to formulate any predictions of the development of international migration on a territory; the lesser area it is (as is the case of the Slovak Republic), the harder task it is. Hitherto this topic has not been elaborated in Slovak scientific literature. Therefore it is inevitable – at estimating a potential future extent of international migration in the country – to start from the broadest spectrum of contemporary as well as expected impacts of various processes, phenomena, factors and mechanisms determining migration shifts and flows on an international scale with an emphasis on Slovakia.
Development of international migration, especially in the macro-region of Europe, Asia, Africa. It seems that neuralgic points of endemic violence will here be preserved (Chechnya, Caucasus, countries of Near and Middle East, Sri Lanka, some states in sub-Saharan Africa) or replaced by others (Central Asia, India-Pakistan, the Philippines, Tai-wan, some countries in South Africa?) in the coming period. That is why migration flows from these regions to Europe onto/through the territory of the Slovak Republic as a result of political reasons will probably continue to an unchanged degree. As regards international migration for economic reasons, experts even forecast its growth towards the EU in association with: the increasing demographic pressure in mother countries, enhancing differences in the living standards, greater possibilities to travel worldwide, flexible traffickers’ networks and the like. On that account, we can legitimately believe that the number of migrants from countries such as China, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan; from regions of South-East and Central Asia; from former countries of the Soviet Union or from some poor countries of Africa will be on the increase. Analogically, the extent of so-called environmental migration is expected to rise as well.
Eastern border and the Schengen zone. The Slovak Republic has become a Member State of the EU and through its eastern border forms also a part of the outer limit of the EU. From 2007 Slovakia will be a full component of the Schengen zone. However, some regulations of the Schengen acquis had to be implemented before the country’s accession to the EU, the others will have to be carried out till the end of 2006. Already in 1999 the Slovak Government passed the Conception of service of the border and alien police in the perspective of integrating the Slovak Republic into the countries of the Schengen Agreement – the protection of the outer limit of the EU. Then, in 2001 the Government passed the Schengen action plan and in 2002 the Strategy of completing the protection of the State border of Schengen type. With the help of these measures, legal, personal, economic, material and technical requirements have been partly ensured for the forthcoming period. Current and future priorities thus are: to finish the model of protecting the State border with the aim to eliminate undocumented migration and criminal activities connected with it; to improve the organisation of work through new forms and methods and by modern technical means; to integrate Slovakia into the information systems to detect and register illegal migrants, searched persons and counterfeit documents. We can also partly suppose that the situation in the area of co-operation between respective Slovak and Ukrainian authorities will be improved within the attempts of Ukraine to be more associated with the countries of the EU. It may be summarised that the number of irregular migrants in the territory of Slovakia could modestly grow in the very next period (10 – 15 thousand in 2004?). Nevertheless, it is impossible to provide a more precise quantitative estimate of the figure without a considerable potential error.
Asylum issues and the Dublin Convention. The situation in the field of asylum migration in the Slovak Republic is marked with an extraordinary dynamics and it is presumed that such a tendency will continue in the future too. The number of asylum applications will be growing and the importance of Slovakia as a destination country could be noticeably enhanced right after the accession of the country to the EU. An outlined trend in Table 3 referring to the first months of 2004 allows to forecast the final number of asylum seekers in Slovakia in this year to 13 – 14 thousand persons. The Dublin Convention passed by the Government will bring Slovakia an accrual of migrants too, this time in the direction from the west. It is a consequence of the Convention; the Member States of the EU will hand over to Slovakia all irregular migrants entering the EU territory through the Slovak Republic as well as all asylum seekers who applied for asylum in the Slovak Republic but later left the country for the EU. Among other things, the identification system EURODAC based on scanning fingerprints serves to the effective implementation of the Dublin Convention. There are 35 workplaces of the border and alien police and some workplaces of Migration office connected to this system in Slovakia. The reality of first three weeks after launching the system proves its functionality; out of some 650 scanned persons approximately three tens were “positive”.
Structural changes in view of aliens with a permit to stay. The increase of their number is not much expected in the Slovak Republic in the coming period. Reasons for such a stagnation are not unequivocal. On the one hand, Slovakia after all does not represent an especially attractive destination. Nor the communities of foreign compatriots already established in the country are so numerous. It seems that the accession of Slovakia to the EU will practically not much change this situation. On the other hand, according to expressions of aliens proper, the Slovak Republic does not signalise too high willingness to grant permits to stay, particularly to foreigners from economically less developed countries. Moreover, impacts of momentary social and economic reforms realised now in Slovakia do not create a hospitable climate for economically weaker entrepreneurs or employees from among the aliens. As regards the structure of categories of permitted stays and countries of origin of aliens, it is gradually changing. Since 2004 the citizens of the EU in the territory of the Slovak Republic have had the right to permanent stay already. For this reason we can legitimately count upon an increase in the number of those foreigners with permanent stay in Slovakia who will come mainly from countries of Western Europe and who will here carry out their high-skilled labour activities in the tertiary and quaternary sectors. On the contrary, it is possible to presume that the number of low-skilled workers coming from countries outside the EU (e.g. the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Asia) – who were previously more granted temporary or permanent stays – will drop. A part of them will then logically join the group of illegally working and staying persons in the territory of Slovakia so this category of migrants will rise in number too.
New migration policy of the Slovak Republic. Slovakia is missing a newly defined (and applied in practice) State migration policy reflecting not only the contemporary situation, but primarily expected trends in the field of international migration, namely in a broader geographical, temporal and functional context. Such a migration policy should refer to all spheres of international migration and should also: comprise a more exact articulation of conditions for the employment and enterprise of aliens on the Slovak labour market; reform the integration policy for refugees; modify principles of granting the Slovak citizenship; harmonize the visa policy; complete and revise readmission agreements; promote a more intensive participation of foreigners in domestic political, administrative and economic power and civic life; accept a greater cultural diversity; change the perception of migrants by the public opinion in Slovakia etc.
Only in this way it is possible to gradually mitigate a presumable growth of undocumented migration to the territory of the Slovak Republic and, on the contrary, to support those migrants who have interest in life and work in the country in conformity with the possibilities and legal standards of Slovakia and the European Union. In any case, however, international migration is one of the immanent attributes of a globalising world, to which the Slovak Republic belongs a bit more since May 1, 2004. Due to this fact, Slovak society will have to get used to the increasing number of its members coming originally from abroad.

Identita a štátny záujem v slovenskej zahraničnej politike

Identity and State Interest in the Foreign Policy of Slovakia

Jozef Bátora

The article invokes a set of social constructivist approaches to the study of world politics and conceptualises Slovak foreign policy in the light of identity formation. Central to the argument is the notion that actions of states cannot be derived exclusively from state interests (as realists in the IR theory would have it) but that identities of states precede interests. As Wendt (1998:231) argues, “[i]nterests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is… [Yet] identities by themselves do not explain action, since being is not the same thing as wanting… Without interests identities have no motivational force, without identities interests have no direction.” It is therefore crucial for a state (or any other actor) to have an identity so as to be able to act in a meaningful way. Establishing an identity is dependent upon an actors’ self-understanding and on the recognition of this self-understanding as valid by other actors with whom s/he interacts. Identity therefore is reflexive. The ability to bestow a certain identity upon us rests with those actors who already are what we are striving to become. Ringmar (1996:81) calls these audiences the circles of recognition.
Facing problems with receiving recognition of a particular self-understanding, we have three options (ibid., p. 82). We can accept others’ descriptions of ourselves; we can try to modify our self-understanding and describe ourselves anew; or we can stand by our original self-understanding and try to convince the circles of recognition that it is valid. If we choose the last option, words most likely will not suffice, and what we instead do is to act. Such “action does not seek to maximise utility or minimise loss, but instead to establish a standard – a self – by which utilities and losses can be measured. These are consequently not ‘rational actions’, but instead actions undertaken in order to make rational actions possible. We act, as it were, in ‘self defence’ in the most basic sense of the word – in defence of the applicability of our descriptions of our selves” (ibid., p. 83).
New states upon their entrance into the international system strive for recognition and for the development of a particular identity. Slovakia was no exception. The first five years of Slovakia’s independence were characterised by an unclear identity of the state. There was a discrepancy between the self-descriptions of Slovakia as a country ready to enter the EU and NATO presented by the government of the Prime Minister Mečiar and the negative descriptions of Slovakia in the circles of recognition in the EU and NATO reflecting the semi-authoritarian political style of the very same Slovak Prime Minister. The new government that came to power following the election in 1998 had tried to overcome the negative descriptions of Slovakia in the circles of recognition of the EU and NATO through action. A primary example of such actions was for instance the decision to open the Slovak air-space to NATO forces during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. Similarly, adoption of structures in the EU pre-accession process reflected the same dynamics of recognition-seeking. In general, a focus on aspects of identity enables us to see the interconnectedness between domestic politics and foreign policies, as the character of domestic political processes largely defines the identity of the state, which in turn defines state interests and actions in foreign policy.
When it comes to practical implications of the identity-focus for the conduct of Slovak foreign policy, there are at least two areas in which this is relevant. First, in the work of Slovak diplomatic missions abroad. Given instant access to information on events abroad through the media, the value added by Slovak diplomats should be their deep understanding of local cultures and identities of foreign constituencies, which the Slovak government and public cannot perceive from their Central-European perspective. The thrust of the information function of Slovak embassies should therefore be moving from the simple information gathering and reporting towards editing and interpretation of events abroad. The Slovak diplomats should become interpreters of events instead of simply reporters on events.
Secondly, the focus on identity issues will have impact on the strategies of public diplomacy. The building blocks of such strategies will be consistent narratives locating Slovakia in time and space, and outlining its specifics and values. Presentation of the narratives would be supported by a set of metaphors capturing the essentials of the narratives. The goal will be to achieve a situation, where the term ‘Slovakia’ will be associated with positive values by foreign audiences. A nuanced approach and co-ordination are necessary due to the fact that different segments of Slovak engagement abroad will be helped by different kinds of narratives and metaphors. Legitimisation of public diplomacy narratives is also crucial as they in turn will shape the identity of the Slovak constituency.
To sum up, analysing Slovak foreign policy through the lens of identity allows for at least three propositions. First, given its membership in the EU and NATO, Slovakia anno 2004 has different identity and thereby different interests than Slovakia anno 1993. This has implications for the character of Slovakia’s relations with the EU and NATO member states and with third states. Secondly, given the stabilisation of Slovakia’s belonging in terms of foreign affairs, the aspects of identity will become increasingly “invisible” and interests will increasingly seem the primary determinants of Slovakia’s foreign policy actions. Thirdly, Slovakia’s membership in the EU and NATO means that Slovakia now starts to play a role as a member of the circles of recognition for those countries in Southern and Eastern Europe and the adjacent regions, which strive for membership or intensification of relations with the EU and NATO. This means that Slovakia now can use this position for awarding recognition to those policies of the countries in question that are coherent with Slovak values and foreign policy priorities. Recognition, in other words, is a powerful foreign policy tool.

Poland and Transatlantic Security

Poľsko a transatlantická bezpečnosť

Marcin Zaborowski a Kerry Longhurst

Marcin Zaborowski, Centre for International Relations, a Kerry Longhurst, European Research Institute na University of Birmingham sa vo svojom príspevku, ktorý je napísaný na základe ich článku uverejneného v októbrovom čísle International Affairs, zamerali na poľský transatlanticizmus.
Poľsko sa od začiatku 90. rokov javí ako jeden z najbližších spojencov Spojených štátov v strednej a východnej Európe. Najmä po udalostiach v septembri 2001 sa Poľsko ukázalo byť Spojeným štátom bližšie ako ktorýkoľvek z ich západoeurópskych spojencov. Dá sa teda povedať, že zatiaľ čo udalosti po 11. septembri spôsobili „vylúčenie“ Paríža a Berlína z úzkeho okruhu blízkych amerických spojencov, Poľsko túto medzeru promptne vyplnilo.
Spojené štáty vnímajú Poľsko, aj v dôsledku jeho populácie a geografickej polohy, ako dôležitého hráča v NATO a následne po jeho prijatí do EÚ sa očakáva, že jeho úloha regionálnej mocnosti bude ešte výraznejšia. Aj v dôsledku rozkolu, ktorý nastal v EÚ počas irackej krízy, a ktorý poukázal na relatívne slabú víziu Nemecka a Francúzka o úlohe Európy vo svete, sa môžeme domnievať, že Poľsko bude pravdepodobne patriť ku skupine štátov, ktoré budú v blízkej budúcnosti formovať novú Európu a jej zahraničnú politiku.
Príčiny blízkeho vzťahu Poľska a USA sú výhradne strategické. Poľsko vníma americkú prítomnosť v Európe ako záruku svojej územnej bezpečnosti a pre USA je Poľsko spriateleným štátom na strategickej hranici západnej a východnej Európy. Ako spomenul americký veľvyslanec v Poľsku Ch. R. Hill: „Poliaci a Američania majú vo všeobecnosti spoločný pohľad na bezpečnostnú a zahraničnú politiku, čo je dôsledkom našich konkrétnych historických skúseností.“ Poľské elity sú podobne ako tie americké skeptické aj čo sa týka multilateralizmu. Mali rovnaký pohľad aj na situáciu v Iraku, argumentujúc, že pre vojenský zásah v Iraku nebola rezolúcia OSN potrebná. Pôvod tejto zhody má samozrejme rozličné korene. Kým v USA tento postoj vyplýval z ich sily, v prípade Poľska bol založený na jeho relatívnej slabosti. Autori to vysvetľujú cez prizmu teórie R. Kagana, ktorý argumentuje tým, že zatiaľ čo Európa potrebuje multilaterálne inštitúcie, aby tak kompenzovala svoju relatívnu slabosť, USA vďaka svojmu oveľa väčšiemu armádnemu potenciálu vnímajú multilaterálne organizácie skôr ako obmedzujúce než umožňujúce zásah. S tým však nekorešponduje správanie sa stredo- a východoeurópskych krajín. Kagan pri koncipovaní tejto teórie pravdepodobne nevzal do úvahy skutočnosť, že v Európe existuje názorová diverzita. Namiesto toho, to, čo poňal ako Európu, je iba vykreslenie nemeckého a francúzskeho postoja. Jeho teória sa teda neviaže na Európu ako celok.
Vôbec nie je prekvapujúce, že Poľsko, podobne ako aj ďalšie postkomunistické štáty, podporilo americký postoj voči Iraku. Okrem toho, že mali možno rovnaké motívy ako niektoré západoeurópske krajiny (teda že nesúhlasia s nemeckým a francúzskym pohľadom na svet), ich podnety sú pre región špecifické a potrebujú ďalšie prepracovanie. Kaganova dichotómia americkej sily a európskej slabosti sa dá použiť v tom prípade, ak bude zrejmé, že poľský atlanticizmus, rovnako ako atlanticizmus ostatných postkomunistických štátov, je výsledkom ich „slabosti“. Slabosť tohto regiónu vyplýva najmä z geopolitickej zraniteľnosti a nedávnej minulosti, keď tieto štáty patrili do tzv. sovietskeho bloku. Na rozdiel od západoeurópskych štátov, Poliaci a podobne aj ostatné stredo- a východoeurópske krajiny nechcú obmedzovať americkú hegemóniu. V skutočnosti má Varšava záujem na tom, aby USA boli v Európe prítomné a presadzovali svoju politiku. Keďže Poliaci sa zmierili s faktom, že nie sú sami schopní zabezpečiť svoju bezpečnosť, akceptujú hegemonický medzinárodný systém. Avšak len v tom prípade, pokiaľ nie je hegemón ich bezprostredným susedom. Ako autori tvrdia, je zrejmé, že americká sila je živým dôkazom neefektívnosti Európy ako celku v otázkach kolektívnej bezpečnosti, alebo ako tvrdí Kagan, aktuálneho úpadku. Naopak fakt, že Poliaci sa stali akýmsi protežantom USA pre nich znamená ozdravenie ich bezpečnosti, resp. ich všeobecného statusu.
Aby sme tieto rozdiely v Európe pochopili, je nutné rozumieť podstate poľského strategického vývoja. Po prvé, poloha medzi Nemeckom a Sovietskym zväzom, resp. Ruskom, bola v minulosti zdrojom ohrození poľskej štátnosti. Aj v dôsledku tejto skutočnosti ostáva poľská bezpečnostná politika primárne koncentrovaná na otázku teritoriálnej obrany. Nie je preto prekvapujúce, že Poľsko silne podporuje NATO, vedené USA, ktoré je schopné reagovať na základe článku 5. Aj poľská východná politika je poznačená historickou skúsenosťou, a preto sa niekedy javí úplne inak ako východná politika západoeurópskych štátov. Je charakterizovaná najmä silnou podporou novovzniknutým štátom medzi Poľskom a Ruskom, Ukrajine, demokratizačným pohybom v Bielorusku a rozšíreniu NATO za jeho východnú hranicu. Po druhé, poľská aktívna účasť v operáciách, v ktorých je ohrozená stabilita určitého regiónu, vyplýva z pretrvávajúcich aspektov poľskej identity – boli obeťami západoeurópskeho pacifizmu. Ide najmä o politiku appeasementu Francúzska a Veľkej Británie voči Hitlerovi. Po tretie je to ambivalentný postoj voči multilaterálnym bezpečnostným organizáciám (s výnimkou NATO). Tento postoj opäť vyplýva z historickej skúsenosti. Poliaci sú silne kritický najmä voči Spoločenstvu národov, ktoré nebolo schopné zabrániť druhej svetovej vojne. OSN má síce v Poľsku lepšiu reputáciu, no tej zas vyčítajú, že nebola schopná zabrániť vzniku studenej vojny a nechala tak Poľsko na „zlej“ strane železnej opony.
Aj keď je transatlantická komunita v súčasnosti širšia, je takisto viac vnútorne rozdelená. Takéto rozdrobenie sa však nehodí do Kaganovej teórie, podľa ktorej je Európa na jednej strane a USA na druhej. Ide skôr o vnútornú rozdrobenosť samotnej Európy, ktorú americký minister obrany rozdelil na novú a starú. V tomto ponímaní patrí Poľsko určite do Rumsfedlovej novej Európy. Táto skutočnosť bola potvrdená podpísaním tzv. listu ôsmich stredo- a východoeurópskych predsedov vlád, ktorým podporili zásah v Iraku. Zatiaľ čo západoeurópske mocnosti, ktoré zásah podporili, k tomu viedli obavy z irackého ohrozenia svetovej bezpečnosti, pre Poľsko to bol sekundárny faktor. Postoj Varšavy k irackej kríze, spolu s ambivalentným postojom voči EBOP a jej jasná podpora americkému raketovému obrannému programu boli jednoznačne v súlade s kľúčovou dogmou poľskej zahraničnej politiky – snaha o pokračovanie angažovanosti USA v Európe. Len čas ukáže, či sa po vstupe Poľska do EÚ niečo zmení, ale podľa autorov existujú minimálne tri dôvody, pre ktoré nebude poľský transatlanticizmus ohrozený. Po prvé, poľská východná hranica ostáva východnou hranicou EÚ. Ak vezmeme do úvahy teritoriálnu bezpečnosť, ktorú, ako už bolo spomenuté, Poľsko vníma ako kľúčovú, ostane NATO pre Poľsko naďalej kľúčovou bezpečnostnou garanciou. Po druhé, EÚ je v otázkach zahraničnej a bezpečnostnej politiky aj naďalej rozdelená. A po tretie, rola, ktorú zohrali USA pri skončení studenej vojny, ako aj podpora demokratizácie v Poľsku, je pre Poľsko stále nenahraditeľná.
Ak to teda nebude členstvo v EÚ, čo podkope poľský transatlanticizmus a jeho nesporne kladný vzťah k NATO, môže to byť iba nezvládnutie svojej regionálnej úlohy a neschopnosť modernizovať svoje ozbrojené sily, pretože v dôsledku vstupu nových členov stráca Poľsko svoj status nováčika a je vnímane rovnako ako staré členské štáty. Ak teda Poľsko zlyhá v týchto úlohách, môže sa štruktúra jeho vzťahov s USA zmeniť.

Europe and America after Iraq – and Madrid

Európa a Amerika po udalostiach v Iraku – a v Madride

Jeff Gedmin

Jeff Gedmin, riaditeľ Aspen Institute v Berlíne, sa vo svojom príspevku, ktorý predniesol na podujatí Inštitútu pre verejné otázky v rámci projektu Politickí aktéri a budúcnosť transatlantických vzťahov, zameral hlavne na objasnenie dvoch pre neho dôležitých bodov. Prvým je vzťah Ameriky a Európy, za zlomový bod ktorého považuje 10. november 1989, deň, kedy definitívne padol Berlínsky múr. Táto udalosť predstavovala podľa Gedmina začiatok konca komunizmu, začiatok európskeho unifikačného procesu, ale najmä to bol dátum, po ktorom Európa zistila, že vzťah, ktorý mala dovtedy so Spojenými štátmi, je odrazu iný, a že závislosť od USA, ktorú pociťovala počas studenej vojny – obdobia spolupráce, súčinnosti, ako aj konfrontácie – sa kvalitatívne zmenila. Zmenila sa zo dňa na deň. Oba kontinenty boli nútené svoju reláciu prehodnotiť. Ak sa obzrieme späť do obdobia ostatných 15 rokov, môžeme vo vzťahu Amerika – Európa spozorovať niečo svieže, normálne a racionálne. Je to práve dôsledok prehodnotenia vzájomných vzťahov. V súvislosti s diskurzom prebiehajúcim v dôsledku irackej krízy cituje autor nemeckého ministra zahraničných vecí Joshku Fishera, ktorý povedal, že celá táto debata by mohla byť najmä o tom, v akom svete chceme žiť. Ako tvrdí autor, bolo to presne o tom, aké inštitúcie, pravidlá, vyššie záujmy a priority budeme mať. Čo však autorovi vo vyjadrení chýba, je jadro celého tohto vzťahu, a tým je moc. Podľa autora sa to týka najmä moci, úcty, dôvery, rovnosti. Je to veľmi komplikované vzhľadom na skutočnosť, že nie všetci Európania zmýšľajú rovnako. Európa totiž dnes nie je tou Európou studenej vojny, ktorá bola vedená Berlínom, Bruselom či Parížom. Dnes je to Európa, ktorá sa 10. novembra prebudila a povedala si, že USA už tak veľmi nepotrebuje a chcela by si s nimi vybudovať nový vzťah. Ako tvrdí autor, USA pravdepodobne podcenili skutočnosť, že počas 40 rokov trvajúcej studenej vojny bolo pre západnú Európu veľmi ťažké prehltnúť fakt, že je menejcenným partnerom USA a že v kľúčových momentoch musí stáť pri nich. Ešte ťažšie to bolo možno pre Nemecko, ktoré bolo rozdelené, nebolo stálym členom Bezpečnostnej rady OSN, nemalo jadrové zbrane ani vlastnú nezávislú zahraničnú politiku. Keďže to Nemecko malo počas tohto obdobia ťažšie, možno to v súčasnosti dáva pocítiť USA.
Druhým a nemenej významným bodom je 11. september 2001. Autor súhlasí s vyjadrením, že 11. september bol útokom na demokraciu, civilizáciu, liberalizmus a mravnosť, ale podľa jeho názoru išlo predovšetkým o účelový, zámerný útok na Spojené štáty americké, hoci si uvedomuje, že USA neboli jediné, ktoré boli ohrozené. Neboli to len občania USA, ktorí zahynuli, boli to aj Európania a  teroristi odvtedy zabili ďalších, ale existujú určité príčiny, pre ktoré sa autor domnieva, že útoky boli namierené predovšetkým proti USA, nie výhradne, ale predovšetkým. Možno práve preto teraz nastal čas, aby si aj Amerika povedala, že síce Európu potrebuje, ale trochu menej ako v období studenej vojny. Spojené štáty išli do vojny proti Iraku a mnohí im vyčítali, že to urobili unilaterálne. Jeff Gedmin však tvrdí, že nie. Urobili to bez Nemecka a bez Francúzska, ale aj keď mali vytvoriť širšiu koalíciu, stále mali podporu Austrálie, Južnej Kórey, Japonska, Španielska, Poľska a ďalších stredoeurópskych krajín, Dánska a Veľkej Británie. Aj keď to teraz vyznieva inak, z pohľadu Američanov predstavoval 11. september objektívny dôvod na zmenu kvality diskurzu a postoja voči Európe. Je to aj preto, že americkí stratégovia, vnímajúc problémy v Indii, Pakistane, Kórei, Číne atď. považujú práve tieto oblasti za zóny potenciálneho ohrozenia. Práve kvôli tomuto začali vnímať Európu odlišne, a  ako tvrdí autor, pravdepodobne to bude v najbližších rokoch pokračovať.
Na záver svojho príspevku sa Gedmin vyjadruje k situácii v Madride. Podľa neho sa len v najbližších rokoch ukáže, či skúsenosti z Madridu budú tým, čo zblíži Európu s USA v boji proti terorizmu, alebo či sa ich cesty rozídu. Autor považuje postoj španielskej vlády za úplne normálny. Ako však pripomína, vyjadrenia nového predsedu vlády sa zhodujú s cieľmi Al-Káidy zatriasť koalíciou. Práve toto narúša koalíciu v Iraku a prehliada dôležitosť a potrebu chápať tento problém nielen ako otázku uplatňovania zákonov, ale aj ako problém zahraničnej politiky – zahraničnej politiky, ktorá používa množstvo nástrojov, vrátane vojenskej intervencie a použitia sily.
Čo sa týka Iraku, táto situácia nechala množstvo otvorených otázok a problémov, ale sústredených výhradne v Iraku, pretože podľa autora mali USA dobrých Európanov, ktorí ich podporili, a rovnako dobrých Európanov, ktorí ich nepodporili. Vojna sa však skončila a v súčasnosti čelíme iným výzvam, keďže v Iraku zostali dve diferencované skupiny, ktoré majú spoločný cieľ – rozvrátiť koalíciu a vyhnať USA z Iraku, zabrániť rozvoju bezpečnosti a stability a vytvoreniu irackej vlády.
Je samozrejmé, že zmeny v regiónoch napätia sa neuskutočnia zo dňa na deň. Je potrebné prísť na skutočné korene a pohnútky radikálnych islamistov. Je to dlhodobý proces a za taký je nutné ho aj považovať. Ak si však hlbšie neuvedomíme príčiny, ktoré sme si uvedomovali počas 40 rokov v strednej a východnej Európe – boj za slobodu, sebaurčenie, politický pluralizmus – pravdepodobne v najbližších dekádach nedosiahneme žiaden výrazný pokrok v riešení problému radikálneho islamizmu.

Rozšírená Európa: Nová agenda.
Zápisky z medzinárodnej konferencie think tankov a expertov Bratislava 18. – 19. marca 2004

Towards a Wider Europe: The New Agenda

Pavol Demeš, Mário Nicolini

The German Marshall Fund of the United States, in co-operation with the Slovak Foreign Policy Association and the Institute of Public Affairs (Slovakia), convened an international conference entitled Towards a Wider Europe: The New Agenda. The meeting took place on 18 March 2004 in Bratislava, Slovakia, prior to a parallel conference of some ten Central and East European Prime Ministers, two Presidents from the Southern Caucasus as well as NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the EU Commissioner Guenter Verheugen.
Coming several weeks before the official accession of Central and Eastern Europe to the European Union and NATO, this was one of the first major international conferences to focus attention on defining a new agenda for the Euro-Atlantic community toward wider Europe. This conference brought together over hundred high-level experts and representatives of policy think tanks from more than twenty countries in Central and Eastern Europe, both those to join the EU and NATO this year and those representing the immediate Southern and Eastern neighbourhood of the enlarging Euro-Atlantic community. Leading experts from the United States and Western Europe, as well as relevant international organisations, joined the discussions.
In helping to identify crucial challenges for the years to come, this conference aimed to help set an agenda for foreign and security policy for the countries in the region, as well as of the Euro-Atlantic community more broadly. With the dual enlargement of the EU and NATO this year, a major part of Central and Eastern Europe will become formally and firmly anchored in the main structures of European and transatlantic integration. The achievement of membership will shift the foreign and security policy agenda of accession countries, as well as of both organisations more broadly, increasingly towards new geographical and problem areas. These significant challenges were central to this conference.
Panel I – Wider Europe: Both the EU and NATO need to define and develop their relationship with Europe’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. To date, various forms of partnerships have been established. Beyond that, the Wider Europe paper proposed by the EU outlines a new and comprehensive framework. The first panel discussed areas of co-operation with the countries acceding to, negotiating with, and remaining outside the European Union and NATO.
Panel II – Integrating the Balkans: The Balkan countries, their political and economic reform processes, and their eventual integration into Euro-Atlantic structures remain one of the primary challenges in the immediate neighbourhood of an enlarged NATO and the EU. The second panel addressed current and possible future approaches that can assist the Balkans in accomplishing the dual goal of internal reform and external integration.
Panel III – Security in the Black Sea Region: The Black Sea region bridges the space between the realm encompassed by Euro-Atlantic structures and the Greater Middle East with its manifold and complex challenges for security and democracy in the world. For this reason, increasing attention is geared towards developing a comprehensive security strategy for the Black Sea region. The third panel focused on recent efforts and possible approaches in this area.
Panel IV – Challenges to Democracy and Security: The Wider Europe framework, the reform and integration process in the Balkans, and security issues arising around the Black Sea describe three of the most salient challenges for security and democracy. Others will certainly have to be added, not least in the Greater Middle East and in other regions of the world where freedom, democracy and security still face uncertain prospects.

Parlamentné zhromaždenie NATO Bratislava 2004

NATO Parliamentary Assembly Session Bratislava 2004

Jozef Banáš

At the beginning of this article it is necessary to stress that the basis of the Parliamentary Assembly work depends on activities of 5 Committees and 9 Sub-Committees. During the Session in Bratislava the reports on development of Caucasus as well as fight against the children trafficking in Europe were discussed within the Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security. The transatlantic co-operation and fight against terrorism in Afghanistan, European Security and Defence Policy, NATO Response Force, the role of Europe in the process of stabilisation of the Balkans as well as implementation of the Prague commitments were the main topics of the session of the Defence and Security Committee. The discussion within Committee on Economics and Security concentrated on post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan, economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe and its influence on environment. The debate within the Political Committee focused on the dominant topic of the Session – NATO and the use of force, the EU – NATO relations, further development in the Western Balkans, transatlantic relation and security conception of the EU. The Science and Technology Committee discussed the issue of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and missile defence system and weapons in space. Transatlantic relation was the official topic of three Committees. The key discussion in this regard focused on the further development in Iraq. The aspects of further political, security and military development in this country were also analysed. The report of the reporter Jos van Gennip dealt with the post-war reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Another topic of the session concerned the issue of NATO and the use of force. The main goal of the Bert Koenders report was to initiate a discussion within the NATO member states on who authorises military force and under which conditions.
The Western Balkans was also the intensively discussed issue during the Session. The reporter stressed the need for closer NATO, EU and other stakeholders co-operation for stabilisation.
Relations of NATO, Russia and Ukraine, co-operation in the Mediterranean region and the Caucasus were debated as well. The significant issue being discussed was the relation between NATO and the EU, especially relations of the Response Force of both organisations.
Significance of the Bratislava Session is based on the fact that it was held short before the NATO Summit in Istanbul. As for Slovakia, it was very important that Slovakia’s representatives had the opportunity to present their opinions concerning the current Alliance’s questions, as well as the problems in Slovakia. Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Pavol Hrušovský, the Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda, the Minister of Defence of the Slovak Republic Juraj Liška, the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Ivan Korčok, as well as the deputies of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Tibor Mikuš and László Nagy held presentations at the Session. As the Parliamentary Assembly Deputies claimed, the supreme constitutional officials expressed clear pro-Atlantic attitude and confirmed the decision to contribute to the strengthening of the Alliance.

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