Electronic Library of Scientific Literature - © Academic Electronic Press
Vol. XIII / No 3 / 2004
ŠTÚDIE, ANALÝZY – STUDIES, ANALYSIS
ÚVAHY, ROZPRAVY, ROZHOVORY – REFLECTIONS, TRANSACTIONS, INTERVIEWS
RECENZIE, SPRÁVY – REVIEW, REPORTS
Bezpečnostná stratégia Slovenskej republiky po vstupe do NATO a EÚ
Three years after approval of the Security Strategy Slovakia has joined NATO and the EU and therefore a need of new strategy is under discussion among security community. The Slovak Foreign Policy Association and the Institute for Security and Defence Studies MOD has prepared several workshops and issued enough theoretical materials for next possible discussion. All effort has been finalised by preparation of starting points (recommendations) about new security strategy issued in a paper Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic after its Accession to NATO and the European Union.
Of course, the discussion within the security community was much more wider. It included a „lesson learned“ from 1993 to 2001, when current security strategy was approved. The incompatibility of previous security documents (Defence Doctrine 1994 and Basic Objectives and Principles of National Security 1996) with new challenges became evident after the Washington summit 1999. Because Slovakia started strong attempt to meet NATO admission criteria, MOD was a first ministry that felt a necessity of new strategic document which would define responses to new security challenges and risks. Despite that a preparation of main strategic documents proceeded from 1998 to 2001which was a long period. Beside that next lesson learned from that time is that realisation of the Security Strategy has been slow especially by preparation of new security system in Slovakia. Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic should be a complex document oriented on the future in order to be stable without need to be reassessed each year. In the Slovak Republic this document is being approved by the National Council and then it should be binding for the new Government. The contents of the document will affect besides others also the decision of the SR whether to keep three strategic documents (Security, Defence and Military Strategies) or to reduce them to two documents – Security, and Military Strategies or Security and Defence Strategies. The discussion involved issues connected with the fact that there is a development process of the complex security system of the SR until 2010 running concurrently with development of the Security Strategy. Concerning the changes of security conditions the old concept is not suitable any more and theoretical problems are emerging in process of the concept preparation too. The Security Strategy should define basic terms that should be reflected in the security system.
While speaking on material characteristics of threats the discussion placed emphasis on two fields. First of them is a creation of terms and characteristics of terms as challenges, risks, threats, vulnerabilities that has not been solved yet. Current security documents beside „security risks“ use terms „security challenges“ and „security threats“. In general it seems to be necessary so that the authors of draft prepare at least a brief explanation of terms.
The second issue referred to incorporation of threats to the Security Strategy that is connected with a question if some of them are separate threats. Some proposals tend to define only three threats - terrorism, failing states and mass destruction weapons. Inclusion of other threats into the Security Strategy will depend on the philosophy of its creation. In case that the elaboration of the Security Strategy is followed by the internal strategy, facing that phenomenon it would respond to an internal strategy or other sub-strategies. If we take into consideration the ability to react to mutually interconnected threats, facing that threats should be incorporated into the security strategy. Therefore after discussion the security strategy should contain:
Terrorism. Resistance to this threat is not possible without a combination of membership in the joint war against terrorism with internal measures to make the security system more effective.
Weapons of mass destruction represent a special category of risk because they are the ideal way to execute an unexpected attack on political and shopping centres with potentially disastrous consequences.
Tension and rivalry in international relations (regional conflicts). As a NATO and the EU member, the Slovak Republic becomes a part of wider security environment which is geographically approached to regions with open or frozen conflicts.
Failed states become a source of further threats, such as organised crime, terrorism and ambitions to get WMD.
Illegal migration became a priority problem of the EU with respect to the war against organised crime. Organised crime is more and more oriented on organising of illegal migration that shows negative economic consequences.
Organised crime will increase with respect to differences in the efficiency of the Slovak economy when compared with the EU member states, to differences in the SR legislation and the legislation of the EU member states.
The Slovak Republic is not yet the target of migration flows and waves but is a transition area. Intensity of this threat increases and is related to our EU accession. In a long-term view larger migration flows from economically stronger EU members to Slovakia may not be excluded.
From the viewpoint of multidimensional approach to security, there are factors which act on security in the complex way (directly or indirectly). However, they shall not automatically mean a threat but require specific means and methods of action. Primarily, it relates economic, ecological, demographic and other factors related to the globalisation process. In the current Security policy of the Slovak Republic they were postulated as a challenge. However they might involve into threats. Such phenomena are as development of the information society and specific phenomenon in this field – information terror or information war. Next are demographic changes, economic instability, ecological security and environment, political and religious extremism.
Significant part of the discussion was devoted to the issue of interests and their formulation. Different opinions led to a discussion on the proposed hierarchy of the SR interests as well as to a theoretical problem of attributes giving – determination of interests. The hierarchy of interests proposed in the material Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic after its Accession to NATO and the European Union. From the viewpoint of categorisation it is possible to keep classification of interests in two categories (vital and important).
As for vital interests they have two dimensions. International dimension of vital security policy is based on the knowledge that security political needs of a member of selective integration groups (NATO, EU) are linked with security political interests of these institutions. Internal dimension is based on the needs of the state and its citizens. They are of key (life-important) significance for the protection of life and security of citizens as well as for the existence and operation of state.
Important interests of the Slovak Republic create wider pre-conditions for life-important interests of the Slovak Republic by affecting the internal and international conditions of its realisation. In the article listed interests can be interpreted as important security political interests of the Slovak Republic.
Európska bezpečnostná a obranná politika a jej limity
The Balkan wars, first in Bosnia, then in Kosovo, seriously put into question the weak position of the European Union as a security actor. Failures of the Europeans to end these conflicts dealt a serious blow to the project of European integration. The European Union had failed to produce a common strategy to Bosnia and Kosovo and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) didn’t work. It was a leadership of the USA and NATO military operations which led to the end of the Balkan wars. Kosovo also provided a striking confirmation of European military weaknesses. This conflict clearly pictured European dependence on the US military power and demonstrated that without making an effort to improve its military capabilities, EU’s influence as a security actor would continue to be very limited.
These events initiated creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). At the June 1999 European Council in Cologne, the member states stated their determination that the EU shall play its full role in the international security. To that end, they intended to give the EU the necessary means and capabilities for autonomous crisis management actions, backed up by credible military forces. In December 1999, the European Council in Helsinki set out the ESDP process’s Headline Goal objectives. The aim was put at the EU’s disposal Rapid Reaction Force capable of carrying out all Petersberg missions, including the most demanding, in operations up to army corps level (60.000 troops deployable in 60 days, operational readiness in 2003).
Following the events of 11 September 2001, the CFSP was not implemented effectively. The UK, France and Germany didn’t co-ordinate their efforts within the EU framework. The same happened during the Iraq crisis at the beginning of 2003 with much grave consequences for CFSP. The EU was split and completely paralysed as an international and security actor. Fortunately, the problems of CFSP didn’t freeze the development of ESDP, because there was a consensus on strengthening of the European military capabilities. In November 2001, the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) was launched. As a next step, the Capabilities Conference was held in May 2003 in order to ask for more national commitments and launch specific programs to address current shortfalls in military capabilities.
The year 2003 witnessed not only the collapse of CFSP during the Iraq crisis, but also a compromise on ESDP. The EU members clashed over foreign policy priorities and security policy goals, but continued in co-operation on military capabilities for out-of-area crisis management operations. The crucial agreement on EU-NATO relations (Berlin plus) was reached, the European Security Strategy document was endorsed and the EU’s first police mission in Bosnia (EUPM), the first „Berlin plus“ military mission in Macedonia (Concordia) and the first autonomous military mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis) took place during 2003.
The very important progress was made on the field of armaments and European defence industry. It was decided to establish a European Defence Agency to support the EU members states in their effort to improve their military capabilities in the field of crisis management. The Agency will be set-up at the end of 2004 and will promote equipment collaborations, research and technology projects and armaments procurement. It main task is to prevent the considerable waste of resources spent on inefficient generation of military capabilities through the EU (amounting to 160 billion EUR).
On the other hand, the military capability aspects of ESDP are still lagging behind. The original objective set at Helsinki in 1999 (Helsinki Headline Goal) has not been met. It was merely quantitative target designed after a Balkan wars experience, and therefore ill-suited to the current post September 11 global security environment. It was just a catalogue of forces, which only ten per cent of which were actually rapidly deployable (6.000 troops). The June 2004 European Council confirmed the Petersberg tasks revisition and defined a new Headline Goal 2010. Although the strengthening of military capabilities is very important, it isn’t the most serious limit of ESDP. It is a lack of political will and a strategic consensus in the framework of CFSP, which is limiting the efficiency and credibility of ESDP.
The future security crisis will demonstrate whether there is a possibility to reach an agreement between two groups of EU member states – „euro-atlantists“ and „euro-autonomists“. If these countries follow only their particular interests and are against the close security co-operation with the USA, it will lead to marginalisation of ESDP and the EU will never become a global security actor.
Nevyhnutnosť vojny v Iraku a jej kontroverzné bezpečnostné výsledky
The war on Iraq was a watershed in international relations causing serious rifts among and within NATO and the EU. Despite all the controversies surrounding and accompanying this war, this article argues that the regime change in Iraq was inevitable and urgent. Out of many reasons leading to war, two factors were crucial and provide the right explanation why this war happened in that particular moment. It concludes with the assessment of security outcomes of this war claiming that regional and international security and stability were partially strengthened. This outcome, however, was achieved indirectly, as a by-product of this war, and remains largely tentative and reversible. In Iraq itself, paradoxically, the invasion has significantly worsened security and stability and created new operational field for terrorist activities inside and outside the country. The new security challenges emerging in Iraq, however, were not produced by the decision and actual removing of the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein from power as such but rather by the way this war was accomplished and post-war reconstruction and stabilisation carried out.
The article starts with summarising the main reasons leading the US to war on Iraq as provided by various literature and school of thoughts. The arguments range from military, security, political, to pure economic. All are rational and reasonable, and certainly played their respective roles in the strategic thinking and decision-making of the President Bush’s Administration. However, none of them adequately explains why this war happened in that particular moment, taking into account that many of these reasons had already existed for some time.
Neither the events of 11 September 2001 nor the subsequent war on terrorism provide sufficient explanation of the timing of the invasion. The war on Iraq was generally perceived as causally linked to the war on Afghanistan. However, these two campaigns were mutually connected only indirectly, each of them having its own distinct rationale and causes. Unlike Afghanistan, which emerged as a sudden, unexpected and eminent threat to the US only after 11 September, requiring direct and ad-hoc intervention, the case of Iraq had been internationally well-known, lengthy and irritating, regularly appearing on the UN agenda, keeping the international community divided and helpless in finding a common, effective and definite solution to it.
The role of 11 September was mainly and exclusively in providing the US, as the key player in Iraq’s case, with domestic and international conditions conducive to opening the issue of the final solution to this problem, and with a new range of arguments supporting and pushing forward particularly the US approach and convincing a significant part of both domestic and international audience that undergoing a regime change in Iraq even at the expense of a military action is just and fair.
The attempt to indiscriminately capitalise on the momentum of 11 September caused dubious rationalisation and logical contradictions. Among them mainly three public justifications were prominent: „axis of evil“ theme, weapons of mass destruction, and the alleged ties between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda. All proved rather intentionally-designed, false and incapable to explain the timing of Iraq’s invasion that, as the article claims, would have to happen in that particular period regardless the events of 11 September.
The article then demonstrates that the following two main factors made the regime change in Iraq pressing, inevitable and unavoidable. First, the impossibility to maintain further the long-term status-quo of the UN sanction regime against Iraq. Second, the burden of the Bush family and its personal and national unfinished business with S. Hussein. Their combination and timing proved to be critical and provided the direct and last missing impetus to undergo a regime change in Iraq.
The long-term harsh UN sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990 in the aftermath of its invasion of Kuwait had two critical impacts on the internal development in Iraq. First, they paradoxically strengthened the regime of S. Hussein, profiting from oil smuggling and black market economy, and provided it, in addition to already applied means of political terror, with a new effective economic tool to control, manipulate and subjugate Iraqi civilian population. Second, they led to extensive and pervasive impoverishment and disastrous humanitarian situation of Iraqi civilians, bringing the society to an edge of general and irretrievable disintegration with unpredictable consequences for internal, regional and international stability. At the international level, the united anti-Iraqi front was disintegrating. A growing number of countries, among them European, demanded the lifting of sanctions for both ethic and economic reasons.
In the beginning of the 2000s, the US became aware that the UN sanction regime against Iraq would need to be revised. However, neither of the two possible alternatives, nor tightening nor lifting the sanctions, would serve the US interests. The only solution to this dilemma was removing the root cause of the sanctions – i.e. the regime of Saddam Hussein. This plan became feasible when G. W. Bush, with his personal and national motives to do so due to the family „burden„, became the US President in 2000. The US now got a short, four-year opportunity period to initiate and implement a regime change in Iraq either through diplomatic means and co-ordinated international pressure, or through intelligence services activities and internal coup d’état, or through direct military intervention, either multilateral or unilateral.
A successful removing of S. Hussein from power would definitely solve the lengthy Iraqi case, safeguard US interests, needs and position, and last but not least secure President Bush re-election in 2004. Due to the above described factors, the regime change in Iraq became so urgent and inevitable for the Bush Administration that it could not avoid it despite the risk of a split with and among its allies and going to war unilaterally.
The article then moves to examine the security outcomes of the war on Iraq, given the fact that security and stability in their wider contexts became the leitmotif and priority of the Bush administration. It demonstrates that, so far, these outcomes are mixed, ambiguous and contradictory.
At the regional and international levels, this war indirectly and partially strengthened security and stability by generating a positive change in actors’ behaviour in the following three main cases. First, Libya with its agreement of 19 December 2003 to renounce weapons of mass destruction and consequent surprising rapprochement with the US, UK and EU. Second, the Arab League with its summit on 22 –23 May 2004 adopting an agenda promising democratisation and reform to the stagnant Arab world. And third, the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the Israeli-Palestinian in particular with conflicting sides having now conditions more favourable to achieve their main objectives through negotiations, flexible approach and concessions.
These changes and processes, however, remain largely tentative and reversible, heavily dependant on the final outcome in Iraq. Failure of post-war stabilisation, democratisation and reform of Iraq could easily reverse them.
As for the war on terrorism, the invasion of Iraq has directly and indirectly exacerbated the terrorism threat. Indirectly, and so far temporary, due to a rise in anti-Americanism, radical passions among Muslims and Al-Qaeda morale and recruiting power. In Iraq, which has been turned into an entirely new source and target of terrorist activities, the security outcomes are even worse with direct negative impact on the war on terrorism. This, however, was not caused by the fact of removing Saddam Hussein from power, but rather by surprisingly ill-prepared US post-war reconstruction and stabilisation as well as several wrong decisions and steps undertaken by the coalition administration. The most critical were: leaving army storage houses unprotected causing mass proliferation of guns and ammunition; dissolving Iraqi army turning 450 000 soldiers into potential insurgents; extensive de-Baathification indiscriminately affecting all party members regardless their position, responsibility and committed crimes; and underestimating necessity of effective police force and public order for successful reconstruction and stabilisation.
All this generated new, additional security challenges in Iraq with wider direct and indirect impact on stability and security in the country, region and the world. These challenges are of three main forms: military resistance; armed militias linked to political parties and movements; and militant and terrorist groups.
As for the future of international relations, the article concludes that the lesson of Iraq’s war is that effective multilateralism, respecting and adhering to international law and order and at the same time capable and willing to intervene and impose a successful regime change to achieve security and stability as a means to protect and maintain international law and order in the long run, could be the a right tool and a solution to international problems.
Istanbulský summit a budúcnosť NATO
NATO Heads of States met in Istanbul in June 2004 for a summit preceded by great expectations. Many viewed the event as a chance to put behind, once and for all, the rifts created by the Iraq war. In the end, while progress has been made on Iraq and a new Middle East initiative, the meeting failed to bring about the desired reconciliation. The reasons for continued tensions are complex but can be roughly divided into strategic and tactical or, put another way, policy differences vs. political/personality differences.
The latter category includes efforts of many European heads of states to distance themselves from President George W. Bush, and to deny the U.S. leader political ammunition of potential use in the forthcoming presidential elections. Even on issues where real progress has been made, allied leaders continue to publicly question the importance of the breakthrough.
One of the best examples is Iraq. France, Germany and other critics of the Iraq war refused their involvement in the stabilization of the country on the grounds that the U.S.-led occupation is illegal. While careful not to make any promises of military assistance, they nevertheless created an expectation that should power in the country be handed over to an indigenous government – and should the United Nations authorise and request military assistance – they, too, would join the stabilisation process.
Alas, this turned out not to be the case. The interim government of Iraq was established on June 1; four days later it officially asked for military assistance by the multinational coalition. A UN Security Council resolution 1546 of June 9 subsequently called on all countries to assist in the stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq. Yet no NATO allies have offered new assistance. The Paris government has even also tried to block NATO from deploying a military training mission in Iraq – itself a scaled-down version of the original plans for a full-fledged allied stabilisation mission, watered down due to resistance from the original critics of the war. It appears that many European governments – including some who supported the war – are quietly encouraging a change of government in Washington by refusing to substantively engage with the Bush Administration. The Istanbul summit, said Philip Gordon, a Europe-observer at the Brookings Institution, „had a sort of ‘Waiting for Godot’ quality about it – European leaders biding time, neither creating a crisis nor mending fences, and hoping that the American election in November will provide more favourable circumstances for their interaction.“
This tactic carries real risks – in case of Kerry’s election to presidency, for example, the U.S. public will expect a quick improvement in U.S.-European dialogue, including greater willingness from Europe to aid Iraq. Should it not materialise – and it is not clear that some allies are willing to provide help under any circumstances – a backlash in the United States is a real possibility. Nevertheless, the European tactic of „false pessimism“ may leave open the door to a relatively quick U.S.-European rapprochement in the event of a change of power in Washington.
At the same time, the allies also continue to be divided by some very tangible differences in security outlooks. Their respective Middle East policies serve as the most visible and perhaps most divisive example. In this regard, the Istanbul communiqué offers a sense of false optimism – the allies did agree on a new initiative to reach out to the countries of the troubled region, but the agreement is replete with reservations and caveats and, as such, it hardly offers a workable guide for future action.
The allies appear to hold very differing views on sources of terrorism and, in particular, the role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in fuelling anti-Western violence. The United States largely associates terrorism with the totalitarian nature of the regimes in and around the Middle East, which, it says, breed generations of young people, unemployed and uneducated, unable to express their political views in a non-violent manner. Washington proposed to include NATO in a broader effort to set the ”Greater Middle East“ on the path toward more democracy and prosperity.
Many European allies, however, view the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the key to fighting global terrorism. They accuse Washington of both insufficient involvement in the peace process and of pursuing policy biased in favour of Israel. Instead of launching a sweeping political reform in the region, they would like the United States to lean on the Israeli government in order to accelerate the peace process.
The Istanbul summit communiqué clearly reflects the differences. In principle, it offers NATO assistance in security sector reform of countries in the Middle East. But it also comes with many caveats, mostly related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Given that any reform of the Middle East is an extremely difficult proposition to start with, and that its only reasonable chance of success would likely have required a sustained, co-ordinated effort on the part of all allies, NATO’s internal rifts may prove fatal to its own plans in the region.
The Alliance survived Istanbul, and it will live to see other, possibly many more summits. But as long as personalities and policies divide the Allies as profoundly as they do today, NATO will remain an organisation performing far below its potential. For all their differences, member states share common culture, political background and – in recent years – also a new common threat in the form of catastrophic terrorism. It was hoped that the Istanbul summit would prove to be a starting point for a new transatlantic bargain, one forging a common view and strategy for campaign against terrorism. In the end, the meeting left NATO’s future wrapped in questions.
Perceptions of NATO in Ukraine
Príspevok Oleksandra Sushka, riaditeľa kyjevského think-tanku Centrum pre mier, konverziu a zahraničnú politiku, prezentuje prieskum verejnej mienky, ktorý uskutočnilo Razumkove centrum pre hospodárske a politické štúdie, Nadácia pre demokratické iniciatívy a Taylor Nelson Sofres Ukraine v decembri 2002. Autor ponúka prehľad názorov verejnosti, ako aj expertnej komunity. Prieskum expertnej mienky uskutočnilo Centrum pre mier, konverziu a zahraničnú politiku.
Najzávažnejším determinantom postoja Ukrajincov k NATO je skutočnosť, že kontakty Ukrajiny s alianciou sa rozvíjajú primárne len v úzkom kruhu vojenských a civilných expertov a verejnosť sa k informáciám dostáva len zriedka. Podľa prieskumov len 1,6 % opýtaných označilo svoje vedomosti o NATO za značné a každý štvrtý respondent za čiastočné. Na druhej strane až 49,7 % považovalo svoje znalosti za veľmi slabé a 19,2 % opýtaných tvrdilo, že o NATO nemá žiadne informácie. Podľa autora majú na tento fakt vplyv dva faktory: 1. menší záujem verejnosti o zahraničnopolitickú agendu; 2. nedostatok nezaujatých a komplexných informácií, ktoré by mali šíriť politické elity. Na otázku „Ako hodnotíte súčasný stav vzťahov Ukrajiny a NATO“ 37 % respondentov odpovedalo, že sú stagnujúce; 18,9 % ich označilo za progresívne a iba 5,7 % za zhoršujúce sa. Zvyšok respondentov odmietol na otázku odpovedať.
Aj v dôsledku transformačných zmien aliancie sa ukrajinská verejnosť stále menej obáva, že by mohla byť zapletená do konfliktu medzi Ukrajinou a NATO. V prípade konfliktu medzi NATO a Ruskom, majúc na zreteli polohu Ukrajiny medzi západným a východným modelom vojensko-politickej integrácie, by každý piaty respondent podporil Rusko, kým NATO by podporili len 3 % opýtaných. Na druhej strane, absolútna väčšina bola za neutrálny postoj Ukrajiny.
V otázke členstva Ukrajiny v NATO panovali značné rozdiely, ktoré súviseli s vekovou štruktúrou obyvateľstva. Zatiaľ čo starší boli viac-menej proti vstupu do aliancie, vo vekovej skupine 18 – 29 rokov bolo až 43,4 % respondentov za vstup, pričom iba 23,6 % proti. Mládež už NATO nevidí cez prizmu sovietskych stereotypov, ale verí v jednotnú a silnú Európu.
Na základe tohto prieskumu možno konštatovať, že postoje Ukrajiny k NATO sa vyvíjajú pozitívnym smerom. Aliancia už nie je vnímaná ako nepriateľ. Čo sa týka budúcnosti, postoj Ukrajincov k NATO bude ovplyvnený vnútorným vývojom na Ukrajine a vyhýbaním sa nesprávnym rozhodnutiam jej oficiálnych predstaviteľov, ktoré znižovali ich autoritu v očiach Ukrajincov.
Expertný pohľad je prezentovaný na vzorke významných zahraničnopolitických a bezpečnostných analytikov. Tento prieskum sa uskutočnil na jeseň 2002 a bol venovaný otázke vzťahov Ukrajiny a NATO po tom, čo sa Národná rada pre bezpečnosť a obranu rozhodla získať členstvo v aliancii. Iniciatíva prezidenta L. Kučmu a Národnej bezpečnostnej a obrannej rady súvisiaca s integráciou Ukrajiny do NATO bola medzi expertmi vnímaná väčšinou pozitívne, aj keď s určitou dávkou skepticizmu. Väčšina chápala zmenu kurzu ukrajinskej politiky skôr ako PR ukrajinskej vlády, pričom spochybňovala schopnosti ukrajinskej vlády daný cieľ zrealizovať. Experti boli nejednotní najmä v určení kľúčových vnútropolitických prekážok, ktoré majú vplyv na proces integrácie. Za najzávažnejšie problémy brzdiace integráciu považujú nekonzistentné smerovanie ukrajinskej politiky, stav ukrajinských ozbrojených síl a ekonomickú situáciu.
Central Asian Security Dynamics in the Global Context
Muzaffar Z. Munavvarov
Autor príspevku patrí k nastupujúcej generácii analytikov zoskupujúcich sa na Univerzite svetovej ekonomiky a diplomacie v Taškente (UWED – univerzita vychováva nové kádre pre uzbeckú diplomaciu, resp. zahraničnú službu. UWED zaisťuje pre potreby štátnej správy Uzbekistanu tzv. Školu diplomacie, ktorá je určená stredným diplomatickým kádrom, t. j. po hodnosť prvého tajomníka). Rozhodol sa pre analýzu a porovnanie politiky USA, Ruska a Číny v priestore postsovietskej Strednej Ázie s presahom na celú Centrálnu Áziu.
V úvode svojich poznámok nenásilne pripomína, že po procese sublimácie Sovietskeho zväzu a vzniku geopolitického vákua sa logicky zmenil charakter a podstata vzťahov medzi globálnymi silami v regióne (v Strednej a Centrálnej Ázii). Záujem týchto subjektov o región sa zvýšil predovšetkým z dvoch dôvodov: geostrategický štatút regiónu a perspektívne zásoby energetických surovín.
Bilaterálne vzťahy USA, Ruska a Číny s jednotlivými (novými) krajinami regiónu sa postupne stali primárnymi komponentmi ich zahraničnej politiky. Samozrejme, neskôr sa do popredia dostali problémy komplexnej bezpečnosti.
Analyzujúc politiku Číny vo vzťahu k regiónu Centrálnej Ázie a jej jednotlivým krajinám autor poznamenáva, že otázky boja proti medzinárodnému terorizmu a náboženskému extrémizmu sa stali aktuálnymi témami aj v rámci bilaterálnych vzťahov.
Podľa názoru autora bol vznik Šanghajskej organizácie spolupráce (ŠOS) logickým vyústením spomínanej bilaterálnej spolupráce jednotlivých krajín regiónu s Čínou, samozrejme, s prevahou problému regionálnej bezpečnosti.
Autor venuje pozornosť aj faktu aktívneho prístupu Ruskej federácie k činnosti ŠOS a možnej perspektívnej aliancii Čína – Rusko, ako protiváhy voči USA, ktorých prítomnosť a vplyv sa v teritóriu po tragických udalostiach z 11. septembra 2001 reálne zvýšili.
Čo sa týka úlohy Ruska, autor prichádza k záveru, že v súčasnosti Moskva nemá vypracovanú komplexnú stratégiu vo vzťahu k Strednej Ázii, a teda ani voči regiónu Centrálnej Ázie. Navyše, vzhľadom na politickú a ekonomickú slabosť Rusko nie je schopné byť skutočným garantom bezpečnosti jednotlivých republík regiónu a ani regiónu ako celku.
Pri podrobnejšom hodnotení súčasných regionálnych mechanizmov bezpečnosti akcentuje činnosť Dohody o kolektívnej bezpečnosti (na práci ktorej neparticipujú všetky štáty Spoločenstva nezávislých štátov), ktorá by mala ochraňovať záujmy účastníckych štátov pred vojenskými a nevojenskými hrozbami. Tiež sa dotýka známych tém ruských vojenských základní – nových a starých – v Kirgizsku a Tadžikistane.
Politika USA v regióne je podrobená analýze cez prizmu udalostí po septembri 2001, ako aj cez súvzťažnosť americko-ruskej prítomnosti. Tu autor zdôrazňuje dve špecifiká americkej prítomnosti v regióne. Prvým je skutočnosť, že USA sa aktivizovali v Centrálnej Ázii až v rámci reakcie na teroristické útoky na New York a realizáciou následnej vojenskej operácie v Afganistane. Druhým je fakt, že prítomnosť USA predstavuje zo strategického pohľadu zvláštnu a priamu výzvu iným globálnym silám majúcim historicky blízko k regiónu, inak povedané Číne a v danej chvíli slabému Rusku.
Autor textu sa tiež pokúša otvoriť tému ekonomických dividend amerických spoločností – predovšetkým ropných a plynárenských – plynúcich zo strategickej prítomnosti USA v regióne.
Trojuholník USA – Rusko – Čína je v Centrálnej Ázií realitou. Autor si je toho vedomý podobne ako toho, že v rámci tohto trianglu je potrebná harmonizácia vzťahov a hľadanie konštruktívneho dialógu. Rozumná rovnováha síl v regióne sa tak stane očakávaným akcelerátorom dynamiky rozvoja vzťahov s regionálnymi a globálnymi faktormi svetovej politiky. V tomto kontexte je veľmi zaujímavé poznanie, že uzbecké elity si to zrejme uvedomujú. Na nedávnom summite prezidentov krajín ŠOS v Taškente (ŠOS vznikla 14. – 15. júna 2001 v Šanghaji pristúpením Uzbekistanu ku krajinám pôvodnej tzv. Šanghajskej päťky – Rusko, Čína, Kazachstan, Kirgizsko, Tadžikistan), ktorá vznikla v roku 1996, a ktorej cieľom bolo posilnenie vzájomnej dôvery vo vojenskej oblasti a zníženie počtu ozbrojených síl na spoločnej hranici s Čínou. Formálne nová regionálna organizácia si kladie za cieľ rozvoj širokospektrálnej multilaterálnej spolupráce zameranej na zabezpečenie bezpečnosti a stability a na rozvoj obchodno-ekonomických a politických vzťahov. Prioritou ŠOS je boj proti medzinárodnému terorizmu, náboženskému extrémizmu, separatizmu a nelegálnemu obchodu s drogami. Uzbekistan je Ruskom i Čínou považovaný za strategického partnera v Strednej Ázii. Vzhľadom na skutočnosť, že Uzbekistan nemôže byť členom žiadnej vojenskej alebo vojensko-politickej organizácie si jeho vstup vyžiadal zmenu charakteru pôvodnej regionálnej štruktúry. Členstvom Uzbekistanu v ŠOS vzrástol aj jeho geopolitický význam. Prezident I. Karimov počas slávnostnej večere (15. júna 2004) vyhlásil: „... Nehľadiac na vplyv Ruska a váhu USA, Čína je dnes krajinou, bez ktorej sa vo svete nedá nič urobiť...“
Konštruktívny prístup troch komponentov svetovej politiky je výhodný pre región, pre stabilnú stabilitu v stabilne nestabilnom priestore. Autor to síce vo svojich poznámkach priamo neuvádza, ale týka sa to aj európskej, a teda globálnej bezpečnosti. Formálne ďaleko býva niekedy veľmi blízko. Centrálna Ázia je odsúdená na spoluprácu. Konfrontácia uškodí všetkým a v tom nie je v Európe nikto zainteresovaný. Samozrejme, ak sa nevenuje obchodu s drogami alebo ropou...
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