Electronic Library of Scientific Literature




Vol. VIII / No 2 / 1999



3 Príhovor šéfredaktora - Editorial


5 Alena Kotvanová

Minulosť a súčasnosť spolupráce stredoeurópskych krajín
The Past and the Future of the Cooperation of Central European Countries

17 Vladimír Tarasovič

CENCOOP – Spolupráca stredoeurópskych krajín na podporu mieru
CENCOOP – The Cooperation of Central European Countries in Supporting of Peace

31 Lev Voronkov

Regional Cooperation: Conflict Prevention and Security through Interdependence
Regionálna spolupráca: Predchádzanie konfliktom a bezpečnosť prostredníctva


48 Mikuláš Dzurinda

Visegrádska spolupráca – odraz potrieb stredoeurópskeho regiónu
The Visegrad Cooperation – Reflection of the Needs of Central European Region

56 Miloš Zeman

Visegradska spolupráce
The Visegrad Cooperation

58 Jerzy Buzek

Spolupráca v rámci Visegrádskej skupiny
The Cooperation in the Framework of the Visegrad Group

62 Viktor Orbán

Visegrádska spolupráca
The Visegrad Cooperation

66 Urban Rusnák

Renesancia Visegrádskeho zoskupenia
The Renaissance of the Visegrad Group

72 Jozef Klimko

Nové impulzy pre cezhraničnú regionálnu spoluprácu s Rakúskom
A New Impulses for the Crossborder Regional Cooperation with Austria

77 Zbigniew Brzezinski

A Robust and Credible Process
Mohutný a vierohodný proces

82 Robert Cooper

Sovereignty and the Small State
Suverenita a malé štátty

87 Konstantin Konstantinovič Chudolej

Európska politika Ruska
European’s Policy of Russia

92 Tamer Levent

Yes to Art Project
Áno projektu umenia


97 Deklarace o spolupráci Maďarska, ČSFR a Polska (15. února 1991)

101 Spoločné vyhlásenie z prvého stretnutia ministrov životného prostredia Visegrádskej skupiny o spolupráci v oblasti ochrany životného prostredia a prírody (Banská Štiavnica, Slovenská republika 8. mája 1999)

105 Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Meeting of Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Countries, Bratislava, May 14, 1999

107 Spoločné vyhlásenie zo stretnutia predsedov vlád visegrádskych krajín, Bratislava 14. mája 1999

109 Krátka história Visegrádskej štvorky a chronológia vybraných spoločných stretnutí v rámci V-4


114 Daneš Brzica

Ján Sopóci: Politika a spoločnosť (Úvod do sociológie politiky)

119 Daniel Šmihula

L. N. Gumiľov: Etnogenez i biosfera Zemli

123 Sylvia Vranová

Peter Juza: Demokracia v Rusku (mojimi očami)

124 Jozef Škultéty

Stretnutie ministrov životného prostredia visegrádskych krajín v Banskej Štiavnici



Alena Kotvanová: The Past and the Future of the Cooperation of Central European Countries

Last autumn when the results of elections created conditions for a turn of isolationists foreign policy of Slovakia, the Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have signed the proclamation, reviving the ”Visegrád” cooperation. Both facts created a need of actualisation of the question concerning the regional position of central European countries. Besides political changes, the present situation has been decided also by a new political team in the Czech Republic, but especially by joining of the three Visegrád countries the North Atlantic Alliance and their position in the first group of European Union membership applicants. This creates new conditions for looking for existence, goals and forms of regional cooperation both for Slovakia, and all other countries of the region.

From a geografical point of view, the Central Europe means a transnational region and it is very hard to set borders satisfactorily. It represents the territory from the Baltic Sea to northern Italy and from Rhine to eastern Carpathians, or, in other words, it is the territory of smaller countries between Germany and Russia. The the size of this geografical territory and variety of historical determinants influenced considerably the width of the scope of convergent and divergent moments of its development. The modern identity of this territory became an initial impuls in the disident circles, where the ”Central Europe-ism” was defined first as a cultural and historical phenomenon, which served for stressing specific civilisation features earmarking this territory from the eastern Europe. Its positive dimension was the variety (of the cultures, languages, religions, traditions, etc.) with tolerance, which the feeling of coherance originates from. The period folowing the velvet revolutions was to certain extent influenced by a dilemma, whether the power (of perseverance) of during decades shared common destiny of former socialist countries, similarity of problems and goals, or whether this influence will be definitely substituted by divergent movements towards different political goals arising from pre-socialist historical, religious and ethnic variety. Namely, the signs, which in certain situation helped to define this territory positively as a certain particularity within the context of western civilisation, after diminishing of outer obstacles, instead of their development became almost a contrary interpretation.

The answer to the question, why many of central European countries by statements of their politicians openly declared mistrust to closer relations within this territory, is very complex. To internal factors, like extensive emphasizing of own way, differences, specific factors and qualities, awaking of latent national problems, competition of economic and politic interests can be added. Individually oriented geopolitical pragmatism, which won in the policy of countries folowing the velvet revolutions and contributed to the disintegration of the Czecho-Slovak federation was influenced also by external factors. Western Europe, represented by European institutions, clearly said the central European countries, that it would welcome a closer cooperation within this territory. This gave impuls to a mistrust, that, behind the promotion of cooperation, a moderate attitude to the idea of an accelerated integration into the European structures can be hidden.

The above general statements concerning the development of central European relations, can be illustrated in full scale by short evolution of the Visegrád cooperation. The first impulse of it was the meeting of the presidents of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary in Bratislava. Among other participants were also observes, the ministers of foreign affairs of Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia. Its initiator, Mr. Václav Havel, gave impetus for a talk about willingness to cooperate within the territory in order to fulfill the basic goal of these countries, i.e., the integration into the transatlantic structures. This process resulted in signing the Declaration on Co-operation of Czecho-Slovak federation, Hungary and Poland on the Way to the European Integration on Febebruary 5, 1991 in Visegrád.

Among the positive results of of early 1990s can be named the formulation of common goals, namely ”de-Sovietization” of the territory (dissolving the Varsaw Pact and the COMECON), building of a modern market economy and plans for full integration into European structures with coordination of acceptance negotiations and their fulfillment. The process of ”de-Sovietization” was quick and successful. It was promoted especially by the atmosphere of the velvet revolutions, public support, as well as by the fear of further development in the former Soviet Union. The next goal, the cooperation in the transition form old socialist economic relations, has necessarily resulted into a need for liberalisation of mutual trade and business relation, later carried out within the CEFTA. Also integration efforts of the Visegrád countries became a coordinated and the goal was reached by signing of the integration agreements with EU in December 1991.

This coordination phase can be evaluated dispite of criticism for some political realism of the representatives of Central European countries. Unfortunately, in the following period of time, after the Prague summit in May 1992, which was highly praised both by the participating countries representatives and foreign countries, a turn took place. Many factors subverted the Visegrád cooperation, among others especially the Czecho-Slovak dissolution, the change of the Czech political representatives, tension in the Slovak-Hungarian relations, military conflict in Yugoslavia and the political development in Slovakia. For completeness, it is necessary to be added, that the Visegrád cooperation did not decay entirely. Besides CEFTA, which originated from it, it was was just the military part, where the talk continued uninterruptedly.

Of course, several opinions exists about why the potential of this historical alternative was not fulfilled. Now the qustion what a renewed Visegrád cooperation can offer, has been in the centre of interest. Slovakia, which was assured in the Budapest declaration to be an integral part of the Visegrád idea, must in future time prove the durability of political changes and irreversibility of its democratic tendency, so that the effect of participation in common goals within the common integration ambitions and in fulfillment of regional goals by positive contents can be utilized.

However, revival of the Visegrád cooperation will not be easy even in new conditions and it will be necessary to avoid several risks. First, the revival reasons must arise from a realistic need for cooperation of all participating countries, though every one of them has its own specific interests and aspirations. Following the Budapest Declaration, the most important aim will be the harmonization of efforts having the goal of integration procedure acceleration. It is necessary to continue in mechanisms of mutual information exchange concerning the negotiation with EU, which already in the past period became a hight standard, regular meetings of ambassadors of the participating countries in the key countries, V-4 meetings with Benelux etc. Just this kind of attitude has been preferred by the EU in order to simplify the communication and intensify the cooperation between the regional partners.

The cooperation of V-4 countries opens a possibility of extensive contacts in the field of culture, science and education, to support crossborder activities and building of Euro-regions. It can also extend from official contact level to a communal one. Simultaneously, it is possible to look for inspiration and confirmation of the sense in many of sub-regional kinds of cooperation, being active in Europe. To advantages of such formations in comparison with big regional organisations it is possible to add a more direct attitude towards looking for adequate solving of problems, arising in the region, being extensively interconnected by many ties, the possibility of creating a new common geography and history, exploring a potential of economic, human and cultural dimension of the territory in question.

Within this context, Slovakia should not forget the fact that it has been a member of two sub-regional formations – the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) and the Central European Initiative (CEI). First of all, in new central European conditions, also having in mind the prospects of EU enlargement, CEFTA should get a strong impuls for strengthening of liberalisation of mutual economic relations. The Central-European Initiative belongs to the oldest sub-regional structures. Though from the beginning on, it copes with a number of problems, determined on one hand by a complex development in the region, and on the other hand by the lack of financial capital for carrying out projects, has its position among initiatives strengthening the local dialogue and cooperation.

In order of progressing and prosperity in this region it is necessary to utilize the whole potential of this new situation. Slovakia, the priority of which is intensifying of Central European cooperation in all its kinds, has a chance to become a firm part of it by means of its active cooperative attitude.


Vladimír Tarasovič: CENCOOP – The Cooperation of Central European Countries in Supporting of Peace

In the first part of the article, the reader will get acquainted with evolving changes in the field of risks that happened since the end of the Cold War and which had a significant impact on the change in the way the peace operations are conducted.

Instead of military risks originated from the bipolar division of the world, there have appeared in many parts of the globe ethnic, national and religious conflicts, still more marked by violence. Such conflicts have completely different dynamics of their evolution and nobody can foresee exactly, when and where they can appear. Because they happen mostly inside a country and not between the countries, the character of peace and humanitarian operations changes also. Predominantly military operations are changing into multifunctional operations with military, humanitarian and civil components. Operations conducted without those elements are condemned to fail, as happened in Somalia. This knowledge as well as the failure of so far U. N. operations gave rise to a preparation of international peace operations, named Peace Support Operations (PSO). The continual struggle with time and escalating violence in the crisis areas can be won only by a prompt reaction using all the available resources. The choice was: the method of modular construction of Stand-by System of real and covered resources, which would enable ad hoc flexible creation and activities of common Task Forces. The initiation for the beginning of the Stand-by System construction was the initiative of the U. N. Secretary General Butrous Butrous-Ghali, who in 1992 in the publication ”Agenda for Peace”, in accordance with the chapters V – VIII of the U. N. Charter, pronounced the need to maintain a permanent rapid reaction unit for peace operations, which would significantly increase the reaction ability of the U. N. Organization. The goal of the project was to provide a capacity of the peacekeeping forces for action within 60 days and the teams for the disaster relief within 12 hours. The practical implementation of the U. N. Secretary General started early in 1994, when, under Danish leadership, the task force for the creation of the U. N. rapid reaction brigade known as SHIRBRIG (Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade) started to work. Based upon this initiative, new regional military-political associations appeared, such as SEEMNF, BALTSEA, WEIMAR THREE and, at last, also CECOOP. Central European Nations Cooperation for peace support started as the initiative of Austria, which presented it to its neighbors. In March 1998. It stems from the Partnership for Peace and its goal is to increase the capacity of Central European countries for sufficiently energetic reaction upon the demands of future peace operations in order to support the peace. CENCOOP is not a competitor to any other similar initiative but it should complement to these operations.

The next part of the article analyses the framework of CECOOP functioning, its aims, the scale of its use and the concept of the armed forces building.

According to the Frame Document CENCOOP, it is a multinational program of activities by the small states of Central Europe, built upon the principles of the U. N. Charter, Agenda for Peace and the decisions of the U. N. It means that it will strive for improvement of interstate cooperation, using resources and the capacities of member states for peace operation within the framework of regional cooperation and in the spirit of the U. N. recommendations.

Among the basic goals of CENCOOP belongs intensification of the experience-sharing, especially in the field of training and logistics with the intention to maximize the standardization and thus also the possibility of common using of resources, harmonization of the concepts of force using and bringing closer the national forces managing, which would make possible serene using the common units.

CENCOOP shall support a form of multinational ”ad hoc” contingents of two or more member states, which can be sent into missions under the U. N. mandate and the missions according to the chapter VIII of the U. N. Charter (regional agreements) and into the operations VI and VII (support or assistance in conflict prevention, peace keeping, peace upholding, peace enforcing etc.) The very decision, if a country does or does not part in the mission and the size of its participation remains the domain of each particular country.

The concept of common armed forces building presupposes to build them as ”Task Forces” from the prepared modules, while every module must enable such a multinational “stand-by contingent” to be established into the peace operation. The principle of the ”Task Forces” formation upon the basis of SAS presupposes a different time in achieving the state of alert in accordance with the accepted international standards. It applies especially to the “Search and Rescue” groups, Disaster Relief groups, ambulance facilities, evacuation forces, etc.

The third part of the article describes mechanisms of cooperation – Defence Ministers Meeting, Secretariat of CENCOOP, Steering Committee, Coordination Group, Working Groups and Planstaff, which provide planning, organization and executive work of CENCOOP.

Defence Ministers Meeting (DMM) represents the supreme body of CENCOOP, especially in the relation to the principal decisions making, the decisions of which have an impact on the multilateral relations of the member states and the cooperation activities. In normal conditions the regular (once a year) sessions shall serve for consultations in the affairs which do not require immediate decisions accepting. In case of real necessity DMM can be called to order in an unplanned term and that especially for the ratification of the decisive steps, agreements and multinational activities, in which the CENCOOP wants to participate.

Secretariat of CENCOOP (SEC) is permanently located in Austria, represents the working staff and the coordination center for the member states as well as the international partners. It plans, organizes, and provides the process itself of the DMM and Steering Committee (SC) sessions. The Secretariat only is authorized to give information outside CENCOOP and keep the contacts with the relevant national and international representatives and institutions.

Steering Committee (SC) practically implements the DMM political decisions in its own periodical sessions, leads the negotiations for the acceptance of a necessary multilateral consensus and, based upon the Coordination Group proposals, prepares and implements common activities.

Coordination Group (CG) clarifies common needs, proposes new projects, sets tasks for the workshops and prepares recommendations for the Steering Committee.

Multinational Working Groups (WG) contain the experts according to the particular fields. They work upon the CENCOOP needs and demands, decisions of the coordination group and their own tasks and schedule. According to the coordination group decision they elaborate backgrounds for the steering committee or the DMM for the decisions in particular matter questions. Among the first workshops which have started to work already in 1998 are: WG-Training, ”ad hoc” WG-Military Observers (First Early Realization Project), ”ad hoc” WG-Medical, WG-Operations & Force Generation, WG-Civilian Military Cooperation, WG-Communication & Information Systems, WG-Logistics, WG-Humanitarian & Technical Aid, WG-Military Police etc.

Currently created Multinationalplanstaff will be a permanent staff responsible for the preparation and formation of Pre-established Peace Support Operation-Contingents (PREPCON). It should create the core of the staff for the commandment of Task Forces and in the future can be changed into the considered multinational CENCOOP HQ. The basic tasks for the planning staff should be developing of standard operation procedures, elaboration and current completion of the data-bank of the possible areas of deployment, which would enable to shorten the time for planning and preparation of the CENCOOP units deployment, planning and managing of operational training and exercises, close cooperation with the commander bodies of the organization, which gives mandate for peace operations at the tactical level of using the CENCOOP resources, collecting and evaluation of knowledge achieved at the missions accomplished and presenting the annual report to the steering committee: that especially about the level of preparedness of PREPCON and the brigade staff. The supposed seat of the planstaff should be Austria. This would underline the country’s role in putting this initiative into life. The only obstacle is that Austria still has not ratified NATO-SOFA Treaty. At present, the tasks of the planstaff are fulfilled by ”ad hoc planning team”, which meets regularly at the monthly meeting in Baden, Austria.

The closing part describes the participation of Slovakia in CENCOOP, which is considered by Slovakia to be an important means of strengthening security and mutual trust in central and eastern Europe. In the last period Slovakia participated in the work within the particular CENCOOP structures. The main focus was directed to the activity of the logistics workshop, the guarantor of which was Slovakia itself. In the ”ad hoc planning team”, at present, two officers of the Slovak Army are working - the chief of the logistics group and the member of the research group. Although CENCOOP as a whole did not join any specific peace operation so far, some of the activities can be considered ”in the spirit of CENCOOP”. Among such operations can be counted Slovak participation in the Austrian battalion in the Golan mountains woithin the framework of the UNDOF mission, which shall increase from 35 Slovak Army members to 93 in may this year; the participation of 2 military observers in the mission of UNTSO can be mentioned, too.


Zbigniew Brzezinski: A Robust and Credible Process

If NATO expansion was driven by the desire to enhance Europe’s geopolitical security against Russia, no further expansion is needed. Enlargement to 19 has already given NATO the additional geostrategic depth needed in the East to enhance its security in the West. However, if the driving factor in expanding NATO was to build a broad zone of peace and of democracy in a wider Euro-Atlantic area, then it follows that further expansion is historically and geopolitically desirable.

Because I subscribe to the letter view, I take very seriously what Secretary Madeleine Albright said a few months ago regarding the April NATO summit: ”Getting a robust and credible open door package is one of the key challenges we face for the Washington summit.” The need to keep the open door package ”robust” and ”credible” defines the process of NATO expansion, the choices involved in pursuing it, and the mission of the enlarged alliance.

Insofar as the process is concerned, it should be clear that vagueness regarding the open door process is tantamount to the pause which alliance members could not proclaim because to do so would be a violation of the Madrid declaration signed nearly two years ago. Thus interpreted as a pause, such vagueness in keeping the door open to additional enlargement could have some demoralizing and deleterious consequences, including a sense that some parts of Europe are outside of the Euro-Atlantic security zone. This is why the process truly must be credible. There has to be a roadmap, and there has to be a timetable.

A credible process would begin with the commitment, at the April Summit, that within the following 12 months a ministerial will undertake a serious assessment of the progress being made toward qualifying for membership by countries that seek such membership. A report could then be presented at the next NATO summit, held with all 19 members, which presumably could take place before the end of 2000. That summit could determine which candidate countries have fulfilled the criteria that are now well established, and which countries should be designated as the next nominees for serious negotiations. Thus, the next group or individual state could expect to enter the alliance at some time in 2001 or 2002.

That to me would be a process of enlargement that would be both ”credible” because doable, and ”robust” because of its specificity. It would not be precipitous: spread over several years, it would have room for adjustments should any be warranted. But it would not be vague either and, accordingly, it would not risk the consequences associated with the perception of a pause that would result from vagueness.

That brings me to the question of choice. Although it my still be too early to identify new members, some general observations can be made about that selection. First, there should be no portion of Europe that is automatically designated as a preferential zone for expansion, and no portion of Europe that should be designated as an excluded zone, or a zone that is beyond a so-called red line. For Europe to be stable there can be no zones of ambiguity, no areas that are open to aggression because there is no commitment to collective security involving the United States as well as Europe. That is what the process of NATO enlargement attempts to achieve – a process that will be stretched out, slowed down, or accelerated depending on the circumstances. This means that any future expansion for qualified candidates can go either north or south, or perhaps in both directions, at the same time. Enlargement must also be based on the notion that the countries concerned must meet objective standards. The will require the assessments at 19 mentioned earlier, first by the ministerial in December 1999 or in the spring of 2000, and then by the summit later that year. And finally, enlargement can proceed all the more effectively as NATO does have the benefit of an intermediary arrangement that is less than membership and yet more than exclusion, namely, Partnership for Peace.

Still, there are already reliable indications as to where the applicant countries stand. Thus, the Congressional Research Service recently concluded a comparative assessment of their readiness. On that basis, and as of this moment, Slovenia and Lithuania appear to be ahead of the other contenders for membership. Whether that will still be the case 12 to 18 month from now is too early to say. Nevertheless, such an assessment suggests the directions in which future expansion should head as part of the process of enlarging the Euro-Atlantic security zone.

Admittedly, whether Russia should be brought in or kept put of this zone, including NATO, is a challenging question. Yet, even those who raise that question most directly usually fail to answer it conclusively. For one, the question may be premature. Each of the three new NATO countries explicitly asked to join the alliance, following which the 16 NATO members made their decision. By comparison, Russia has not shown any interest to be in NATO, and it is not now showing the slightest indication that it wants to join. Instead, there seems to be much interest in keeping NATO weak, as well as far from Russia by preventing its enlargement to some specific European countries.

Under such circumstances, arguing or asserting that Russia will, or will never be a member of NATO is hardly useful. The question should be raised if and when Russia were to meet all the qualifications for membership, including a genuine desire to be in NATO, and the issue could then be discussed in reference to the fundamental transformation which the inclusion of Russia in NATO would have on the alliance. In the meantime, it would be more helpful to discuss how best engage Russia and help it to recover, while creating on its borders a wider security system by which Russia can be limited if it regains its strength, or which it cannot threaten if it does not recover.

Finally, the mission of an enlarged NATO must be the security of the members of the Euro-Atlantic system. That is indeed the core mission on which deterrence or threat prevention ought to be based. In future years, a new broader mission for NATO may well be required, but such a broader mission should be defined prudently and, above all, avoid overloading an enlarged alliance with global objectives that would be excessively ambitious and could not be met. Only by keeping the alliance as a Euro-Atlantic alliance can its integrity and cohesion be sufficiently maintained to make possible an integrated commitment to the fulfillment of its mission.

What constitutes a security threat to Europe is a question Europeans themselves will have to answer. Because they do not seem to interpret out-of-area conflicts the way we do, especially out-of-Europe, moving the alliance to distant threats is going to be increasingly difficult. As it the case in the Persian Gulf, the best way to respond to out-of-area threats is with multilateral coalitions that ensure the cooperation of some (but not all) countries that are willing to be involved.

Nor is ”Europe” easy to define. There is no Europe in the political security sense. Instead, there are individual European states. Some of these states, like Great Britain in the Persian Gulf, do interpret distant threats as threats to themselves in Europe. Other European countries may not do so, however, and pushing too hard may precipitate a premature strategic debate within the alliance at a time when there is not yet an interlocutor that can truly speak for Europe. We should not create unnecessary tensions by trying to harness NATO into some from of global alliance in which the United States defines what the threat is and Europeans are called to assume the burdens of reaction.

This is not to argue the assumption of additional alliance responsibilities, such as the prevention of proliferation writ large, or the deterrence of regional aggression beyond the scope of the NATO region itself. These wider, global objectives are not the exclusive responsibility of the alliance, however, and cannot be limited exclusively to a NATO response. Proliferation, for example, involves other countries, both positively and negatively. Japan has reason to be concerned about proliferation given its proximity to North Korea, but European states, too, have reasons to be concerned about North Korea’s role as a proliferator. Any global effort to halt proliferation must involve in some fashion states that have recently proliferated. The same is even more true of the deterrence of regional aggression in areas distant from NATO territory. Here, too, other countries may be involved and will have, therefore, to be included. Yet, because not all NATO countries may be affected similarly by out-of-area threats, the inclination to act together within the framework of the alliance may differ from country to country.

That Europe is itself in the process of unifying and expanding at the same time is a further complication. As Europe’s position within the alliance evolves, any effort to define broader responsibilities for NATO must take into account the impact of Europe’s own unification on its role within the alliance. Across the Atlantic but also within Europe, this process is going to be enormously complicated in terms of the division of responsibilities, the commitment of resources, and the balance of influence between the United States and the states of Europe. We must avoid creating tensions which, instead of strengthening NATO as it expands, would either dilute it or force a divisive debate on issues which the alliance at this stage may not be prepared to handle either on an integrated or on a unilateral basis. Enlarging the Euro-Atlantic system is a process sufficiently complicated, and how it unfolds will have a significant impact on the cohesion and integration of the alliance itself.


Robert Cooper: Sovereignty and the Small State

This is an exciting time for anyone involved in politics and especially anyone involved in international affairs. The pattern of nation states that has shaped Europe for three countries and more has now become fluid again. The Cold War which froze the political geography of Europe has come to an end. We are all free to choose our destinies again. Indeed, we are free to ask ourselves the fundamental question of how that ”we” should be defined. When I say ”we” can choose our destiny do I mean we citizens of the city, we inhabitants of a province, we members of a nationality, we tax payers of a state, we believers in a religion, we Europeans, (and if so what do we mean by Europe)? Or do I mean all of these?

If we are asking such fundamental questions we have to return to fundamental concepts. Political philosophy and political theory are once again relevant to practical politics. Questions about the shape of our states and the shape of Europe require us to think our policies through from the fundamentals.

I therefore start with the fundamental question ”What is a state”. There are many different answers to this. I offer three, one from a sociologist, one from a poet and one from a pictogram.

The most famous definition comes from the sociologist, Max Weber. He described the state as the body having the legitimate monopoly on force. This probably remains the best short definition available.

The poet definition comes from Kipling. In a poem describing the creation of the English state he wrote.

”There shall be one people – it shall serve one lord – (neither priest nor baron shall escape!) It shall have one speech and law, soul and strength and sword. England’s being hammered, hammered, hammered into shape.”

The pictogram definition comes from the Japanese language where the character for ”country” can be written with a pictogram which seems to show a king inside a box, not a bad representation, perhaps, for a territorial unit controlled by a single sovereign.

Both Kipling and Weber also insist on the single sovereign. Admittedly we are no longer ruled by kings but the monopoly of power has been transferred to the fictional person of the state. Although both Kipling and Weber insist on the monopoly of force (”one sword” in Kipling’s description) this is an aspiration rather than a reality for most states. Crime often involves a use of force not sanctioned by law. What is really important in the state’s existence is its monopoly on law, the ability to decide what is and is not right. The victory of the state over the church was thus one of the key moments in its developments. Until this happened there was a source of law and authority and a definition of what was right outside the control of the king.

In the twentieth century Communism played a somewhat similar role to that of the church, with the Communist party as a kind of priesthood able to determine through superior knowledge and through possession of a sacred text (Karl Marx rather than the Bible) what was and was not right. This enabled the Communist party to put itself above the state and provided the intellectual foundation for the Brezhnev doctrine of ”limited sovereignty”.

The defeat of the church (encapsulated in Kipling’s ”Neither priest nor baron shall escape”) had however long-run consequences for the king himself. Where did the king derive his authority from? Previously it had been possible to answer this question by referring to God and the church. But if the church was now subordinate to the state, or at least separate from, who appointed the king? It has taken us three hundred years to answer this question but the answer is now clear: sovereignty rests with the people. Rulers rule under the authority of the people. The states exist by the consent of the people who make them up. The consequences of this second point are not yet fully worked out in Europe.

As we enter the 21st century however the state is changing. Once we had kings surrounded by clear territorial limits. First the king is no longer what he was. On the one hand he has been replaced by the people, in the shape of popular sovereignty and democracy. At the same time power is no longer so concentrated on one point. Many countries have provincial assemblies, federal systems or devolved government. In Britain we are on the point of creating a parliament for Scotland. And in Northern Ireland, where there will also be devolved government, some of the functions of the state will be subject to discussion by an all-Irish body bringing together a region of the UK with the neighbouring state of the Republic of Ireland.

The box around the king is also increasingly porous. It is not just that trade, investment, people, telephone calls, aeroplanes and motor cars travel across borders. In some parts of Europe police may operate outside the boundaries of their national territory and it is common for European countries to take part in military training or exercises outside their borders. Military observation of each others exercises and inspections under the CFE Treaty are also a part of every day life in Europe today.

As well as meaning the authority of the king or the state ”Sovereign” was also the name of a gold coin which circulated in the UK until well into this century. Money has always been connected to the state. Coins bear the king’s head. Bank notes are often issued by a state bank. This too has now changed in Europe. The creation of a European currency does not imply the creation of a European state but it does imply that the states which belong to ”Euroland” are undergoing a fundamental change. In Britain too, even though we not members of the Euro a number of retailers have announced that they will accept Euro notes and coins when they are introduced in 2002: a further example of the weakening grip the state now has on its national territory.

The most fundamental of all the state’s monopoly on law is no longer what it once was.

The cliché in international relations is that by creating exclusive territorial jurisdiction the nation states of Europe obtained domestic order but the price they paid was international anarchy. But that indeed is haw Europe seemed to be for last several centuries, an area of almost incessant wars.

Today however it no longer makes sense to talk of international anarchy. International trade, international finance, international travel, international telecommunications all function because the anarchy of previous centuries has been replaced by an increasingly ordered multilateral system. Although there is no single law making authority ever growing aspects of our lives are governed by international agreements and international organisations. The International Monetary Fund may determine the rate of interest we pay on our mortgages; international aviation agreements enable us to fly through other countries’ air space; regulations by the European Community may affect the size and shape of the vegetables we eat, not to mention the price.

Some of these international regulations are followed voluntarily by states who have agreed them by a consensus process. Some regulation, in the form of treaties or European Union directives may have the force of law. The monopoly of law which was such an important part of the definition of the state is therefore undergoing radical change. It begins to look as if domestic order may not imply international anarchy after all. But if this is the case then sovereignty can no longer be defined as the monopoly of states on both law and force.

A world of growing international order is an attractive environment for small states. There are many reasons to prefer small states to large ones. Small states are less threatening to their neighbours and often attract a higher degree of loyalty from their own citizens. The patriotism of small states seems charming and attractive. In large states patriotism can too closely resemble a threatening nationalism. Citizens of countries like Denmark, Norway or Switzerland seem to identify much more closely with their government than is the case for British, French or Germans.

They may also be richer. The richest countries in Europe seem to be the smallest ones: Switzerland, Denmark and Luxembourg. It is particularly astonishing that Luxembourg should be rich. This tiny state without easy access to the sea is stuck in the mountains between France, Germany and Belgium. Geography seems to give it the destiny of being one of the poorer parts of Europe. Switzerland is another country which seems designed by geography to be poor – and indeed for countries it was one of the poorest countries of Europe.

The success of these countries may be partly owing to their small size. In a small country a government is closer to its people. It is probably better able to respond to their needs. The people in turn feel more involved in the government and may be more ready to fulfil their duties as citizens. Both state and people are likely to be more flexible and responsive to changes in the external environment.

This also may be one of the secrets of success of the small state. A large state is not only more complicated to organise and more slow to respond, but it may also suffer from the delusion that because it is large it is able to control its own destiny. It believes it can control the international environment by dominating it rather than by adapting to it or cooperating with it: a large state suffers, that is to say, from an old-fashioned concept to sovereignty believing that it can monopolise the law-making process.

The modern concept of sovereignty is different. It recognises that the new international order require a new kind of state, no longer the closed monopoly state insisting on its own rights but the open cooperative state. For states of Europe today sovereignty consists in the right to join in the different cooperative activities that have replaced international anarchy.

This comes naturally to small states. Provided they are open and cooperative and accept that the international order brings obligations as well as privileges they are likely to prosper.

The 19th century was the era of nation states; the 20th century has been the century of the super power. If we are lucky the 21st century could see the return of the small state as the most successful and constructive actor in international affairs.


Tamer Levent: Yes to Art Project

At the end of the 20th century, it seems that humans need new values.Sharing ideas, creating values, reaching collective aims and feeling happy.

Fast development in technology creating an erosion.

That creates a cultural gap. Someone wants to use these periods and wants to make a commerce of crime, guns, fundamentalism, drugs etc.

It seems humans forget the meaning of art and it’s necessity. They start using this word as the name of work itself.

Like, theatre, opera, ballet, music, dance = art.

Are they art?

What is the meaning of ”art here?” Is it the name of a job?

Is it a kind of profession or value?

If one young boy and girl will play roles at the school theatre, how shall we call them?

As an ”artist”!

And the play which they performed is it an art?

Are we sure, are we able to explain who is an artist and what is art?


Aesthetic Philosophy

You know in the 17th century with German philosopher Baumgarten, art and it’s philosophy started to be discussed with philosophy of aesthetic. So if we will look at old philosophers of aesthetics, Aristotle’s, Plato, Kant, Schiller, Schelling, Hegel, Marks and the others, we can realise that they have one common point.

Art is the criteria of the value itself. Art is the name of the quality.

It is not a profession, but it is a quality of any profession!

For instance we are usually calling theatre as ”arts Theatre!”

But why are we not calling cooking as a arts cooking ?

Here, cooking is work itself, and the word ”arts” is the sign of the quality!

But if we use ”theatre” without the word ”arts” what will be theatre?

If it is an art itself, why we need to create another word as an ”art” near by the word theatre. In that case the word ”theatre” must have to combine everything and we mustn’t need an extra word as ”art”!

But, theatre is a work. It is an act! Acting is a work of course! Main human work.

So, the meaning of theatre is ”to show human action on the stage”.

But we are not calling every human as an artist! Like every actor can’t be an artist!

What is the difference between student and professional theatre actor?

What is the difference between actor in the life and actor on the stage?

But what is profession? What is the difference between profession and art?

Art, is it itself, is it a profession or the criteria of quality?

The theory of beauty, theory of good and truth isn’t a criteria?

Did humans miss reaching common aesthetic values or not?

What is ugly, what is bad and what is wrong?

Here let’s create a discussion between an aesthetic philosopher and a carpenter. Philosopher can explain to us the advantage of comparison between ugly and beauty and he can make us awaken to making a decision. But a carpenter looks to the product. For him, beauty means together with the same meaning as useful. Because, any chair which comes beautiful for carpenter.

After the carpenter’s explanation about the chair, may be we can change our mind about the beauty. So for every decision we need knowledge! But we must have to learn how can we reach knowledge and how can we use it. That can be technical, practical, academic or professional knowledge and it is also endless...

Making a decision is another process. What will be the value of the product which we create...every second we are producing a behaviour do we know what we are doing and why we are doing it?

We may have to know ourselves. Our own capacity and ability. But for learning and understanding ourselves we also need knowledge! For creating our quality, we may have to know what’s wrong and what’s right for ourselves.

In that case with the value of ”to be aware” we can re-produce ourselves. That’s art! But, we mustn’t think that the process is going to be finished and also product is finished. Product, if is ourselves, process is always must have to continue for development. Here product, it’s also not art it self. But, the process of the dialectic comparison, is an art! Or this togetherness is great art!

So in that process, we need criteria’s for making our own life more aesthetic, more artistic. That can be possible with the formula of aesthetic;

step 1.

bad ugly wrong

step 2.

good beauty right

step 3.

ethic aesthetic justice

In this process with the help of the knowledge, if humans come to Step 3., his behaviour becomes very clear, bright and shining! A person can be more artistic about his decisions on life. Because if he succeeds to reach Step 3., he will earn the values of ethics, aesthetics and justice! For using these values, he needs more and more knowledge. About culture, politics, world policy, art, aesthetics, ethics, nature etc.

So how can we explain this project to humans and how can we make them join this process for creating their own quality for our common culture and life on the earth.

That means for each person it makes, life more artistic, and makes art as a life style.

We need a campaign;



Can be the name of the campaign! A world wide campaign!

And, we can organise this campaign with all participators and volunteers.

With this campaign we can start to update all our common values and their important roles in our life.


What are the roles of:


what are the roles of:


what is the importance of:

Near to end of the 20th century, don’t we need to upgrade our knowledge also for the new century!

So this is the suggestion for world wide campaign.



We send a proposal to General Directory of UNESCO – Paris.

That was a proposal for organising a participating program and workshop with incorporate countries about the meaning of this article.

Slovakia was also there. But, still we didn’t get any answer.

If you believe the value of that campaign, please write UNESCO and us and support it. This is a campaign for all humans who live on this earth. We have to develop new values for the new century. And ”arts as a life style” is ready there, in front of the door!


Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Meeting of Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Countries

Bratislava, May 14, 1999

1. We, the Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic, welcome the opportunity of meeting in Bratislava in order to revitalise the co-operation of the Visegrad Countries in full historical dimension. We are pleased that the group will be able to act in its full capacity.

2. Taking into consideration the proximity of our States and the similarity of experiences from the process of political, economic and social development, the participants of the meeting recognise the need for closer co-operation of the Visegrad Countries and confirm their interest and readiness to participate in developing good neighbourly relations in the region of Central Europe.

3. We strongly condemn the deliberate policy of oppression, ethnic cleansing and violence pursued by Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces against the civilian population in Kosovo. We call upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to comply with all conditions set forth by NATO and other international organisations and countries to ensure a verifiable stop to all military actions and the immediate end of all forms of violence. We sympathise with all people afflicted by the Kosovo crisis and will undertake all necessary efforts to put an end to the conflict, secure lasting peace and stability in the South-East Europe and will promote democracy, human rights, freedoms and the rule of law.

4. We welcome the progress of Visegrad Countries towards full integration with the Euro-Atlantic and European structures. We are satisfied with the results of the NATO Summit in Washington, the reaffirmation of the Alliance’s open door policy and the inclusion of Slovakia into the group of candidate countries. We reaffirm that it is in the interest of all Visegrad partners and the region as a whole that Slovakia became full member of NATO and started accession negotiations with the European Union as soon as possible. The transfer of expertise is of crucial importance for all partners. Visegrad states will share their experiences from the process of accession into NATO and integration with the European Union, as well as those related to informing the public about accession.

5. We are determined to deepen the co-operation in the area of preparation for meeting the EU criteria in the field of justice and home affairs, with the emphasis on the fight against illegal migration, trafficking of people, illicit drugs and weapons as well as combating international crime and terrorism. The development of cross-border co-operation on the local, regional and intergovernmental level is an effective way of strengthening our mutual relations. It is desirable to intensify the utilisation of the relevant existing and future EU programmes and funds.

6. The building of solidarity and integrity of the region should be facilitated by various activities aimed at enhancing day-to-day contacts among the citizens of Visegrad countries. We assign great significance to the activities of non-governmental organisations and shall encourage their co-operation.

7. The considerable revival of Visegrad Group should be strengthened by the annual meetings of Prime Ministers, members of Government, state secretaries of Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and co-ordinators of the Visegrad co-operation. We assume that the subsequent meetings will be hosted by the partners on a rotating principle. It is with satisfaction that we accept the invitation to meet in Prague next year.