Electronic Library of Scientific Literature - © Academic Electronic Press
Vol. IX / No 4 / 2000
ŠTÚDIE, ANALÝZY - STUDIES, ANALYSIS
3 Vladimír Leška
Integrace Slovenska do evropských a transatlantických struktur – pohled z ČR
Integration of Slovakia into European and Transatlantic Structures – Perspective from the Czech Republic
33 Tomáš Valášek
U.S. – European Dialogue on National Missile Defence
Americko-európsky dialóg o systéme národnej raketovej obrany
46 Daniela Geisbacherová
Spoločná európska zahraničná a bezpečnostná politika – druhý pilier Európskej únie
Common European Foreign and Security Policy – the Second Pillar of European Union
68 Jana Grittersová
Transatlantic Economic Diplomacy
Transatlantická ekonomická diplomacia
89 Ingrid Brocková
Transatlantic Business Dialogue
Transatlantický obchodný dialóg
ÚVAHY, ROZPRAVY, ROZHOVORY - REFLECTIONS, TRANSACTIONS, INTERVIEWS
105 Peter Hulényi
Kanada a Európska únia – realita a perspektívy transatlantických obchodných vzťahov
Canada and European Union – the Reality and Perspectives Transatlantic Trade Affairs
115 Juraj Ješko
Ďalšia vlna rozširovania Aliancie vo svetle transatlantických vzťahov a možnosti Slovenska v nej
Next Wave of the Alliance Enlargement in the Light of Transatlantic Relations and the Possibilities of Slovakia in it
125 Yvona Gustafíková
Politika vonkajších vzťahov Európskej únie
Policy of External Relations of the European Union
DOKUMENTY, PRAMENE - DOCUMENTS, SOURCES
137 Štefan Šebesta
Európska bezpečnostná a obranná politika – edičná poznámka
140 Anna Petrášová
Ján Liďák: Medzinárodné vzťahy – medzinárodná politika
142 Daniel Šmihula
Ján Čierny: Vladimír Clementis diplomat
146 Peter Juza
Oskar Krejčí: Geopolitika středoevropského prostoru
Vladimír Aleksandrovič Dergačev: Geopolitika
153 Urban Rusnák
Nové bezpečnostné výzvy v Európe – 4. International Security Forum
155 BIBLIOGRAFIA 2000 - BIBLIOGRAPHY 2000
Each pro-European politically literate citizen of the Czech Republic whether supporter or opponent of division of Czechoslovakia should for judging integration victories and loses of the Slovak Republic use the same criteria as are used for evaluating results of the whole process of European unification. Sovereign Slovakia is a real and inseparable element of contemporary international relations and its movement towards integration structures is an organic part of the positive tendency of post-confrontational development of the continent.
Historically not very long post-November era of the Central European states one can deduce one fundamental lesson, valid for all their politicians: Should they relieve their decisions of an attempt of short term and often limited political gain and orient themselves more to longer term and more universal contribution that could be confronted in a wider international context, they would do good not only to their voters but next generations, as well. Approach of some politicians to issues of integrations of successor states of divided Czecho-Slovak Federation into European and Transatlantic structures was an illustrative confirmation of this thesis.
After creation of an independent Slovakia it seemed its integration route would be similar to the one of other neighbouring Central European states. Nevertheless very soon the first signs that it might not be so appeared. The new political criteria of accession to the Association Agreement accented above all respect of national minorities’ rights. The fact that the European Agreement of Accession with the Slovak Republic (but with the Czech Republic as well) entered into force already on 1st February 1995 was a signal that the EU tried to approach this issues more generously than some observers expected.
There was probably also a contribution of the fact that Slovak politicians since the Slovak independence declared unequivocal interest in the EU and later also the NATO membership. Politicians of democratic Europe and the USA were comforted because in principal all parliamentary political subjects except for SNS (Slovak National Party) and ZRS (Union of Workers of Slovakia) agreed on this basic philosophy of anchoring the young state in international relations. Consensually agreed foreign policy orientation was projected also into the Programme of the Government of the Mečiar’s Cabinet that resulted from 1994 elections. But following realisation of this line was strongly influenced by the fact that the only willing coalition partners for the HZDS (Movement for Democratic Slovakia) were SNS and ZRS. More sceptical analytics were already afraid that the price SR would have to pay for creation of this power constellation might be quite high.
Even that the Cabinet of V. Mečiar considered the North Atlantic Alliance “the most effective existing security organisation and membership in it at the same time a possibility of gaining the security guaranties“ they not always properly followed this thesis. Their integration efforts unequivocally accented steps that should get Slovakia closer mainly to the EU. But in relation to this institution they did not fulfil political criteria thoroughly what would secure for SR a favourable starting position for membership candidates’ selection. The first disturbing signals of possible weakening of their assumptions to integrate to European and Transatlantic structures sounded very loudly during the first two sessions of the NR SR (National Council of the Slovak Republic), which were held on 3rd November and from 3rd to 4th November 1994. Freshly agreed parliamentary majority – HZDS, SNS and ZRS – in an attempt to secure their positions and stability of power influence on all important spheres of public life, adopted a series of measures that in their way demonstrated mečiaritic understanding of democracy. This government’s four-year stint provided with sufficient evidence that this peculiar democracy distinguished itself from the real one very substantially.
Even though we in CR really wished Slovak integration into European and Transatlantic structures together with other participants of the Visegrad co-operation it was obvious that consequences of “Mečiar’s route“ would surely project into its evaluation. Not only economic experts but also others who were interested in a situation in Slovakia demurred at party conception of big privatisation accompanied by gross abuse of law and unprecedented scale of corruption and cronyism. Anti-constitutional resolutions of the parliament governed by HZDS disturbed politicians of all democratic countries. Attempts of the then governmental representatives to create unequal conditions for fair play of political powers were met with strong criticism, as well.
Consequences of this kind of democracy naturally turned up soon. SR on its integration route during the V. Mečiar’s government lost contact with other countries of the Central European region. In Madrid on 8th July 1997 SR was not listed even among candidates of possible second NATO enlargement wave. On 13th December 1997 on the EU Luxembourg Summit SR was also missing from the group of states with which EU decided to start accession negotiations.
The fact that Slovakia was excluded from a group of hot candidates of integration was in CR perceived as one of the strongest impulses that after 1998 parliamentary election contributed to creation of the government of a wide coalition of M. Dzurinda. Some Czech politologists and analysts doubted that such a wide spectral grouping might even arise. M. Dzurinda managed to create a government with participation of SMK (Party of Hungarian Coalition) and this immensely contributed to strengthening the international position of Slovakia. Overcoming the “Hungarian syndrome“ was judged positively not only by political representatives of the southern neighbour but countries playing in European and Trans Atlantic structures’ enlargement a significant role, as well.
It was not surprising that representatives of individual parties of the governmental coalition and even different platforms within SDK (Slovak Democratic Coalition) tried to pursue their own ideas in solving inherited economic, political, but also legal and security problems. Society of Slovakia as well as its supporters abroad perceived with regret that discrepancies in coalition not infrequently appeared also as a result of attempts to give priority to partial party interests. Process of removing history residua was as a result of this disproportionately prolonged. Tension and often mutual antipathy grew among supporters of different policies.
Government credibility and its position in eyes of public opinion were considerably weakened by some corruption or crony scandals. Most of conflicts inside the governmental coalition confirmed that the Slovak political elite, equally the majority of Czech politicians, even during ten years of post-November development did not respect the basic principle of wise politicians: to be in all situations sufficiently politically provident. Short term and partial party gains were given priority to longer term and wider comprehended contributions for the whole society.
Consequences of the fight inside the governmental coalition according to Czech analysts influenced the Slovak political scene in two time levels – current and perspective ones. In the current level they were threatening internal stability a thus significantly complicated realisation of plans of the Programme of the Government including those concerning integration of Slovakia into European and Transatlantic structures. In the perspective level consequences of turbulences in the governmental coalition were projected mainly in possibilities of coalition co-operation before the next parliamentary election and after them. As a result before the end of the governmental term there could cause relations inside the coalition to culminate in such a way it would practically exclude future co-operation of participating parties.
Politologists and analysts in the Czech Republic perceived changes in Slovakia after assumption of power by the wide coalition, despite accompanying significant complications and problems, prevailingly with major sympathies. According to them the positive sense of this change laid mainly in the fact that principles of parliamentary democracy started to be applied consistently, conditions for meaningful activity of all constitutional institutions created, rule of law established and judiciary independence honoured.
Despite mistakes and shortcomings the four-coalition government made during its first year of power, its results comparing to previous stage could be marked as extraordinarily encouraging. Changes introduced in Slovakia in the end of 1998 and during 1999 have dramatic importance to its direction to European and Transatlantic structures. Analysts in CR appreciated mainly that the four-coalition cabinet adopted series of positive decisions concerning national minorities.
Observers from the closest neighbouring country saw with satisfaction that the four-coalition despite original perplexity unequivocally confirmed its determination to consistently finish reform of Slovak economy. Efforts of legal experts of the governmental coalition to pursue needed changes in the Constitution of SR were welcomed, as well. Diligent fight for reform of public administration, which should create more favourable conditions for more efficient influence of public issues by citizens, earns to be admired.
A crucial role in evaluating success of the Cabinet of M. Dzurinda from the point of view of integration aims was according to the author above all played by measures in a sphere of international relations. Its foreign policy was made on a base of a wide consensus of all partners in the coalition without bigger delays and with wide support of the Slovak society. The Slovak government in its integration efforts relied on it closest neighbouring states what was bilaterally beneficial. Mainly political representatives of the Czech Republic since beginning expressed their interest in restoration of regional co-operation based on Visegrad Four group. Policy of M. Dzurinda’s cabinet in a sphere of fulfilling integration aims in the international field was thought through, well aimed and fully credible. At the same time it was much more convincing than results reached in home policy.
SR reached the first important success on its integration route in October 1999 when the European Commission recommended the Helsinki summit to invite SR together with five other countries to start accession negotiations with EU. Conceptions of possibilities and limits of its integration into this institution gained thus clear content and time contours. Nevertheless prospects of its acceptation into NATO remained still hazy even though the Dzurinda’s government during one year brought foreign and security policy of its country much closer to the North Atlantic Alliance. It is its credit that Slovakia had de facto nearly the same security guaranties as its neighbours, even though de jure its security status remained completely different.
Results of M. Dzurinda’s Cabinet in home and foreign policy were a quite good certificate for acceptation of Slovakia into the North Atlantic Alliance what was projected into conclusions of its Washington summit in April 1999. Change brought by 1998 elections was explicitly appreciated by the Washington Summit Communiqué.
All pro-European politicians, politologists and analysts were frankly pleased that efforts of not only the Slovak Cabinet and governmental four-coalition but of a number of other governmental and non-governmental organisations supported by a major part of the Slovak society as well were successfully competed by decision of the European Council in Helsinki on 11th December 1999. Gaining EU membership together with its neighbours was a vital interest not only of Slovakia. Joint entry of the whole region was a subject of interest of both its neighbours and bodies of the Union. This possibility has universal advantages. Its realisation would prevent a whole number of complications that would appear should SR be considerably late in its integration process comparing to its neighbours.
A realistic observer from CR, even if judging achieved integration results of the M. Dzurinda’s Cabinet very positively, could not resist some doubts evoked by both the perspectives of possible internal political development in Slovakia and the state of conceptual and structural readiness of EU and NATO for accepting new members. Were did this scepticism come from? Even if Slovakia manages to adjust the two-year loss it has in the accession negotiations with EU comparing to its neighbours and by 2002 would fulfil operational, technical and politico-military measures resulting from the Membership action plan (MAP) cumulated effect of both groups of negative factors might cause that it would not be accepted to EU together with its Visegrad partners anyway and it’s North Atlantic Alliance membership would be postponed again.
But it was evident that the speed of EU negotiations would be ultimately decided mainly by ability of the governmental administration, flexibility of parliament activity and quality of internal development. All three conditions were mutually interconnected. Level of unity and ability of action of the governmental coalition was their common denominator. But as an involved observer from CR in this connection got more familiar with the Slovak reality, there were not many reasons for optimism. What was most disturbing? Turbulences in the governmental coalition were reaching level wrecking continuation of reform efforts in required pace and even threatened their further existence. Destructive opposition unethically capitalized on these problems, outlining its return plans by scandalizing governmental politicians and incitement to social unrest. It even used constitutional institute of the people’s voting.
In the context of further events on the Slovak political scene one can presume that the highest rung of the scale of weightiness causes of further co-operation of coalition parties should be occupied by endeavour to prevent rise of another government headed by V. Mečiar. Also even if his return to the Prime Minister’s chair would not cause exclusion of Slovakia from the group of countries with which EU decided to held accession negotiations. Slovak position in negotiations with EU would certainly weaken considerably by his only appearance in any constitutional position. Rationally contemplating politicians of governmental coalition parties should not allow such a situation.
Deepening disputes among coalition parties might cause that their constitutional majority in the parliament would become an empty quantity and the process of adoption of needed changes of the Constitution and other laws as well, mainly those connected to the reform of public administration, would change into a fight of pursuing the party interests. This would project itself into both quality of individual legislative norms and slowing the pace of their adoption. Impeded situation of Slovakia in EU negotiations would seriously endanger realisation of the governmental aim of maximal speeding up negotiation of individual chapters, even though they managed to start this process extraordinarily well in 2000.
Should Slovakia be ruled by any political grouping, it will be citizens’ approach to the NATO membership that will be an important factor deciding its entry into this defence community. Politicians of countries of the North Atlantic Alliance always consider candidate country’s public attitude towards NATO as an exceptionally important indicator of country’s readiness to fulfil future membership commitments. If the Slovak government makes farther trustworthy foreign policy and its internal political practice results from principles of democracy, political plurality, protection of human rights and rule of law, probability of gradual change of cold public attitude towards NATO membership is bigger than if it is the other way round. It was unequivocally confirmed by latest public opinion polls.
But should consequences of low credibility government cumulate with resistance of majority towards entry into the North Atlantic Alliance, political representatives of its member countries would certainly not hurry up an invitation to join the Washington Treaty followed by the Treaty ratification of its acceptation.
People of Slovakia and their political representatives will decide direction of future two years of Slovakia. The first big possibility to express their notion of integration goals of their homeland came in November referendum about early parliamentary elections. Czech observes expected its results with a big thrill.
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Systém národnej raketovej obrany (NMD), navrhnutý Spojenými štátmi, bol v Európe prijatý chladne. Väčšina európskych krajín nesúhlasí so záverom, ku ktorému dospela americká vláda, že rakety dlhého doletu v rukách prezidentov Severnej Kórey, Iránu či Iraku predstavujú bezprostredné nebezpečie. Hoci ich potenciálne deštruktívne účinky sú dobre známe aj v Paríži či Bruseli, európske krajiny udržiavajú s Iránom a Irakom lepšie vzťahy ako USA, a teda sa necítia byť ich raketami ohrozené.
Európa je oveľa viac znepokojená možným dopadom amerického systému národnej raketovej obrany na jadrovú rovnováhu medzi USA a Ruskom. Ruský jadrový arzenál sa neustále zmenšuje, pretože Moskva nestačí vyrábať nové rakety, ktoré by nahradili tie dožívajúce. Hoci systém NMD je stavaný iba na zostrelenie relatívne malého počtu rakiet naraz, je možné, že počet ruských rakiet s jadrovými hlavicami klesne na úroveň, ktorú by už NMD systém vedel zastaviť. Narastá teda nebezpečenstvo, že Rusko použije svoje rakety skôr, ako by ich systém NMD vedel zneškodniť.
Moskva sa preto pokúša predísť konštrukcii národného raketového systému v USA nástojením na dodržaní zmluvy o Protiraketovej obrane (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, ABM), ktorú Spojené štáty americké a vtedajšie ZSSR podpísalo v roku 1972 a ktorá bola neskôr potvrdená Ruskom. NMD systém predstavuje jasné porušenie tejto zmluvy v jej dnešnej podobe. Spojené štáty a Moskva sa pokúšajú dohodnúť na prípadnej revízii, ktorú Rusko zatiaľ odmieta. Hrozí teda, že ak sa USA a Rusko nedohodnú, Európa sa bude musieť pridať na stranu Ruska (a tým ohroziť nielen vzťahy s USA, ale aj fungovanie NATO) alebo Spojených štátov (čím by sa mohla porušiť jadrová rovnováha a zhoršiť medzinárodná politická klíma). Týka sa to hlavne Veľkej Británie a Dánska, ktoré v prípade, že sa Washington rozhodne pre vybudovanie systému NMD, budú musieť rozhodnúť o schválení konštrukcie radarov na ich území. Vlády oboch týchto krajín sa vyjadrili proti revízii zmluvy ABM a jej vypovedanie Spojenými štátmi by ich postavilo do veľmi nepríjemnej situácie.
Americké plány na vybudovanie systému národnej raketovej obrany spôsobili znepokojenie v Európe aj preto, lebo ich vlády považujú EÚ za prejav rastúcej tendencie k unilaterálnemu rozhodovaniu bez zohľadnenia názoru európskych spojencov. Poukazujú pritom aj na nedávny návrh Georga Busha, kandidáta v prezidentských voľbách, na stiahnutie amerických vojsk z misií NATO v Bosne a Kosove.
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Despite bold progress in the European political co-operation, the real momentum to European security and foreign policy co-ordination came only with the end of the Cold War. The debate over European defence policy was stirred up by the impelling need of redefining Euro-Atlantic relations by finding a new balance between EU and NATO.
The Gulf War in 1990 dramatically brought to light the weakness of the lack of an integrated European approach to foreign and security policy. Later, the civil war in Yugoslavia, in particular in Kosovo, have underlined that Europe need to develop effective capabilities and strengthen its contribution to security and defence matters.
Europe had to react to such an embarrassing flop. The introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as the second pillar of the Union was regarded as a way to react to the new European risks. It was designed to provide a framework that allows the EU to adequately respond to new challenges and to new type of security emergencies. The definition of the EU’s new functions inescapably led to the project of creating autonomous military capabilities and to the revision of NATO’s strategic concept.
The prevalent line of orientation is to build up an European security and defence identity (ESDI) that shares more of the transatlantic security responsibility and consents the EU to conduct military missions with command structures, forces and assets that are normally assigned to NATO.
The essay is divided into three main sections. The first one is devoted to the historical background of the developing of common European foreign and security policy (CFSP) idea (discussions about the European security and defence identity within Western European Union (WEU); establishing of CFSP as the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union; its acceptation within NATO at NATO summits conclusions in Berlin and Washington).
The second section investigates the modifications introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam and further developed at the European Councils in Cologne, Helsinki and Santa da Feira, which were aimed at strengthening of the CFSP and creating a proper framework for a future common European defence policy.
The last section is a short conclusion, which makes an attempt to recapitulate the development as well as perspectives of CFSP including European security and defence policy (ESDP).
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU), adopted in 1991, which entered into force in 1993, was the first real attempt to accommodate economic integration and co-operation in diplomacy and security within a single institutional framework in order to face the post-1989 security challenges. The TEU forms the basis of a political union built around a CFSP. Article J.4.1: “The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence“. The WEU, although not an EU institution may be asked to elaborate and implement decisions of the EU which have defence implications. This provision is set out also in Art. J.4 and further explained in Declaration No. 30 by the member states of the WEU on the role of WEU and its relations with the EU and with NATO (annexed to the TEU).
Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 with their so-called Petersberg tasks represents further landmark in the developing of the CFSP and the ESDP. The so-called Petersberg tasks cover a spectrum of activity by military forces, ranging from assistance where political conflict does not even arise to enforcement in the context of an intervention by the international community. They represent a very fitting response by the EU, embodying member states shared willingness to safeguard European security through operations which can be evaluated as “soft“ sort of security working.
The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept opened up greater flexibility for NATO and WEU permitting them to assemble packages of forces following the specificity of critical emergencies. The CJTF is central to NATO purpose to assemble forces for contingency operations parallel to the goal of building the ESDI within NATO. The approval of the CJTF concept had certainly a positive effect on the restructuring of national armed forces that was finally guided by the principle of interoperability.
The NATO Berlin agreement in 1996 was precisely tailored for this objective. The adjustments made to the command structure already allow for European-led NATO operations and CJTF initiative consents European allies to use NATO assets without necessarily involving the North American allies.
Regarding to the Amsterdam Treaty (adopted in 1997, entered in force in 1999), the CFSP provisions were amended with the existing Title V, Article J (11 to 28) of TEU and contents were only marginally modified, though some amendments have led to a partial re-ordering of the material. The legal basis of the CFSP on the whole remains unchanged, the second pillar maintaining its own decision-making procedures. Although the position of the Council in the CFSP has been reinforced, it remains to be seen whether this will affect the inter-institutional balance so far as consistency is concerned.
From the institutional point of view, the Amsterdam Treaty endowed the EU with new institutional and operational instruments. Article 13 introduces the concept of common strategies – in areas in which member states have important common interests, whose respective aims and durations, as well as the means to be made available by the Union and its member states, will have to be specified. The defence policy will depend on these strategies. It is necessary for common strategies to include as precisely as possible the various dimensions of the Union’s external policy in order to guarantee the coherence and consistency that it requires. Joint actions, developed in the framework of common strategies, will be decided by qualified majority. The principle of constructive abstention (or opting out) allows a member state or a number of member states to abstain in a vote without preventing others from doing so. Those countries who qualify their abstention by a formal declaration, they are not obliged to apply the decision; but they must accept, in a spirit of solidarity, that the decision commits the Union as a whole and must agree to abstain from any action that might conflict with the Union’s action under that decision.
The greatest innovation brought by the Amsterdam Treaty in the CFSP is certainly the new post of the High Representative for the CFSP that is fulfilled by the Secretary-General of the Council who is accorded the right to attend meetings of the General Affairs Council. The High Representative assists the Council by helping to formulate, develop and implement political decisions, and, when appropriate to act on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties. The greatest breakthrough of this Treaty is the creation of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit. Its tasks include: monitoring and analysing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP; providing assessments of the Union’s foreign and security policy interests and identifying areas on which the CFSP could focus in future.
The Amsterdam Treaty defines the content of the common defence policy as including „humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking“. This follows the conception of a role in crisis management by the WEU member states as settled in the Peterberg Declaration. The incorporation of the WEU’s Petersberg tasks into CFSP is probably the most important achievement.
In December 1998, the British and French governments, Europe’s two leading military powers, met at Saint-Malo and agreed to work together. Their final declaration concluded that the “EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises“. The British shift from traditional conservative position on European defence to a more co-operative attitude within the EU decisively pushed the debate.
Although the Saint-Malo conclusions stressed that NATO was still the milestone of European defence, the declaration clearly envisaged the possibility of European military action outside the framework of the Alliance. Europe should therefore retain the option of a truly autonomous military capability while at the same time pushing the US to co-operate in the development of ESDI within NATO. There might be cases where it is more appropriate for the EU to act outside the NATO framework.
The NATO Washington summit welcomed the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy on security and defence by the Amsterdam Treaty and confirmed that a stronger Europe will contribute to the dynamism of the Alliance for the 21st century.
The conclusions drawn up at the Cologne European Council are certainly pointing in that direction. It was in fact decided that the European Council can now decide to integrate the WEU functions into the EU creating, in this way, the first nucleus of a European defence policy. However, WEU functions will probably be limited to the so-called Petersberg tasks but this does not prevent the EU from going further than that. What is also crucial is the question whether article V would ever be extended to the EU member states. The role of neutral states and those non-allied members of the EU will be determinant for the definition of relations among NATO, EU and WEU.
The German EU Presidency then transformed what had been a set of national and bilateral initiatives into a formal European Union process, capped by the Cologne Council of June 1999. The heads of state and government decide, inter alia, on:
The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 took the process further by:
In the last 18 months Europe has made more progress on ESDI than in 18 years before. From Saint-Malo through Cologne to Helsinki, a new sense of direction has become visible. Indeed, all three institutions involved in building an ESDI – EU, WEU and NATO – are reflecting these new political and military imperatives.
Europe is capable of taking more responsibility for maintaining security and stability on this continent. European security and defence policy is a scenario where NATO and EU are not rivals, but partners. In short, it would be a scenario of an enlightened Atlanticism, an Atlanticism that can adapt to the challenges of this new century.
The EU’s Headline goal, the WEU’s Audit and NATO’s new command structure - they are all converging towards the same ends: a stronger Europe and a stronger transatlantic relationship.
Philosophical questions about the desirability of ESDI are no longer dominating EU agenda. European representatives have moved beyond that: they are finally discussing the practical questions of implementation. This indicates that all players know much is at stake.
At Helsinki, EU Heads of State and Government committed themselves, by 2003, to be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain for at least a year, up to 50-60.000 troops capable of undertaking the most demanding crisis management tasks. This agreement will provide significant political impetus for European capability improvements that will be available for EU-led operations, where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, and also for NATO-led operations.
There is also growing support for holding some form of capabilities Pledging Conference under France’s Presidency on 20-21 November 2000. The Conference also means that the acceleration of integration in defence matters within the EU does not consent anymore to hold a traditional national standpoint.
The first and initially decisive reason is linked to Britain’s new policy toward the EU in the field of defence. Although the Blair initiative of the summer of 1998 was deliberately launched at the time in an open-ended, indeed vague, fashion, it was extremely precise at heart: capabilities are of the essence, and they must provide Europe with the ability to act in autonomous fashion; only a deep-rooted, broad-based and weighty institution such as the EU can deliver those goods. This is what St-Malo was about. Without this sea change, nothing much would have happened. The discussions within NATO on the Europeanisation of part of the NATO chain of command would have continued in a half-hearted manner, as a consequence of the failure to reach an agreement between France and its integrated partners in 1996-97.
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Tradične bola prioritnou oblasťou v transatlantických vzťahoch vojenská bezpečnosť, ktorej dominovali Spojené štáty americké a ich významný nukleárny potenciál. Od osemdesiatych rokov dochádza k radikálnej zmene v transatlantickom partnerstve v dôsledku zániku sovietsko-americkej bezpečnostnej agendy, štrukturálnych zmien vo svetovej ekonomike, snáh na oboch stranách o prehodnotenie ich vzájomného postavenia a úloh v medzinárodnom systéme s ohľadom na ekonomickú a bezpečnostnú sféru. Súčasné transatlantické vzťahy sa uskutočňujú v prostredí prehlbujúcej sa vzájomnej ekonomickej prepojenosti a posilňovania ekonomickej úlohy Európskej únie (EÚ). Sú charakterizované mnohými prívlastkami „po hegemónii“, „interdependentné“, „multilaterálne“ a „inštitucionalizované“. Transatlantické vzťahy zahŕňajú multilaterálne dohody medzi inštitúciami Spojených štátov a EÚ v oblasti vojenskej (NATO, OBSE), ekonomickej (OECD, G7), obchodnej (GATT/WTO) a menovej (MMF, Svetová banka). Featherstone a Ginsberg tvrdia, že jedným z kľúčových problémov v transatlantickom vzťahu je, či a aká spolupráca je možná v prostredí úplnej vzájomnej závislosti a absencie hegemonického štátu. Zatiaľ čo bezpečnostný imperatív a americká hegemónia v období studenej vojny pomohla zmierňovať vzájomné obchodné spory, koniec studenej vojny prináša rozdielne pohľady partnerov na medzinárodnú bezpečnosť, zahraničnú ekonomickú politiku, a zahraničné záväzky.
Autorka štúdie tvrdí, že zatiaľ čo na čiastkové aspekty translatlantického vzťahu sa môže nazerať z pozície realistických teórií medzinárodných vzťahov, jeho komplexnosť možno najlepšie pochopiť aplikovaním teórií interdependencie a neoliberálneho inštitucionalizmu. Vychádzajúc z tohto tvrdenia, autorka zastáva názor, že transatlantický inštitucionálny rámec pre vzájomnú spoluprácu, ktorý bol vytvorený po druhej svetovej vojne, môže „prežiť“ a rozvíjať sa aj po zániku americkej hegemónie.
Podľa tradičných realistov medzinárodné vzťahy predstavovali boj o moc. Národná bezpečnosť bola videná v úzkom slova zmysle ako vojenská bezpečnosť. Realizmus ako doktrína má svoje počiatky v tridsiatych rokoch a bol dominantnou teóriou na vrchole studenej vojny. Stal sa však menej presvedčivým od obdobia tzv. uvoľnenia alebo „détente“. Túto zmenu výstižne charakterizoval Chris Brown tvrdiac, že medzinárodné diplomaticko-strategické vzťahy mali centrálny význam, keď naozaj išlo o život a smrť, keď sa však pravdepodobnosť vojenského konfliktu znížila, sociálne a najmä ekonomické vzťahy nadobudli na dôležitosti, najmä v súvislosti s prehlbujúcou sa ekonomickou interdependenciou.
Interdependencia vytvára potrebu zvýšenej koordinácie politík, ktorá by mala viesť k väčšej medzinárodnej spolupráci. Keohane tvrdí, že medzinárodná spolupráca sa rozvíja na základe komplementárnych záujmov štátov a je uľahčovaná vytvorenými medzinárodnými inštitúciami s jasnými pravidlami a štandardmi správania, ktoré znižujú neistotu a stabilizujú očakávania štátov. Robert Keohane je predstaviteľom školy neoliberálneho inštitucionalizmu, ktorá je hlavným teoretickým prúdom pri analyzovaní medzinárodných inštitúcií, a kladie dôraz na spoločné záujmy štátov pri vysvetľovaní medzinárodnej spolupráce. Podľa tejto teórie formujú medzinárodné inštitúcie politické vnímanie a hodnotový rámec členských štátov a podnecujú vytváranie spoločných noriem a pravidiel spolupráce. Na druhej strane sa (neo)realistické teórie zameriavajú na mocenské vzťahy medzi štátmi v medzinárodnom systéme a medzinárodnú spoluprácu považujú za prostriedok maximalizácie moci štátu.
Medzinárodné ekonomické prostredie po skončení studenej vojny sa vyznačuje asymetrickým vzťahom medzi ekonomickou a bezpečnostnou sférou vzájomnej spolupráce. V oblasti medzinárodnej bezpečnosti majú Spojené štáty stále dominantnú úlohu, aj v dôsledku nepresvedčivej zahraničnej a bezpečnostnej politiky EÚ. Vzájomná závislosť medzi Spojenými štátmi a EÚ v ekonomickej oblasti je zdrojom početných bilaterálnych sporov, najmä sektorovo špecifických sporov, sporov ohľadom taríf, štandardov, intelektuálneho vlastníctva a exportných subvencií poľnohospodárstvu a pod. V tejto súvislosti sa vytvárajú silné tendencie v smere regionalistických združení a zoskupení (napr. NAFTA alebo rozšírená EÚ), v rámci ktorých môžu Spojené štáty alebo EÚ udržať alebo vybudovať svoje hegemonické postavenie. Regionálne dohody by však mohli byť zdrojom strategickej obchodnej konkurencie, a nie prostriedku rozsiahlejšej multilaterálnej liberalizácie. Aj napriek existencii týchto prejavov regionalistických tendencií vo vzájomnom transatlantickom vzťahu je potrebné zaznamenať značné úsilie oboch partnerov o uzatváranie vzájomných dohôd, ktoré by boli realistické a prínosné pre oboch partnerov a prispeli by rovnakou mierou k stabilite a otvorenosti svetovej ekonomiky.
Tento optimistický empirický vývoj v transatlantickom partnerstve potvrdzuje opodstatnenosť teórií neoliberálneho inštitucionalizmu, ktoré zdôrazňujú dôležitosť medzinárodných inštitúcií pre medzinárodnú a transatlantickú spoluprácu po skončení studenej vojny a dokazujú, že transatlantická ekonomická spolupráca v období po skončení americkej hegemónie v ekonomickej oblasti je možná, a dokonca sa prehĺbila, pretože je založená na presne definovanom a pevne zakotvenom inštitucionálnom rámci pre usporiadanie systémových rozdielov a vzájomných frikcií a sporov. Koalícia EÚ a Spojených štátov spĺňa všetky predpoklady pre zohrávanie vedúcej úlohy v existujúcom multilaterálnom rámci pre medzinárodnú spoluprácu s cieľom jeho rozšírenia a prehĺbenia.
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Transatlantický obchodný dialóg (TABD) je súčasťou širokej agendy americko-európskych vzťahov zastrešovaných tzv. Novou transatlantickou agendou (NTA), začatou v roku 1995 (November, Seville). Bilaterálne hospodárske vzťahy USA a EÚ predstavujú takmer 50 percentný podiel svetového obchodu, transatlantický tok obchodu a investícií sa pohybuje denne vo výške zhruba 1 mld. USD. Európa a USA sú tradičnými partnermi v presadzovaní zmien v globálnom obchodnom systéme.
TABD predstavuje úspech vzájomnej hospodárskej spolupráce USA a EÚ. Spočíva v komunikácii vládneho a súkromného sektora, ktorý vyúsťuje do liberalizovanej legislatívy a budovania tzv. Nového transatlantického trhu. Je cielený na elimináciu obchodných bariér a na prispievanie do procesu liberalizácie svetového obchodu. Prelomom vo vývoji TABD bolo podpísanie dohôd o vzájomnom uznávaní testov a certifikátov v oblasti telekomunikácií, farmaceutických výrobkov a elektrotechnickej výroby (1997). Novými výzvami TABD sú o. i. oblasti, ako je elektronický obchod prispievajúci k vytvoreniu predvídateľného legislatívneho prostredia a ku konštruktívnemu dialógu vláda – súkromný sektor. TABD, na ktorom participujú významné ekonomické subjekty na oboch stranách Atlantiku, pracuje v štyroch pracovných skupinách:
Aj napriek úspechom TABD existujú určité prekážky pri jeho ďalšom rozvoji, ako je existencia dvoch rozdielnych regulačných systémov v USA a EÚ; rezistencia k zmenám v inštitucionálnom zabezpečovaní harmonizácie regulačných politík (certifikácia, štandardizácia a pod.); riadenie ľudských zdrojov (expertíza); politické aspekty prehlbovania TABD (záujem napr. odborárskych asociácií a i.); požiadavky environmentálnych združení, záujmových skupín zameraných na dodržiavanie pracovných štandardov a ich obavy z rýchlosti progresu TABD; politická vôľa vlád oboch strán aplikovať doporučenia TABD. Tieto by sa mali stať východiskom pre budúcnosť TABD v smere a) ďalšieho presadzovania obchodnej expanzie v transatlantickom kontexte a v kontexte globálnom; b) konštruktívnosti k požiadavkám amerických a európskych firiem; c) kompatibilnosti so starými cieľmi spotrebiteľov a odborárskych záujmov; d) umocňovania cieľov americkej a európskej zahraničnej politiky.
Ďalším rozvinutím TABD je tzv. Transatlantické ekonomické partnerstvo (TEP) iniciované na EÚ – U.S. summite v Londýne v roku 1998. TEP smeruje k rozpracovaniu niektorých záverov a doporučení TABD v oblasti liberalizácie obchodu tovarov, služieb, poľnohospodárskych výrobkov. Rozširuje TABD o dialóg s mimovládnymi subjektami, parlamentnou komunitou a vládnymi organizáciami.
V období po skončení studenej vojny – prijatím troch krajín regiónu strednej a východnej Európy do NATO a intenzifikáciou prístupového procesu kandidátskych krajín do EÚ – stáva sa aktuálnou otázkou potenciálne rozšírenie TABD i o nové demokratické trhové hospodárstva. Dôvodom k tomuto kroku je i postavenie amerických hospodárskych záujmov, ktoré sa dostávajú do polohy diskriminačnej v dôsledku existencie preferenčných zmlúv s EÚ.
TABD dokázal počas existencie svoju opodstatnenosť – je optimálnou metódou nachádzania kompromisov a konsenzu než tradičné negociácie vlád jednotlivých krajín. Má potenciál produkovať zmluvy, ktoré sú stabilnejšie a politicky dlhodobejšie udržateľné. TABD je dôkazom efektívnosti prístupu z „dola-hore“, z úrovne podnikateľskej ku vládnej. TABD je dnes modelom efektívnosti a akcieschopnosti. Eliminácia bariér vzájomného obchodu a jeho liberalizácia evidentne vedú k zvyšovaniu exportu, vyššiemu hospodárskemu rastu a vytváraniu pracovných príležitostí na oboch stranách Atlantiku. TABD je „win-win“ riešením pre všetky na ňom participujúce zložky. Jeho neoceniteľným prínosom je zblíženie politík súkromného a vládneho sektora a stanovovanie spoločných priorít.
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Canada is neither the most powerful nor the most influential player in transatlantic economic relations. But Canada’s open economy, based on foreign markets, makes it necessary for the second largest country in the world to enter into bilateral and multilateral relations more actively than its partners, whether that means the existing NAFTA free trade zone; the FTAA – which is in the early stages of negotiation — or the as-yet theoretical TAFTA free trade zone. From this viewpoint, the development of Canadian-European cooperation is interesting and inspiring with regard to both wider regional interdependence and globalization of world trade.
The reality of the trade relations between Canada and the European Union is documented in this essay with concrete information on mutual trade and investment. The interpretation of these figures can sometimes differ, also because of differing statistical methods of Canada and the European Union. No matter from which sketchy model we use to value the economic indicators, the dynamic of the Canada-EU trade does not reflect the current growth of both economies. For Canada, the most disturbing things are two realities – a trade deficit with the EU, and a continually declining share of the EU market. Opinions vary on both sides as to whether this state of things would be affected positively within bilateral or multilateral agreements in the form of a TAFTA trans-Atlantic free trade zone. The fact is that the theme of TAFTA concerns politicians of the EU and Canada incomparably less than do numerous and ongoing trade disputes.
Mutual trade between Canada and the EU should have in the past 10 years theoretically benefited from the implementation of the World Trade Organization agreements. In reality, it is obstructed by customs barriers, and circumscribed by new technical standards and technical limitations, as well as sanitary and environmental conditions. The result is a long list of goods whose trade conditions have been discussed for years with little progress. This essay brings out several well-known chronic disputes. More closely discussed are the examples of trade in asbestos and beef. The truth is that no trade relations are without conflict. Marginal disputes do not contribute to good relations between Canada and the EU and have even wider effects, such as for example, hampering the chances of getting agreements on the very basics of treaties.
A basic treaty is the determining factor in economic relations. This essay discusses three significant moments in treaty relations – the failure of Canada’s concept of trilateralism, Canada’s lagging behind the USA, and the effective development of relations between Mexico and the EU. Canada’s attempt at trilateral accessibility (EU, Canada, USA) began in the early 1990s. However, it ran into US lack of interest and a lukewarm EU position. The USA preferred individual access to the EU and in 1995 signed an Action Plan with the EU and in 1998 signed the TEP, both without Canadian participation. Canada was thus forced to proceed individually. Its treaty relations with the EU lagged behind the US steps – in 1996 it made a Political Declaration and at the end of 1998 singed the ECTI.
The different circumstances of EU trade relations to the three NAFTA states were confirmed by the conclusion of a free trade zone (MEFTA) between Mexico and the EU, which came into effect in July 2000. It should be emphasized that the negotiations of the EU with Mexico touched mostly on simply reducing high tariff barriers, while this is not a case in EU-Canada negotiations. The signing of the MEFTA agreement is therefore not an argument for the necessity of a TAFTA.
What then is the general perspective of TAFTA in Canada-EU relations? From the EU viewpoint, globalization of trade would be more acceptable and more effective than bilateral or regional agreements with North America. For the EU, the new round of negotiations of the WTO next year could contribute to the development of trans-Atlantic relations. Even Canada feels its interests lie more with the Western Hemisphere than with the other side of the Atlantic. Contributing to this feeling was its failure at trilateralization, the half-hearted stand of the EU towards TAFTA, and conflicts in trade relations.
The current priorities of the EU and Canada indicate that it is not realistic to expect any dramatic changes in their trade relations. On the contrary, it is more probable that there will be a slow and progressive growth in trans-Atlantic economic relations, which could be helped by inter-governmental negotiations within the ECTI framework and the CERT business initiative. Or in other words, – the words of Canada’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy – “Europe should gradually re-discover Canada, and vice-versa“.
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1. For the time being the theme of transatlantic relations starts to be more and more popular in Slovakia. Meanwhile the discussion develops most of all on expert level, it is also starting to spread among common citizens who do not get in touch with foreign policy so often. This discussion is conditioned mostly by the effort of the Slovak Republic to admittance to the North Atlantic Alliance which is the most explicit institution representing these relations. However it is the matter of a much larger area than the Alliance covers. That is why the aim of this reflection is not to name and evaluate all aspects of the transatlantic cooperation and their meaning for Slovakia. That would require not only a larger space for the presentation but also a much deeper and thorough analysis. Because of this only some ideas will be presented in this reflection, those that will complete a present-day discussion in Slovakia.
2. Enlargement of the Alliance is still an important political agenda for Central and East European countries. Even though some countries raise voices that it is more important to concentrate on integration in the EU, Slovakia does not consider its effort for membership in EU and NATO as a priority of one over the other. Slovakia sees the priorities as equal that are to be achieved in the shortest possible period of time. That is the reason why the challenges of prioritisation of one area over another mean the challenge for resignation to one of them. Ever getting stronger interest of Austrian representatives in approaching the Alliance and in a future perspective also a membership of the country in the Alliance demonstrates the importance of the transatlantic integration. Even though on the one hand it is hard to imagine that the Alliance would tolerate an act of aggression on an EU member country, on the other hand the Alliance membership enables a country to organise its defence more effectively along with taking part in intense creation of an European security system and exerting influence upon the direction of international politics.
3. Development of ESDP is an important factor that nowadays explicitly influences the transatlantic relations. Although meanwhile it represents mostly a crisis management system, EU should also become an organisation of a collective defence by a possible take over of the Article 5 of the “Treaty on WEU” to EU, e.g. in relation to the so called enhanced cooperation. Many facts (e.g. the enduring leadership of the USA in the field of security technology or the unwillingness of European countries to increase defence expenses) testify that NATO is going to remain the primary institution to cap the collective defence in Europe.
4. On the one hand, the enlargement of NATO has mainly represented and still represents a guarantee towards great-power ambitions of Russia because of the presence of the USA in the Alliance. It is obvious that these countries unwillingly listen to the argument that it is not necessary to enlarge the Alliance because of stirring Russia. Their conception considers Russia as the reason for the enlargement of the Alliance. On the other hand, we should endeavour to positively develop the relationship NATO-Russia, where the candidate countries may play a role. Such countries must have an effort to convince Russia that the enlargement of the Alliance does not mean displacement of Russia on the periphery of Europe but that enlargement is in Russia’s long-term interest.
5. In connection to the possible next wave it is said that the enlargement will demand at least one strong European supporter. However the European representatives are waiting for the outcome of presidential elections in the USA. Both presidential candidates support the enlargement of the Alliance; therefore waiting for the outcome is not proper if the European members are interested in enlargement.
6. In the USA enlargement of the Alliance means the embodiment of an idea of “Europe democratic and undivided” and “Europe whole and free”. However in Western Europe, the institution number 1 in unifying is the European Union. This is the source of different views of European and American representatives on the importance of the Alliance in unifying Europe.
7. Slovakia as a candidate country has to manage with many challenges. First of the challenges is the relationship to Russia where transparency is laid on the basis. In connection to this transparency, it would be desirable to convince Russia that our membership in the Alliance will not be an obstacle for a bilaterally advantageous and also transparent cooperation. It would mean a definite confirmation of a fact that Russia has reconciled itself with a membership of the Slovak Republic in the Alliance. At the same time it would refute the strongest argument of the opponents of the enlargement. The second problem is the relationship between EBOP and NATO. Slovakia must as strongly support the development of EBOP, as it supports the abidance of EBOP in a transatlantic framework. This is the way that Slovakia as a candidate country can contribute to the development of a European security and at the same time to its own one.
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This article deals with external relations of the European Union (EU). The author defines EU’s external relations as the area of international co-operations and common foreign and security policy. The commercial international law, communitarian law and the law of the 1st and 2nd EU pillars frame external relations.
The author draws our attention to the fact that the legal subjectivity of these all three European communities is based on the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.
According to consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (“Amsterdam Treaty”) the EU is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
The structure of the EU foreign relations is following:
– Relations with the overseas countries and territories; relations within the European Economic Area, including relations with the EFTA countries; relations with countries of Central and Eastern Europe; relations with the Mediterranean countries; relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries; relations with the new independent states of the former Soviet Union; relations with the United States and Canada; relations with Latin American countries; relations with Iceland and Norway; relations with the OSCE; relations with Japan and finally with the Slovak Republic.
In the conclusion the author states that a whole set of international institutions is aimed to the only goal – to the maintenance of a peace and security in Europe as well as in the world. The same aim is following by the European Union.
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Európska bezpečnostná a obranná politika – edičná poznámka
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