Electronic Library of Scientific Literature
Vol. IX / No 3 / 2000
ŠTÚDIE, ANALÝZY - STUDIES, ANALYSIS
3 Alexander Duleba
Rusko na začiatku Putinovej éry: príchod k moci a prvé mesiace vlády
Russia on the Beginning of Putin-Era: Seizure of Power and First Months of Government
29 Vatanjar Saidovič Jagja
Rusko v Spoločenstve nezávislých štátov v podmienkach globalizácie svetovej ekonomiky a politiky
Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States in the Process of Globalization of World’s Economy and Politics
42 Karel Hirman
Problémy energetiky majú kľúčové postavenie v ruskej ekonomike a politike
Issues of Power Engineering Have the Key Position in Russia’s Economy and Politics
57 Svetozár Krno
Ruské politické strany po parlamentných a prezidentských voľbách
Russian Political Parties after the Parliamentary and the Presidential Elections
ÚVAHY, ROZPRAVY, ROZHOVORY - REFLECTIONS, TRANSACTIONS, INTERVIEWS
74 Dmitri Trenin
Europe’s Eastern March
Európsky pochod na východ
81 Konstantin Konstantinovič Chudolej
Rusko na hranici tisícročia
Russia on the Millennium Frontier
93 Alexander Georgievič Akseňonok
Zahraničná politika Ruska v novom tisícročí
Foreign Policy of Russia in the New Millennium
DOKUMENTY, PRAMENE - DOCUMENTS, SOURCES
99 National Security Concept of the Russian Federation
Koncepcia národnej bezpečnosti Ruskej federácie
119 Peter Juza
Andrej Fadin: Tretí Rím v treťom svete
121 Jaroslav Straka
D. Nováčková, D. Futej, M. Geistlinger, V. Kunová, C. Cressati, R. Zahoráková, P. Komorník: Európska integrácia od Ríma cez Maastricht po Amsterdam
124 Júlia Hurná
Výjazdové zasadnutie Podvýboru Parlamentného zhromaždenia NATO pre Strednú a Východnú Európu
July 6, 1999, Boris Yelcin:
After the elections in Russia a new power will appear. Young, dynamic, with new ideas about state… Such a power I will relegate my competencies, as we keep saying, with a light heart. It will be the first time in the history of Russia, when power is consigned not by a revolution, but in a constitutional, civilized way. All this did not happen by chance, it was a hard work and my administration is dealing with this issue already today.
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin without an alternative
There is an interesting point to notice about the presidential elections in Russia, first of all is the fact that the result was known already before the first round (March 26, 2000) started. We were witnesses far more of the monarchical act of power inheritance than of a free, transparent competition in fair elections characteristic to democratic regimes.
During the last ten years the Russians went to vote nine times: they elected the parliament for four times, (1990, 1993, 1995, 1999), two times they elected the President (1991, 1996), and three times they decided important issues of public interest in referendum (March 1991, April 1993, December 1993). As a result of frequent elections the Russian Public Relations Agencies perfected their electoral technologies to world’s best ones, the official power taught the citizens to ”vote as necessary”.
The electoral college was not deciding between the personalities of the candidates, their programmes, but between the peace and the war. They had to decide in such a way that they did not need to be afraid. Similar, as in 1996, in big elections of 1999 – 2000 (parliamentary elections 1999 and presidential elections 2000), the main incentive of the campaigne was fear – this time of terrorism from Chechnya.
The war in Chechnya and growth of Vladimir Putin’s preferences
The name of Vladimir Putin was not very popular before August 1999. In August he was designated by B. Yelcin for the Prime Minister and Russian army begun a successful operation against Chechnyan terrorists in Dagestan. According to the news about the success on the Caucasian front the popularity of the Prime Minister Putin was growing. The Russians felt that a new imperator came, who will protect them from terrorists, a successful one, categorical, intelligent, cold – blooded, and so on. Some two months before elections, held on 19th December 1999, a new political subject was created, called Unity (Medved), which nearly won the election. Noteworthy is the fact, that Putin and the new political party won the competition and sympathy of the voters without articulating a coherent political or economical programme.
In January 2000 the growth of Putin’s preferences achieved its maximum and stagnated. The Commander of Russian Armed Forces in Chechnya wanted to stop peacemaking operations and planned peacekeeping operations and preparatory work for the fight in mountains in the spring. The Kremlin gave another command, with the explanation, the electoral campaigne was not over and has to be feeded with successful activities from Chechnya.
On January 21st 2000 the results of the investigation of the VCIOM agency (All Russia Centre for Public Opinion) showed, that the reservations of the Russian population against the government of Vladimir Putin are increasing. In December 1999 100 per cent of respondents signalised that they understood and agreed with the activities of the army in Chechnya, but in January 10 per cent stated that they did not understand the army in Chechnya anymore, 16 per cent said that the government was corrupted, what only 4 per cent thought in December 1999. Number of people, thinking that the government would be able to stop increase of prices and decrease of real incomes, grew up from 28 per cent in December 1999 to 35 per cent in January 2000. Putin started to make mistakes and his image suffered under first splits, but his advantage against other candidates was too big.
Putin without an economic programme
Putin was not engaged in economic issues very much, he even did not state anything concrete about economy. His most important statement before elections in this field was the decision to introduce an obligation for all exporters to sell 100 per cent of yields in foreign currency to the Central Bank beginning from February 1st, 2000. Naturally, the exporters, mainly the oil and gas exporting companies, did not like the idea and a couple of days after this statement leviathan of Russian business visited Putin and convinced him of the opposite.
In another words, already before the election was clear, that, first, Putin was not unerring, secondly, that he is not very tough in economy, so he never would be an ”khoziayin”, and thirdly, but most important, that he can be influenced, and is ready to get persuaded.
Putin, as the Russian Prime Minister for the first time, did not take part in the International Economic Forum in Davos, February 2000, not only because he had nothing to say. Negotiations in Davos had a special panel discussion dedicated to Russian corruption and many Russian oligarchs of the Yelcin – era would get arrested when entering Switzerland, that is why they ignored the meeting and confined also Putin to the negotiations. The Attorney General Juriy Skuratov, who initiated prosecuting for just suspicion of defrauding state money of approximately 800 high level representants of Russian economy and politics, confirmed in a interview for the Moscow News in January 2000 Putin’s role in the obstruction of the investigations. It was first of all former chief of the Federal Security Service Vladimir Putin together with the chief of the Office of the President Alexander Volosin, who stopped the dangerous Skuratov in the first half of the year 1999.
Nevertheless, the year 1999 is considered to be the most successful one from the economical aspect. Experts estimated an increasing Gross Domestic Product of 0,5-1,9 per cent for the first time and the inflation achieved only 40 per cent against the prediction of 80-200 per cent. The experts stated three main reasons for this development: clever economic policy of Primakov’s government, (September 1998-May 1999), positive results of the devaluation of Rubel after the financial crisis in August 1998 and high prices of crude oil at world markets that were kept during the whole period of 1999 thank to the cartel agreement of OPEC.
The weakest side of the 2000 – budget is the fact, that almost a quarter of the supposed costs are to be covered from foreign credits. In the first three months of the year 2000 Russia should pay 3 billions USD to foreign bonds and if the negotiations with the London Club are not successful, further 5 billion USD in the next couple of months. Russia has to borrow more than 8 billion USD if the state budget should be kept, or negotiate successfully and postpone the instalments.
The expectations of the Russian society and separation from Yelcin’s regime
In April 2000 81 per cent of Russian population shared the opinion that the absolute priority was to create order, also on account of violating democratic principles and restriction of fundamental freedoms and human rights. How long will Putin be ruling, and with whom? Will he have time enough to realize political and economic changes? The Federation Council (the upper house of the Parliament) recalled Juriy Skuratov from the office of Attorney General on April 19, 2000 on the proposal of Vladimir Putin. After the ratification of START II agreement in the Russian Duma this was the second greatest parliamentary victory of Vladimir Putin. The public has to forget, that the creator of order and the man who militates against the corruption came to power first of all thank to his previous fight against the combatants of corruption. Skuratov had to go so the period of amnesia could begin. The case started in autumn 1998, when on behalf of the then Prime Minister Jevgeniy Primakov an investigation was initiated of several hundreds cases of corruption and criminal activity connected to abuse of authority and means for private purposes. Focusing on non-transparent business activities of Boris Berezovskiy, who made profit from his close relations to Yelcin’s family. The suspicion of corruption in the most famous case of the Mabeteks company aroused not only against the chief of the Economic Section of the presidential administration Pavel Borodin, but also against Yelcin and his two daughters personally. The task to stop Skuratov fall to the chief of presidential administration Alexander Volosin and Vladimir Putin, the Chief of the Federal Security Service and Secretary of the Security Council. The Moscow Attorney Generalship started investigation of Attorney General without an approval of the Upper House; according to the Russian Federation Constitution only the Federation Council can approve the Attorney General’s prosecution. First rescript signed after an inauguration of Putin on May 7, 2000, was the decree on amnesty and immunity for the former President Boris Yelcin and his family members. In this sense Putin seems to be vulnerable and an easy target for spoliation.
How long and with whom is Putin going to rule
In accordance with the preliminary bill of the constitutional amendment, from the year 2004 upwards Presidents will be elected for the period of 7 years, not four anymore. Putin should rule until 2004 and then win the pools for the next period of 7 years. He does not need to push any substantial economic reforms till 2004, much more it will be a change in the positions and tasks of the state in the economic policy, or, announced creating of order and administrative discipline. Russian economists call this ”using administrative reserves”. This is what Putin understands much better than anything else, economy anyway.
The share of a so-called shadow economy on the entire economy of Russia represents almost 50 per cent. The yearly expenses from the state budget of Russian Federation are approximately 25 billion USD, while yearly exported capital from Russia vary in amount of 15-30 billion USD.
Putin does not need that much for an economic success till the year 2004. It will be enough if he manages to stop the ebb of the capital abroad, to repress the shadow economy, to increase the payment of taxes and this will make him the greatest reformer of the post-soviet period. After the ”aluminium war” of March 2000, that ended successfully for the group of Abramovich-Berezovskiy, the spheres of influence in business seemed to be given for a long-term period and congruent to the allocation of forces.
Who will rule with Putin
There are 5 important interest groups to define: the Putin core – force structures, intelligence agencies represented by the chief of the Federal Security Service Nikolaiy Patrusev, the Secretary of the Security Council of RF Sergey Ivanov, a coordinator of all forces resorts/executive, armed forces and Viktor Ivanov, responsible for personal issues in the presidential administration.
The second group is concentrated around the company of Roman Abramovich-Boris Berezovskiy, that is the continuation of the previous so called The Family, controlling important media systems.
The third group consists of bosses of ”ALFA Group”, a financial group with background of the private banking sector – the first private Bank in Russia – the Alfa Bank.
The fourth group is Gazprom and some other subjects of crude oil and gas industry in Russia.
The fifth group represents Anatoliy Chubays and company – controlling one of the biggest natural monopolies in Russia – RAO JES – Russian power plants.
Last important group – MEDIA MOST around Vladimir Gusinski is currently in disfavour because of its bad strategy in the voting campaigne of 1999, supporting the candidacy of Luzhkov and Primakov.
Putin and the reform of state administration. The end of the regional barons in Russia?
A few days after his inauguration Putin signed a decree, establishing seven federal territories of the state administration. The borderlines of the new territories, each associating approximately 12 subjects of the federation, correspond with the borderlines of the military districts of the Russian Armed Forces.
Alexander Ivanchenko in his analysis together with Vladimir Ryzchkov and Alexey Salmin realized, that Putin’s reform of the political system aims 5 basic strategic goals:
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There is a concept according to which the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was supposed to soften the shock provoked by the breakdown of the Soviet Union. The author, Professor V. Yagya from Sankt-Peterburg tries to turn the readers’ attention to the problem of behaviour and the possibility of survival of an ”unwanted” child of the CIS within the globalization of the world economy and politics.
The author notices that for a long time there has been a principle ”all of them are equal but Russia is more equal”, i. e. more important, in the relations between Moscow and the CIS. It is evident that the Kremlin does not abandon this principle. In the ”Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation” (its full text is published in this magazine – P. J.) it is clearly stated that one of the most important strategic orientations in the field of guaranteeing Russia’s military security is an efficient co-ordination and co-operation with the countries – numbers of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
In forming the CIS, a decisive role was from the beginning played by relations between Moscow and Kiev. Geopolitical thoughts about Moscow are in contradiction with the position of Ukraine. In this respect, the author informs about the new standpoint of the Russian President Putin by which the borders of Russia with other countries are recognized. It is an understandable attitude since in the opposite case the post-Soviet subjects can claim (in more than 2000 cases) their territories.
The author confirms the well-known fact that the CIS countries have entered in various ways to the world economy and international politics. Each time they are separated more and more because there is no core existing that would serve as a unifying factor in their mutual relations. The relations of the most important countries of the world and of global international and regional organizations towards the CIS countries are not equal. Kirghizia joined the WTO but Russia and other CIS countries are making efforts to become members of the WTO without success. With UN support, Turkmenistan declared itself neutral but Russia is trying to put it in practice – by all means – in the ideas of the Agreement on Collective Security.
A serious barrier in the profilation of the CIS countries are regional conflicts in the post-Soviet territory in which the ”non-recognized republics” were founded (Abchazia, Transdnestria, Nagornyy Karabakh, South Ossetia). The role of Russia in this cases has always been ambiguous. Dual norms used by Moscow in her relation towards the states on the territories of which these states were formed are negatively reflected in destinies of the CIS countries.
Russia’s authority has been weakened by the war in Chechnya, unleashed at the end of summer 1999. Not by far all the leaders of the CIS countries, not talking about the public, understand the position of Russia in the conflict with North Caucasus. There is an opinion that due to this conflict ”a crime is committed against the CIS” and that ”Russia proceeds to a policy of neoimperialism”.
In his essay, the author is of the opinion that Russia can maintain and strengthen its position only through an active participation in the CIS, changing thus this Commonwealth to a flourishing regional organization. Only than the (popular) Russian idea of a multipolar world will come true.
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Stagnation of the economic reforms in the second half of the 90s caused the creation of a virtual economy, based on goods exchange. An extensive credit insolvency of individual economic subjects was reflected also in the diminished income of the state budget. Viktor Chernomyrdin’s cabinet tried to solve this problem by new emissions of state guaranteed securities in foreign currency, bearing increasing interests. In 1997-1998 world oil and gas prices sunk, what decreased markedly the income in foreign currency of Russia. All these matters contributed first to the recall of V. Chernomyrdin from the post of the Prime Minister in the spring of 1998 and followingly to the outbreak of a financial crisis in August 1998. Russian state was not able to pay and cover its obligations and Russian rubel was devalued three times in a month. The increasing insolvency and feedback of the financial crisis handicapped also the key sector of Russian economy – power engineering. Russian oil companies and gas concern Gazprom very shortly restricted investments into the mining and opening new sources. This was recorded in a very negative way in 1999, when Russian economy begun to grow moderate. The limitation of electricity and gas delivery in the first half of 2000 interposed already also the central regions of Russia. President V. Putin is aware of the fact, that if he wants to prevent Russia of next default in the horizon of the year 2003, when the next larger parts of foreign credits are payable, and prevent Russian power engineering, economy and the whole state from collapse, he must renew financial flows to the economy. Sources of real money are to be obtained in the most rapid and easy way directly from the export of oil and gas, that is why he has to restrain the economic power and political influence of owners of the corporations – Russian oligarchs.
The energetic crisis has an impact also on Russian foreign policy, Moscow will compensate the decreased Russian sources exploitation by import from the countries of Central Asia, first of all Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. At the same time it strengthens its influence in the Caspian region and inhibits the building of alternative oil ducts and gas lines, that could transport the exploited raw materials to the European and world markets without any contact with the Russian territory. By the oil and gas export the Russian companies with the support of Russian Government will try to eliminate losses resulting from the increasing transit fees in Ukraine and from illegal quartering of the transported raw materials on Ukrainian territory. As long as Russia does not obtain the direct control about the transit network in Ukraine, it will try to build up alternative routes through Belarus. On the market of Central and East Europe Moscow will keep its current status of the main supplier of the energetic raw materials. The defense of Russian oil and gas companies interests has to become a priority of Russian foreign policy, like V. Putin said, under the condition, that the realization of their plans corresponds with the geostrategic interests of the country.
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Post-communist Russia faces the formidable task of rebuilding its political system and institutions. Modernisation is a difficult process under any circumstances, involving profound changes of social values, mechanism and practice.
Post-soviet countries in the former Soviet Union have not managed to restore a system of political parties characteristic for the era before the communist party monopoly. Restoration of the so-called historical parties has been unsuccessful. The situation is complicated by many post-communist residua as well as by some Russian particularities. It is possible to identify this system of factors influencing current political life in Russia: too large territory without the appropriate communication possibilities, poor economy, the phenomenon of big-power and imperial feelings, cultural and historical preferences for a strong leader – extreme power centralism, traditionally accepted by the public. For example, the ruling elite in Russia was traditionally gathered around the ”czar” who used to decide and stabilize the competition among princely clans to gain his favour, political and economic advantage.
Analogically, the political competition was centred on the Yelcin's ”court”. He avoided identifying himself with any single faction, and instead of that he balanced ministers, business tycoons and security chiefs, who, in the absence of the rules of political competition, were in perpetual competition with one another because of his favour. The ties between the members of the ”court” and the society at large are minimal, as before 1917. Yelcin's ”divide and rule” strategy fostered oligarchic infighting and inconsistent policy, but enhanced his authority. There are not many differences during Putin's presidency.
Within this cultural framework, the continuity of the current political establishment with the more dynamic and adaptable fragments of the old Soviet administrative elite is the central fact of Russian politics. The Soviet system ended, not because of a revolution from below, but because the portions of ”the nomenclatura” decided to abandon the old ruling institutions and formally embraced a market democracy. Today this small oligarchy of the political leaders, bankers, media tycoons, industrialists and bureaucrats (often called the ”party of power”) dominates the ”commanding heights” of Russia’s politics and economy.
Parliamentary elections in Russia have not had decisive, crucial consequences because of the weak competencies of the State Duma. Unlike the Western democracies, the president or the prime minister designate is under no obligation to hand out portfolio to the most influential parties.
The so-called superpresidency, a constitutional system providing for an extraordinarily strong chief executive, a weak national legislature, and partially developed judiciary, dominates the Russian politics at the national level. The president is in charge of the foreign and defence policy. The president, subject the Duma confirmation, appoints the Prime Minister. If the Duma rejects the president's nominees for the Prime Minister for three times or if it votes no confidence in the government on its own initiative (twice within three months) the president can dissolve the Duma, can appoint a new Prime Minister and call the new parliamentary elections.
The polls show that people are not interested in political topics very much. The assessments of the inhabitants' interest in political issues are following: the group, that shows the highest interest, is intelligentsia, the second place is reserved for civil servants and the third are senior citizens. Under average we can find groups of workers and students. Russian women are usually apolitical, though Women of Russia is a women parliamentary party.
The legislature, the Federal Assembly (Russian Parliament), is divided into two chambers, the upper Federation Council and the lower State Duma. The two houses meet separately, but may hold joint closed meetings. The Federation Council, created to represent Russia's regions, has 178 deputies, two from each of Russia's 89 federation subjects. One of the members is the locally elected executive head. The other is the head of the regional legislature, elected by regional deputies.
The State Duma consists of 450 seats and is elected through two types of mandates: a party-list vote, in which 225 seats are divided among the parties that reach a 5 per cent vote barrier. Remaining 225 seats are shared by single-member constituencies on a first-past-the-post basis. Deputies serve 4-year terms.
105 members of the Parliament, elected in 1999, declared their political independence. One of the largest parliamentary factions in the current Duma is ”The Russia’s Regions”. This is not a group representing the co-ordinated position of the regions, but a collection of deputies with no political allegiance other then to the constituency in which they were elected. This is partly because the rule, reserving half of the seats in the Duma to the parties on the list vote has not succeeded yet in its purpose of encouraging the development of a multi-party political system in Russia. Moreover, there is one particularity of Russia parliamentary and presidential elections - the possibility to vote for “against all” (protiw vsekh).
The Parties and the movements have gained 120 seats. CPRF (Communist Party of Russian Federation, leader - G. Zyuganov) with its 46 seats was the most successful. It is the best placed, having inherited much of the Soviet Communist Party organisation. Both the LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, leader - V. Zhirinovskiy) and the Yabloko (G. Yavlinskiy) have regional structures, but the former is likely to fade together with its leader, while the latter has not yet developed the strength in numbers that would make it a decisive political force.
The political subjects are created mainly on the personal principle. The Russian liberal anti-authoritative block – Yabloko is the example. The declared orientation and the programme are usually secondary.
Strong personalisation and the principle of a leader in the policy on the regional as well as central level are connected with frequent re-groupment of forces, changes in structure of parliamentary clubs and with weak transparency of parties, which frequently take the form of purpose-built groups.
The author has mapped in details four relevant basic political directions, that always gained seats in the Parliament – i.e. the power party, liberals, communist left wing with its allies and nationalists. The current system is dominated by the ”party of power”, i.e. the ruling post-communist establishment. The presidency has an enormous power in the system. What does the ”party of power” mean? It is not a formal political party, although some political groupings and parties may be regarded as belonging to it. The party most closely linked with ”party of power” is ”Our Home is Russia” – Nash Dom Rassia (NDR), headed by the former Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin. The ”party of power” is a collection of groupings and individuals, who all benefit from the political and economic changes that have taken place since 1991.
The first glance at results of the last parliamentary elections (December 1999) can keep up appearances that the traditional political directions are present in Russia – the right (nationalist and civic), the centre (right, liberal and left) and the radical left. However, the point is that the political parties (except of the communists) have no clear programme and value orientation, no distinct profile. Voters often prefer personal groups connected with economic corporations.
The article offers charts with detail figures, that show the whole spectrum of Russian political scene.
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Najdôležitejšou vývojovou tendenciou v Európe v období po skončení studenej vojny je pozvoľný, ale jednoznačný pohyb euroatlantických inštitúcií smerom na východ. Krajiny ležiace medzi Nemeckom a Ruskom, známe z obdobia medzi dvoma svetovými vojnami ako Zwischeneuropa, štyridsať uplynulých rokov sféra sovietskeho vplyvu, sa definitívne priklonili k Západu. Úspešnejšie krajiny tohto regiónu sa pripoja k novodobému Západu skôr, kým ostatné budú musieť čakať veľmi dlhú dobu, poprípade ostať v dohľadnej dobe mimo expandovaných hraníc EÚ či NATO.
Tento uhol pohľadu prináša nasledovné otázniky:
Ašpirujúce krajiny predpokladajú, že členstvo v EÚ a NATO bude pre ne znamenať v prvom rade stabilitu a prosperitu. Skôr, ako by dôsledky približovania namiesto očakávaného prospechu mali negatívny dopad na budúcnosť spomínaných krajín, bolo by dobré, aby analyzovali proces transformácie, ktorou prešlo bývalé Východné Nemecko. Prirodzene, žiadna východoeurópska krajina nemôže rátať s takou mierou podpory, akú poskytla novým spolkovým krajinám nemecká spolková vláda.
Condicio sine qua non rozšírenia EÚ je v prvom rade vnútorná reforma, ktorá z ruskej perspektívy bude pripomínať matriošku s bohatšími krajinami “Eurolandu” v srdci útvaru a chudobnejšími krajinami bývalého východného bloku na jeho periférii. Pravdepodobný je i vznik rôznych stupňov integrácie, v závislosti od ochoty jednotlivých krajín postúpiť časť svojej suverenity, ako aj od ich ekonomickej spôsobilosti.
Rozširovanie Severoatlantickej aliancie je tiež spojené s novou víziou Aliancie. Stále ešte nie je definitívne ujasnené, či sa bude zaoberať udržiavaním mieru, stability a spravodlivosti v európskom bezpečnostnom priestore, alebo globálne obhajovať záujmy Západu kdekoľvek vo svete. Členstvo v NATO je inštitucionálne menej komplikované, ale takisto vyžaduje podstatné investície a tiež radikálne zmeny v samotnej podstate obranných mechanizmov jednotlivých krajín.
Problémy pri transformácii spomínaných krajín majú charakter dlhodobej domácej nestability, ako aj akútnych konfliktov. Estónsko a Lotyšsko, ekonomicky úspešné, so správne orientovanou zahraničnou politikou, podstupujú riziko rozpoltenej spoločnosti, pretože temer tretina obyvateľstva s trvalým bydliskom na ich teritóriu je de facto, v zmysle štátnej príslušnosti, cudzincami. Táto situácia sa pravdepodobne v dohľadnom čase nezmení a ostane zdrojom potenciálnej vnútornej nestability v spomínaných krajinách. Budúcnosť Bieloruska je takisto neistá. Predbežne bude ďalej existovať ako nezávislý štát, jeho Únia s Ruskom je viac alianciou ako fúziou. Nekompromisné autoritárske režimy tiež nie sú nevyhnutne stabilné a Alexander Lukašenko mal problémy komunikovať aj s umiernenou opozíciou, nieto s radikálmi, ktorí ostro kritizovali jeho neschopnosť pristúpiť na akýkoľvek kompromis. Väčšina bieloruskej populácie ostáva politicky pasívna, ale očakávané ekonomické zhoršenie istotne prinesie nepokoje v širších vrstvách obyvateľstva. Posilnenie protimoskovskej bieloruskej opozície by bolo zo strany ruskej vlády považované za kardinálne ohrozenie. Iným potenciálnym konfliktom je trojuholníkový konflikt medzi ukrajinskými autoritami, ruskou majoritou a krymskou tatárskou menšinou, ktorá sa neustále zväčšuje. Spor o majetkové práva je založený na historickej situácii, ktorá pretrváva od roku 1944, keď boli Tatári vyhnaní do Strednej Ázie. V prípade, že by konflikt prepukol do väčších rozmerov, postihne Rusko, ale aj Turecko a Západ. Problematický vývoj je tiež charakteristický pre Moldavsko, Ukrajinu a Rusko. Moldavsko ako “transdnesterský” kvázištát je čiernou dierou, ktorá poskytuje útočisko kriminálnikom, obchodníkom so zbraňami a pašerákom.
Ukrajina je napriek čiastočným riešeniam najzložitejší prípad. Prvých desať rokov od svojho osamostatnenia síce prežila bez väčšieho konfliktu v rámci svojich hraníc alebo v ich tesnej blízkosti, ale ekonomická transformácia krajiny prebieha ešte pomalšie ako v Rusku. Podobne pomaly napreduje budovanie demokratických inštitúcií. Najpozitívnejšou alternatívou budúceho vývoja je balansovanie na pokraji kolapsu a v prvom rade nezávislosť od Ruskej federácie.
Rusko nebude schopné zapojiť sa do európskych a transatlantických štruktúr ešte niekoľko generácií, aj keby chcelo. Problémy Ruska sa líšia od problémov ostatných krajín. Cieľ stať sa politicky, ekonomicky, právne a sociálne “európskejšou” krajinou je v prvom rade cieľom vnútropolitickým, a nie métou zahraničnej politiky štátu. Cieľom zahraničnej politiky Ruska je stať sa krajinou kompatibilnou s krajinami EÚ. Východoeurópsky pochod EÚ bude rozhodne náročnejší, ako bolo teoreticky naplánované, a, paradoxne, krajiny Západu budú zrejme miestami v krajinách Východu spôsobovať svojimi aktivitami nestabilitu a deštrukciu, ba dokonca aj hrozbu. To znamená, že krajiny inkriminovaného regiónu budú musieť vyvinúť spôsob riešenia konfliktov, ktorý bude pre všetky krajiny progresívny, a nebudú stavať jednotlivé štáty oproti ostatným do pozície rivalov.
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Rusko na hranici tisícročia
Russia on the Millennium Frontier
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Zahraničná politika Ruska v novom tisícročí
Foreign Policy of Russia in the New Millennium
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National Security Concept of the Russian Federation
Koncepcia národnej bezpečnosti Ruskej federácie
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